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The Strategic Management of the Special Constabulary in 2018 
The central contention of this thesis is that the recent budgetary cuts and 
associated developments within policing in the UK challenge the historically 
voluntary nature of the Special Constabulary. This thesis developed the existing 
literature which has focused almost exclusively upon the regular paid police 
officers engagement with the policing frontline by the extensive examination of 
Special Constabulary recruitment, retention, training, duties and deployments, 
leadership, relationship with paid officers and changes associated with the 
budgetary cuts. The role of citizens within policing is nothing new; however recent 
economic necessity and paid workforce reductions mean the use of unpaid 
volunteers in providing policing services has substantially increased and has 
been widely promoted by police leadership and government.  
Drawing upon numerous semi-structured interviews with serving members of the 
Special Constabulary across four police forces within England and Wales; 
members of three Police and Crime Commissions, representatives of the National 
Crime Agency, the South West Police Federation, the Home Office, Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabularies and high ranking paid police officers, this thesis 
highlights how the role of the Special Constabulary has changed substantially in 
the last eight years. The interplay between police leadership and Government 
messages of the Special Constabulary being a supplementary rather than 
replacement force, the everyday operational accounts of Special Constables are 
in stark contrast. Increasingly used as frontline response officers without 
adequate training or supervision, this raises critical debate about the position of 
police as policing experts, when unpaid, volunteers with limited training are 
fulfilling the same role. To use a voluntary force in a reservist capacity amounts 
to a misuse of these volunteers with inherent risks and vulnerabilities being 
exposed. This thesis concludes by critically exploring the future of this voluntary 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
The public police within the United Kingdom have long been an area of productive 
and extensive academic research investigating and uncovering the day to day 
realities, experiences and cultural meanings of police work, offering valuable 
contributions to the broader literature of the social sciences (e.g. Holdaway, 1983; 
Reiner, 2000; Rowe, 2014). Despite the extensive research on the public police 
providing cultural insights and contributions, this thesis recognised that there was 
an area with the little academic examination, offering a broad scope for further 
analysis and methodological progress, the Special Constabulary. The re-
emergence of this police workforce, the Special Constabulary and the role of the 
citizen within policing has been driven predominantly by economic necessity 
created by financial constraints have implications for policing effectiveness, 
efficiency and legitimacy (e.g. Bullock, 2014; Britton & Callender, 2016). The 
majority of existing research directly examining the experiences of the Special 
Constables have been mostly historical (e.g. Seth, 1961; Mawby & Gill, 1990; 
Leon, 1991; Mirrlees-Black & Bryon, 1994; Gaston & Alexander, 2001). There 
has been some additional research investigating their motivations for joining and 
leaving (e.g. NPIA, 2010; Strickland & Lalic, 2010; Whittle, 2014) and the role of 
employer-based support for Special Constables (see Smith & Rankin, 1999; Millie 
& Jacobson, 2002). Some academic commentators such as Millie and Bullock 
(2013), Bullock (2015) and Callender and Britton (2016) emerged during the 
completion of this thesis, supporting the argument raised by this researcher, that 
the Special Constable is not only a topic of academic value but of relevance within 
contemporary policing. Through the interrogation of the existing literature and 
research, the originality of this thesis contributes to the advancement of 
knowledge by focusing upon the experiences of these voluntary officers during a 
period of fiscal constraint and adaptation, and exclusively reconsidering the 
underpinning premise of them structurally continuing as a voluntary unpaid police 
workforce within the context of modern policing.  
Why Now? 
Today the modern police forces bear little resemblance to the idyllic image of the 
British “bobby” from the so-called “golden years” of the 1950s walking around 
their local communities (e.g. Cooke, 2005). Instead, officers are now dressed in 
all black, military-style uniforms with stab vests, responding to calls in high 
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powered cars and carrying equipment for different levels of force, which for some 
officers includes tasers and firearms. The development of individual radios, 
means that police officers are no longer independent while out on patrol instead 
being viewed as agents of central authorities and leadership (e.g. Monjardet, 
2000). Modern policing is once again evolving in response to external influences, 
the most significant being the financial constraints impacting upon all aspects of 
the police organisation themselves and therefore policing in the 21st century.  
The United Kingdom entered a period of the economic crisis created 
predominantly be the financial banking recession in 2008 (e.g. Valdez & 
Molyneux, 2015) forming wide-scale public sector funding reductions and 
constrictions (e.g. Gravelle & Rogers, 2009). As a consequence of these 
constrictions, in 2010 the Liberal-Conservative coalition Government of the time 
outlined their Comprehensive Spending Review which announced a twenty per 
cent reduction in central government funding for all public police forces (Home 
Office, 2010). Before this, the public police have enjoyed a long period of 
unprecedented increases to their funding (Kirkup, 2008b), creating little incentive 
for self-analysis or review of internal processes, procedures and demands. The 
ongoing financial challenge created by austerity has impacted meaningfully upon 
the availability of policing resource and in turn upon the delivery of policing on a 
local, national and international level (Gravelle & Rogers, 2009). Fiscal constraint 
and contraction are the usual although debatable responses or remedy to the 
financial crisis (e.g. Davidson, 2009; Krugman, 2012). These austerity measures 
have not affected the public police in insolation, as all associated public sector 
and voluntary organisations operating within the criminal justice system also face 
similar financial difficulties and constraints (Butler, 2008). This systematic 
difficulty, in turn, has created new pressures upon demands for services and 
solutions to societal issues. Police forces ability to develop long-term strategic 
plans will impact their ability to cope with demands for service and to continue to 
provide the current levels of policing services expected by the public.  
Throughout the history of the Special Constabulary, the protection of the police 
frontline reactive resources has been a priority for both the public and police 
themselves and a clear justification for the development of the Specials as an 
additional operational policing resource (Leon, 1991). The link between wide-
scale use of volunteers for cost savings initiatives is controversial often viewed 
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with cynicism by the regular paid police forces as a threat to full time policing jobs, 
positions and the availability of overtime pay. Indeed members of the paid police 
forces have long stressed that the only role of volunteers within policing should 
be one of complement, not a replacement (e.g. COI, 2001). Within the criminal 
justice system, there has long been a “…deep seated suspicion that volunteering 
is really about job substitution” (Neuberger, 2009, p.10) and previous attempts to 
recruit large numbers of Specials have been abandoned due to vocal opposition 
from the paid police force (e.g. Gravelle & Rogers, 2009). At various times 
throughout history, the Police Federation, the union for the paid police force, has 
vocally called for the disbandment of the Special Constabulary. However since 
2010 and the effects of austerity measures the NPIA (the National Policing 
Improvement Agency) argued that the Special Constabulary is a highly cost-
effective workforce, a view supported by ACPO (Association of Chief Police 
Officers) who stated that the voluntary force “…is embedded within the police 
service providing efficient and effective policing to support achievement of force 
priorities” (ACPO, 2011, p.7). Larson et al. (2008) furthered this dialogue by 
stating that the use of voluntary police officers and citizens has become 
increasingly important as the national funds are reduced, and there is an ever 
greater need for the more effective use of taxpayer’s money.  
Research Aims and Objectives 
This thesis sought to address the following research question: 
What role should the Special Constabulary take within contemporary policing?  
To answer this research question, the research within this thesis addressed the 
following objectives: 
(1) To critically explore the influence of austerity upon the nature of the roles, 
deployments and experiences of the Special Constabulary. 
(2) To critically examine the relationship between the Special Constabulary 
and paid police forces, and in doing so, to explore the issues surrounding 
Specials recruitment, retention, leadership, feelings of being valued and 
training.  
(3) To develop an insight into the future trajectory of the Special Constabulary 
and their position within the wider policing organisation.  
(4) To critically examine whether the voluntary nature of the Special 
Constabulary is still appropriate in the context of modern-day policing.  
The thesis’s contribution to the existing policing literature is through enhancing 
the broader understanding of the role that the Special Constabulary currently 
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perform and the potential role they could play within policing, during a period of 
fiscal constraint. The findings from this study have implications for both policing 
literature, policy and practitioners whose approaches and organisational 
decisions impacting upon the voluntary workforce. The ability of these voluntary 
unpaid officers to be an effective policing service could have a significant impact 
upon the provision of the policing service to the public and the public’s 
perceptions of the police as they become utilised more as a policing resource.  
Methodology 
This section provides a reflexive account of the chosen methodology and various 
research processes adopted for this study. Drawing upon the limited previous 
research carried out on the Special Constabulary, in particular, the research 
conducted by Gill and Mawby (1990) as one of the most comprehensive studies 
into the voluntary workforce at the time.  
Access to the Police 
One of the most substantial barriers to police research has been obtaining access 
to the police as an organisation (e.g. Weatheritt, 1986) and despite improvements 
in the relationship between the police and academic organisations, the police 
remain primarily closed to “outsiders” (e.g. Brown, 1996). Some researchers such 
as Duke (2002) have argued that that governmental organisations and institutions 
deliberately make it difficult for researchers to obtain access as they are reluctant 
to be the subject of scrutiny with certain topics being of a sensitive and 
controversial nature. There are formal procedures through which research must 
go through to obtain forces permission to proceed (e.g. Reiner & Newburn, 2008). 
Without the co-operation of the police research within this area is almost 
impossible due to their ability to remove access to data and officers. (e.g. 
Holdaway, 1989). This need for co-operation and permission means that 
research often emerges through pre-existing relationships that academics and 
officers have within those types of organisations which can be beneficial for 
obtaining access (e.g. Duke, 2002) something which was utilised for this research 
also. Reiner (2000) argued that the majority of police research is outsider 
research with continuing problems with achieving and maintaining formal access 
often dependent upon the subject matter and the political landscape at that 
present time. Reiner (2000) also suggested that although forces have displayed 
an increasing openness to researchers, the results have tended to be of a 
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“…pragmatic kind, governed by the overriding goal of crime reduction” (p.220). 
Some research acknowledged the effects of the police occupational culture, 
especially regarding the group solidarity that it fosters and the “hazards faced by 
whistleblowers” such as the cold shoulder treatment (Chan, 1996, p.121). Chan 
(2006) argues that this means that it is potentially difficult to get any answers 
outside that of the occupational accepted group norms. Loftus (2009) also 
indicated that the police are particularly cautious about allowing researchers in to 
observe and document police-public relations and encounters, and found even 
greater resistance if the study was equipped with a digital Dictaphone, an effect 
encountered with this current study as well. This cynaism means that as Reiner 
(2000) concluded that most studies are merely the “replication of the classic 
observational studies of routine police work”(Reiner, 2000, p.225-6) rather than 
genuinely uncovering the nature of police work and experiences. These 
observation level studies have contributed to the number of researchers 
immersing themselves some way into the police, such as those involved in the 
police culture, e.g. ethnographic research or being police officers themselves. 
Reiner (2010) also categorised five stages of policing research within the UK: 
consensus in the 1960s (where studies were celebratory of policing); controversy 
in the 1970s (studies were critical); conflict emerging in the late 1970s; the 
contradictory stage of the late 1980s (involving new realism) and a final fifth stage 
of crime control. Indeed historically as Perry et al. (2016) pointed out most 
researchers, practitioners and policymakers worked separately from each other, 
and it is only recently that various academics have focused upon building 
effective collaborations with the police (e.g. Fleming, 2012; Wood et al. 2008).  
Evidence-based policy and practice have become a dominant discourse within 
policing in the UK (Lumsden & Goode, 2018) coinciding with the broader rhetoric 
for the professionalisation of policing, the financial challenges to policing post-
2008 and the changing nature of crime. Evidence-based policing and the What 
Work’s movement has seen the development of a dialogue between the police 
and academic institutions. Evidence-based policing has been promoted as the 
use of research, evaluation, analysis and scientific processes within law 
enforcement decision making (Lum & Koper, 2015) and has been gaining 
momentum since the early 1990s (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006). The approach 
emerged from the medical industry, spreading across education, management 
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and social care before moving into policing and criminal justice over the last 
decade (Lumsden & Goode, 2018). This approach means that various crime 
types, interventions, tactics and internal management structures are being 
analysed and evaluated through academic means. A key figure in the 
establishment of evidence-based policing as an approach and term is Dr 
Lawrence Sherman, who posited in a 1998 speech Ideas in American Policing 
(p.2) that “police practices should be based on scientific evidence about what 
works best”. Sherman (1998) mainly focused upon the utilisation of results of 
scientific evaluations of law enforcement strategies and tactics to guide their 
decision making, and secondly upon generating and applying analytic knowledge 
from their analysis of their internal issues and crime problems.  
The College of Policing, established in 2011, builds upon this change in the 
relationship between academic and policing organisations. The professional body 
of policing within the UK, the College of Policing has the task of providing an 
authoritative voice on policing aiming to achieve chartered status. The College of 
Policing has been presented with the mandate of setting the standards to the 
professional development of the police including codes of practice, regulations 
and to set the standards on training, development, skills and qualifications. 
Therefore the College is at the forefront of this recent derive for an evidence-
based approach to policing, and are the hosts to the What Works Centre for 
Crime Reduction which involved the collaboration of academics and a university 
consortium, coordinating and commissioning research. As part of this, the 
College has also created regional university networks, between various academic 
organisations and police forces, resulting in a fundamental change in the 
relationship between the two institutions.  
This thesis argues that the Special Constabulary need to be included within this 
evidence-based approach and that there is a current and relevant need for 
research into their role and position within policing, with reviews of how and if 
they can meet the contemporary demands of policing in the UK. Indeed Sherman 
(2011) emphasised the importance of this type of approach stating that “…it is 
therefore essential that our society constantly improves the competence of its 
police not merely with our opinions, but primarily with facts derived from objective 
knowledge”. By adopting this approach towards the Special, Constabulary could 
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potentially provide rewards for forces as harmful or ineffective policies could be 
discarded saving time, money and risk (Lum & Koper, 2015).  
Methodological Choices 
Traditional police research has a long history of utilising ethnographic studies as 
the method allowed researchers to “…observe, participate in and come to 
understand the social work (they are) studying from the vantage points of as 
many persons who belong to it as possible” (Fox, 2004, p.234). Some of the most 
significant work employing this research method, including Herbert (1997); Chan 
et al. (2003); Wakefield (2003) and Marks (2004). These studies include 
participant observations, historical archives, textual analysis of official documents 
with focus groups, oral histories and recorded interviews (e.g. Shore, 2000, p.7-
11) while other studies went for the “total immersion” approach such as that used 
by Goffman (1989) or Brewer (2000). More recently however in line with the 
evidence-based policing strategy, the majority of police literature is based upon 
quantitative survey or secondary data analysis (e.g. Verriale et al., 2007) with 
some still placing emphasis on observational methods for data collection (e.g. 
Rhodes, 2002, 2005; Bevir & Rhodes, 2006). Verriale et al. (2007) argued that 
police research had become increasingly focused upon the formation and 
administration of managerial policies within the police with other researchers 
such as Flemign and Lafferty (2000) viewing the police as a business or corporate 
entity.  
The study within this thesis is based upon a situative program which while not 
itself a distinct theory but a collection of theoretical approaches with an aim to 
investigate knowledge within its natural context by examining the occupational 
environment as well as the social environment in the study of philosophy or 
experiences (e.g. Jarvela, 2001; Greeno, 2006; Lobato, 2006; Jarvela et al., 
2010). This approach argues that human learning is a complex phenomenon and 
that the social values and contexts in which experiences are obtained all play a 
role (Jarvela, 2001, p.3). Due to the nature of the knowledge needed to answer 
the proposed research question for this study, qualitative methods were chosen 
as the techniques focus on obtaining an awareness of lived experiences, listening 
and understanding while allowing participants the space to voice their own 
opinions and experiences (e.g. Pope & Mays, 1995). Qualitative research 
methods have a long history in the social sciences, and the focus of this study is 
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to understand the perceptions of Special Constables about their role in policing 
during this broader context of austerity and drawing inferences about their 
continuation as an unpaid voluntary police force. Mason (2002) outlined three 
principles to qualitative research; firstly that it is interpretive (concerned with how 
the social world is interpreted, understood, experienced or produced). Secondly 
that it is less structured, relating the data to the context in which it was collected 
while affording a degree of flexibility not provided by more fixed methods such as 
surveys (Mason, 2002). Thirdly that qualitative research aimed to produce data 
in-depth, and this requires content analysis rather than statistical (ibid).  
Qualitative interviewing is a technique in which the interaction between 
researcher and participant assists with the generation of knowledge about the 
social world, and for the context for this thesis, it was essential to explore the 
perceptions of Special Constables in depth. An active interviewing approach was 
taken as this took into account how the information was given and the manner in 
which the interviewees respond, rather than just looking at what had been said 
(e.g. Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Rabionet, 2011). This thesis, therefore, adopted 
qualitative interviews methods as the most appropriate method and providing the 
opportunity to investigate the underlying meanings and a more in-depth 
understanding of Special Constables experiences and opinions (e.g. Miller & 
Glassner, 1997; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). These qualitative interviews covered 
the key themes selected to answer the overarching question by obtaining an 
understanding of the meaning that Special Constables attach to their experiences 
to uncover the complexities of policing within austerity. Semi-structured 
interviews were employed since they were advantageous for acquiring an in-
depth knowledge of the critical topics while still having the flexibility in the 
questions asked and allows the conversation to be focussed on the chosen topics 
(e.g. Holstein & Gubrium, 1997; Barbour & Schostak, 2005). A completely un-
structured interview has the risk of not eliciting the issues or themes most closely 
related to the research question (e.g. Rabionet, 2011). Semi-structured 
interviews were also chosen as they allow for the necessary flexibility for 
questions to be introduced within and following participants responses and the 
opportunity for unanticipated and unsolicited information to be produced in the 
context of a conversation. Davies (2000, p.86) stated that semi-structured 
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interviews demonstrate an awareness of the subjective nature of knowledge and 
treat respondents as individuals with valuable insight.  
The interviews conducted were organised around a schedule or list (see appendix 
A) of various topics which were to be covered within every interview. The specific 
questions or follow up points moved with the flow of the conversation rather than 
being predetermined, leading to the least interruptions possible. The topics that 
were outlined within the schedule included recruitment, training, leadership/rank 
structure and the effect of the budgetary reductions. Before every interview, 
participants were given a brief verbal opening introductory explanation of the 
research, outlining what was being investigated and what the data was going to 
be used for, i.e. a PhD thesis. Participants were then asked to provide verbal and 
written consent that they wished to take part while being informed that 
participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any point, and were 
entitled to answer the questions which they were comfortable. At the end of the 
interview, participants were then thanked for their participation and reminded that 
their data was anonymous and confidential before being provided with the 
researcher's contact details if they had any further questions regarding the study. 
The intention had been to carry out all interviews face to face however due to the 
distances involved across the four police forces involved, combined with 
organising times around participants employment, home life and police duties, 
many of the interviews were conducted over the phone, thus changing the 
dynamics of the conversations.  
Selection of Data Sources and Subjects 
Social research is often carried out with individuals who could be classified as 
vulnerable such as prisoners, victims of crime or children (e.g. Jupp et al., 2000; 
Mauthner, 1997). However, the focus of this study was individuals not classified 
as vulnerable but rather in a position of power in society as warranted police 
officers with sworn powers of a constable. There was an interesting dynamic 
between the researcher and participants in respects to the fact that the 
researcher herself is a Special Constable with approximately twelve years’ 
experience and a ranked position. Participants were informed of this position to 
make sure that individuals did not feel hijacked by that information, and had the 
added advantage that the researcher already understood the dynamics of the 
role, the police jargon and processes. At the same time, this information could 
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have influenced the data collected as individuals may have changed their 
opinions expressed or provided especially regarding leadership although the data 
collected seems diverse enough to suggest that this did not happen.  
Before any individual interviews were organised, the regular Chief Constable for 
each force was approached for permission to contact their Special Constabulary 
for interviews. It should be noted that at the beginning of the research period for 
this study, the Police and Crime Commissioner Office was created meaning that 
for many forces this request was initially pushed aside understandably as Chief 
Constables had to re-apply for their jobs after the PCC’s elections. Therefore 
although permission was granted by all the police forces approached, the delay 
did mean that the interview period took longer than initially planned. 
Nevertheless, the data was gathered from all forces approached for Special 
Constables interviews. The four forces approached were selected mostly through 
the researchers own personal contacts within those forces and through the 
snowball technique (e.g. Atkinson & Flint, 2001). The four forces involved were 
Devon and Cornwall, Avon and Somerset, Dorset and the City of London Special 
Constabulary. Other organisations approached and whom all agreed to assist 
and participate within the study were the Home Office, National Crime Agency, 
Police Federation (South West), Association of Special Chief Officers, HMIC, 
PCC for Devon and Cornwall, PCC for Surrey and PCC for Thames Valley. Only 
one PCC office approached chose not to take part because they were already 
involved in some other academic studies and projects.  
Setting up Interviews 
Once permission had been obtained from the various Chief Constables for the 
Special Constabulary to be approached for interviews, the researcher provided a 
summary of the research and the reasons behind why it was being conducted for 
forces to distribute to their Special Constabularies within their internal 
communication systems. This way, data protection laws were upheld as the 
researcher did not need any access to officers information and provided the 
opportunity to participate in all Specials across the forces. However, it should be 
noted that those who self-selected themselves by coming forward to take part, 
could potentially be those with something to say either positive or negative, and 
does not access those groups who are perhaps more challenging to engage with 
or less willing to come forward.  
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Interviews were then scheduled to be conducted within police stations or public 
places of work at times convenient to the researcher and participants. Interviews 
held within the various other organisations approached to take part were 
organised through various gatekeepers either with key personnel identified or 
contacted by the researcher. These interviews were also held face to face at 
various headquarters or offices around England and Wales. All those who 
participated in the research did so voluntarily, so there has to be some recognition 
that the sample was dependent upon who wanted to join. Self selction means 
that in general, the sample contained more men than females as there were no 
controls over the demographic proportions. However, there was a good mixture 
of varying lengths of service and ranks.  
Ethical Considerations 
Procedural ethics relates to the formal guidelines necessary for carrying out any 
social research (e.g. Guillemin & Gillam 2004) and was obtained via the 
University of Exeter Law Schools ethics committee before any interviews were 
carried out. Obtaining informed consent is a fundamental ethical practice 
demonstrating that participants have volunteered to take part in the research and 
to understand their role within the study. Informed consent was obtained through 
a consent form signed by all participants (see Appendix B). As the interviews 
were not digitally recorded as initially planned as participants were reluctant to 
discuss specific topics on a Dictaphone, the consent to record in that manner was 
not sought. Also essential to all social research is to avoid any repercussions or 
harms being caused to the participants either through the questions themselves 
or through leaked information having the possibility to jeopardise their position 
within their organisations or employment for example (e.g. Williams, 1989). 
Therefore every measure was taken to ensure the confidentiality of all 
participants both during and after the fieldwork was maintained, with all bar the 
researcher herself, being unaware of the individuals taking part, especially in the 
cases where gatekeepers were utilised for recruitment. All interview notes were 
headed under selected numbers used throughout the analysis and writing up 
stages to ensure anonymity. Ranks were removed where necessary due to the 
limited numbers of high ranking officers in certain national positions which would 
undermine their anonymity. The interview data was then stored upon a password 
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protected computer, which in turn was locked away with the researcher being the 
only one with access. 
Collection of Data 
As in most qualitative research approaches, the quality of the data, which in this 
case are the interviews, depends upon the skills of the researcher involved, and 
the participant's willingness to discuss their experiences. The capabilities of the 
interviewer play an essential role in allowing the participants the space to open 
up and to elaborate upon their responses (e.g. Mason, 2002). The researcher for 
this study has carried out multiple interviews previously so was comfortable with 
the data collection fieldwork, although all skill such as these can be further 
developed over time and experiences. The interviews themselves varied in length 
ranging from forty-five minutes to an hour and a half, dependent upon how much 
the participants had to say, the depth they were willing to go into those topics and 
their other commitments for that day. All Special Constables spoken to were very 
willing to take part and welcomed the opportunity to have their opinions collected. 
Participants were relaxed in general, and the interviews themselves took on the 
context of an informal conversation rather than some form of interrogation. While 
the researcher took a relaxed approach regarding the feel of the interview, the 
researcher did decide to dress smartly in a suit to add professionalism and 
respect to the researcher, especially as she has been told at some points that 
she looks particularly young. It should be noted that just because participants 
were willing to take part and discuss various topics through the duration of the 
interviews, this does not necessarily reflect the quality of the data collected with 
some using the experience to air grievances regarding their force. It was, 
therefore, essential to make the role of the academic research clear to clarify that 
this study was not being carried out on behalf of the police although many 
participants hoped that forces would read and reflect upon the various issues and 
topics raised by participants within this thesis. 
Role of the Researcher 
To ensure best practice was maintained, the research process was reflected 
upon, and the impact of the researcher had upon the data generated and 
collected is often unavoidable. Coffey (1990, p.70) argued that difficult decisions 
are made despite the “…physical and bodily, as well as intellectual and 
methodological” immersion in the research site. Research bias is difficult to 
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remove from any piece of research but necessary to recognise. Despite the 
theoretical framework used throughout the analysis stages, the study was 
designed with certain assumptions been made regarding the Special 
Constabulary and the role within policing. These assumptions will have been 
influenced to some degree by the relevant literature and through the researchers 
own personal experiences as a Special Constables herself. Every attempt was 
made to ensure research questions appeared objective yet it is worth noting that 
there were some obvious similarities between the researcher and participants, 
and this baring this has had upon the quality of the data collected. However, a 
strength of these similarities meant that the researcher was able to challenge 
various points and did not need any clarification as to the police processes and 
abbreviations being mentioned.  
Analysis of the Data 
The initial phase of data analysis was the codifying of the interview notes taken 
at the time of the interview into broad categories, which in turn was guided by the 
main topics selected from the existing literature. This stage of coding is regarded 
as deductive, given that the research questions directed the initial coding of the 
data. The main themes were developed from the data examined the definitions, 
perceptions, experiences and responses from the Special Constabulary given the 
main topics outlined. These broad categories were then searched for critical 
concepts and explored any links between the themes, lead to the inductive stage 
of analysis by contextualising the data on a more theoretical level. These themes 
were chosen in order for the findings obtained to be considered in terms of the 
collected information itself rather than by any pre-existing hypotheses. Once this 
broad analysis had been written up, it became apparent that certain key concepts 
and themes were running through the interviews and this was the final data 
transformation stage (e.g. Miles & Huberman, 1994) whereby the analysis moved 
from being descriptive to be more explanatory.  
Some researchers argue that qualitative research and data could be interpreted 
in a theoretically endless number of ways (e.g. Dey, 1993) however this is why 
research biases and the methodological framework of the studies must be 
explicitly referenced (e.g. Chenail, 2011). Research bias, as mentioned in the 
context of this thesis, was also the reason for the author’s interest in the subject 
and awareness of the issues. The researcher's prior experiences and contacts 
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with the police forces meant that there was an overall willingness from both the 
forces and the Special Constabularies themselves to be involved, making the 
recruitment process relatively easily obtained. The researcher’s experiences with 
police activities should not be viewed as a negative impact upon the data, instead 
of resulting in the researcher having a more detailed understanding of the 
pressures, positions and challenges that can arise from being a Special 
Constables. Another issue which occurred during the primary data gathering 
process was the recording of the data. Despite an earlier intention to record all 
interview conducted, the majority of the participants did not wish to be recorded, 
and all were more comfortable about written notes being taken at the time. 
Therefore the quotes may not be as accurate as if they had been transcribed from 
audio recordings; however, they were as close as possible, written down by the 
researcher at the time they were being said. Participants reluctance to be 
recorded does, however, highlight the worry and concern of the Special 
Constables felt in expressing their opinions and experiences, and how forces 
would or may react to the points or positions, they were communicating. These 
concerns suggest that despite relations between the two police workforces 
having improved, there is still a long way to go.  
Thesis Structure 
Chapter two in this thesis provides a historical overview of the Special 
Constabulary tracking their developing from establishment to their modern form. 
By exploring the beginnings of the police and policing within the United Kingdom, 
this chapter describes the evolution of the voluntary police force and their 
historical role within law and order. The chapter also explores the diversity of the 
voluntary forces membership, regarding age, socio-economic background, 
gender and ethnicity. These factors aid in the more in-depth understanding of the 
types of individuals who choose to join the Special Constabulary as volunteers 
as the role is an unusual and demanding type of volunteering imposing strict 
stipulations upon its members.  
Chapter three introduces the historical information and previous literature 
connected to the qualitative research data collected and described later within 
chapter five. These critical themes selected for the study within this thesis include 
the recruitment of Special Constables, retention, ranks and leadership within the 
Special Constabulary and their deployments and duties.  
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Chapter four outlines the key issues and challenges facing policing within the 21st 
century, in particular, the changing nature of policing, recent police reforms are 
all considered in the wider context of the recent financial challenges, and the 
effects of austerity have had upon the police in the UK. The chapter reports on 
how the police have adapted to these various challenges and therefore, how this 
affects the overall role of the Special Constabulary within policing and the 
dangers of continuing as before.  
Chapter five covers the main qualitative findings obtained from the data collected 
during the primary research portion of this project. The interview data covered the 
key themes and topics previously outlined in chapter three. These key themes 
included the recruitment of Special Constables, any retention issues they still 
face, the duties and deployments they are currently fulfilling and any changes 
seen since the budgetary constraints took effect, the relationship between paid 
regular force and voluntary workforce and the use of volunteers within the ranked 
positions.  
The concluding chapter six summaries the research findings and how they relate 
and inform the overall research question in addressing the voluntary nature of the 
Special Constabulary and whether this was still adequate in meeting the 
demands of the role they play within the broader policing context. The chapter 
also addresses the real-world relevance of the research and reflects upon the 





Chapter Two: The Special Constabulary 
This chapter critically analysed the definition of the public police as a public sector 
organisation which is essential as to the context in which the Special 
Constabulary evolved from and in which they are operating today. There is a long 
tradition of citizen participation within law and order in the United Kingdom, and 
within this chapter, the establishment and early history of the Special 
Constabulary will be outlined. Finally, the chapter ends with the demographic and 
underpinnings of the modern day Special Constabulary, the focus of this thesis.  
2.1 The Public Police 
“The civil police is a social organisation created and sustained by political 
processes to enforce dominant conception of public order.” 
(Skolnick, 1972,p.4) 
The public police are defined within the academic literature as the body or 
institution which provides the social concept of policing in turn viewed as a social 
necessity for the maintenance of social order within human society (e.g. Reiner, 
2000). The police, as an institution or organisation, exist in different forms and 
carry out a variety of various social functions within different societies and 
cultures. Legitimately state-sanctioned, the police are formally distributed along 
a hierarchal structure influenced by rank covering a range of core functions within 
the social process of policing (e.g. Atkinson, 2013). The police stand distinct from 
other law and order agencies and organisations in their state-sanctioned power 
to exercise coercive power or violence over the populace (e.g. Mawby, 2003). 
There is a fragility to this legitimate monopoly over the use of force, with money 
breaking down the barrier between private and public interests, blurring the 
distinction between the police and private security, the pluralisation of the policing 
service. Indeed the role of the police within society is often taken for granted by 
both the public and academics. A dominant public sector organisation within the 
United Kingdom, the public contribute significantly to the criminal justice system 
process from attending and recording crime, investigating and processing 
suspects, to preparing cases for court. However, state organised police forces 
are just one modern-day form of policing (Reiner, 2000).  
Indeed more recently, Rowe (2014) argues that there are at least four definitions 
of the police. The first traditional viewpoint is that the police are crime fighters 
enforcing the law, preventing and protecting the public from the crime being 
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committed. The Government consultation document Policing in the 21st Century: 
Reconnecting Police and the People strongly stipulated that this was the core 
function of the public police within the United Kingdom, yet within academic and 
the growing body of evidence-based policing research suggests that this 
definition of the police is far too simple. Various pieces of research have now 
argued that a low percentage of calls to the police are related to crime (e.g. 
Becker & Stephens, 1992, p.2) with Reiner (2000) claiming that this traditional, 
instinctual definition of the public police fuels this law and order myth. There is a 
significant body of empirical work that demonstrates that the police role is far 
more complex than merely seeking to control crime (e.g. Flanagan, 2008). 
Waddington (1993, p.5) acknowledged that it is a “…cliché of police research that 
only a small proportion of public demands on the police are directly and 
unambiguously concerned with crime”. Another viewpoint is to define the police 
by their ability to use force upon the populace when enforcing the law legitimately. 
Bitter (1994) argued that a key message projected is the ability of the police to 
use force to achieve the desired objective and therefore the police are nothing 
more than a social mechanism for distributing situationally justified force in 
society. This viewpoint of the police links to Weber (1918, Politics as a Vocation) 
definition of the state as “…a human community that successfully claims the 
monopoly on the use of legitimate physical force within a certain territory”.  
Others argue that the police should be defined by what they do in practice (e.g. 
Bittner, 1994; Waddington, 2010). The police are often seen today as a generalist 
service providing a multipurpose service to the public (e.g. Monjardet, 2000; 
Bittner, 1970) that than one that is crime-specific both in times of emergency and 
as part of more comprehensive social processes. Police cover everything from 
keeping the peace between family members, dealing with night time economy 
issues, VIP protection, traffic collisions to terrorism. This empirical evidence 
suggests that policing and the police need to be conceptualised on a broader 
spectrum from the 1970s onwards the criminalisation or the “policification” of a 
more extensive range of aspects contained within social policy with the police 
taking on roles previously provided by social or welfare agencies (e.g. Bullock, 
2013; Crawford, 1997; Kemshall & Maguire, 2001). The police could also be 
defined as bureaucrats with Ericson and Haggerty (1997) conceptualising the 
police as knowledge workers in a risk-based society, supplying information about 
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the dangers to other agencies, with multi-agency partnerships, insurance 
companies and financial institutions. Record keeping, form filling public servants 
whose role within the criminal justice system is to provide intelligence and 
information on individuals for courts to decide on both their guilt and risk to 
society. Reiner (2000) argued that there is no way to establish empirically to what 
extent to which these characterised police work in general. 
The final view expressed by Rowe (2014) was that the police could and should 
be understood as the institution that they are, and how that institution fits within 
the wider criminal justice system as a gateway agency. The organisational 
structure of police forces is important to understanding them as it is the formal 
decision-making framework by which jobs tasks are divided and coordinated (e.g. 
Birkinshaw et al., 2002; Markides & Williamson, 1996). The purpose of this 
structure is to make the best use of the organisational resources to achieve the 
organisational goals (e.g. Gottschalk, 2008) explicitly defining that organisation 
through its policies, procedures and objectives. Forces have a command 
structure,  hierarchical rather than a knowledge structure (e.g. Collier et al., 2004). 
A command structure the higher ranking officer is right, resulting in a quasi-
military structure (Kelly, 2005) wherein a knowledge structure the knowledge is 
correct, creating a barrier to innovation and creatively. However, lately, there has 
been a change with the introduction of evidence-based policing approaches 
within forces highlighting the need to challenge current tactics and thoughts with 
regards to policing (College of Policing, What Works, 2018).  
Wechsler and Backoff (1986) outlined that public organisations operate within a 
governmental authority system, rather than a market system seen in the private 
sector. The governmental and therefore political authority system means that 
they must operate and adapt within a relatively complex, multilaterally powered, 
influenced system with bargaining, voting and exchange relationships at work 
(Wechsler & Backoff, 1986). Public organisations also have various external 
influences and variables such as constitutional arrangements, legislative and 
judicial mandates, governmental rules and regulations, client and constituent 
factors and interests (Wechsler & Backoff, 1986). Reviewed within this context, 
the actions of the individual agencies and other organisations transformations 
must be considered in conjunctions to these external influences and factors. 
Gottschalk (2008) also proposed that the police could be viewed both as a 
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bureaucratic and functional organisation with the two elements often working 
against one another. A bureaucratic structure contains a degree of 
standardisation while a function structure seeks to create specialised groups 
such as homicide, drugs and organised crime (Gottschalk, 2008). Such 
structures, therefore, create barriers to inter-organisational knowledge being 
shared (ibid). Any organisation, therefore, is a combination of its various parts, 
with all components being of importance to the effective functioning and efficiency 
of that organisation (e.g. Scott, 2003). Mawby (1990) proposes that the police as 
an organisation can, therefore, be distinguished in terms of their legitimacy, 
structure and function. The structure of the police is based upon features such as 
the level of specialism, codes of practices and functions relating to the 
maintenance of social order, prevention and detection of crimes and criminals, 
and to the extent to which other duties are assigned to the police such as welfare, 
politics as examples. Police organisational structure relates directly to the role of 
the Special Constabulary as a component of the police organisation and their 
importance to the overall effectivity and efficiency of the policing services being 
provided to the public.  
Policing itself is often defined as the social process through which social order is 
maintained although it is not provided by the public police exclusively with law 
and order being produced by an ever-widening body of organisations. Policing, 
in its contemporary form, affects the lives of everyone living in the various states 
and police legitimacy is bound to the relationship between the public and their 
police through the social process of policing. Jones and Newburn (1998) outlined 
that the public or state police are but one of the many individuals and 
organisations that may undertake some policing activities within different 
societies and cultures. Michael Banton (1964, p.1) stated that “A cardinal principle 
for the understanding of police organisation and activity is that the police are only 
one among many agencies of social control”. Others argued that policing in many 
respects has become an attempt to maintain security through surveillance and 
oversight, with the deterrent threat of sanctions and prisons (e.g. Shearing, 1992) 
through various policing activities aimed at preserving this social order (e.g. 
Reiner, 1990). Rowe (2014), however, stated that the purpose of policing is 
political and that it is a means of governance for the city or state to enforce their 
political stance. Waddington (1986) also proposed that policing is essentially 
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reacting to unpredictable demand rather than the pursuit of goals set out in 
advance, making policing principally “unmanageable”. Policing, by its very nature, 
does not lend itself to performance measurements.  
 The literature has long stipulated that the police cannot hold a monopoly over 
policing in modern democratic society and indeed, the pluralisation of policing is 
a much debated and researched topic. This growing contemporary body of law 
and order organisations include those ranging from private police forces such as 
contract security, citizens in a voluntary capacity within existing organisations 
such as the Neighbourhood Watch Schemes, Police Support Volunteers and the 
Special Constabulary, to volunteers in independent schemes outside the public 
services. Most recently, there has been the creation of various “hybrid” policing 
bodies such as Park Constabularies and the Atomic Energy Authority Police 
(Johnston, 1992, p.102). Economic necessity has led to various aspects of the 
policing process being contracted out such as the Highway Agency to deal with 
broken down vehicles and protecting sites of accidents, thus releasing police 
officers from the scenes earlier. In some forces, aspects of the custody process 
have been contracted out to security companies and call centres have also been 
contracted out, with G4S launching UK’s first privately owned and operated police 
custody suites however already in 2012 there was an investigation over a 
prisoners collapse and a crucial record being falsified (e.g. IFSEC Global; 
Guardian, 2013). For many this remit of policing has become far too wide, and 
that the key functions of the police service need to be reviewed for the potential 
for certain aspects to be provided by other, something particularly poignant at 
times of economic constraint (e.g. Bullock, 2013). Given the austerity measures 
and economic constraints, the police are currently facing the more jobs that the 
police could potentially move to other sections of the criminal justice system and 
social process, the better. However, the public services throughout the criminal 
justice system are all experiencing budgetary cuts resulting in many struggling to 
meet the public demands upon them; this is not necessarily possible. Indeed 
there are already signs that police forces are experiencing this with officers taking 
individuals to the hospital as ambulances are unable to respond, and individuals 
with mental health issues being held in police custody due to there being no 
mental health beds available (e.g. Express, 2015; Police Federation, Telegraph, 
2013 etc.).  
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2.2 The Historical Evolution of the Police in England and Wales 
The UK police were never explicitly designed but rather evolved, either as the 
result of a specific policy initiative or as the pragmatic response to changing social 
and economic situations (Reiner, 2000). Reiner (2000) argued that the police 
carry out a special social function stated by Wilson (1993) as the “…function of 
maintaining social control in society”. Within democratic societies, the public 
police is a public social organisation fulfilling this social function with the consent 
of the populace in which it exists, while in many non-democratic countries, the 
police exist as a para-military organisation with close ties to the Government and 
military.  
“Professional police forces, operating within the law, and at the service of the 
citizen, are a hallmark of any decent, peaceful, civilised community.” 
(Ashdown, 2003) 
There are varying police models existing within Europe with some countries 
having a single police force (e.g. Norway and now Scotland) while others have 
more (e.g. Belgian police with two levels: the Federal Police and the Local Police, 
plus those working across Europe, e.g. Europol etc.). Some countries have a 
purely civil police force (e.g. the UK and the Netherlands) while others have both 
a civil and para-military police (e.g. France, Spain, Italy etc.). Waddington (1999) 
expressed the view that the establishment of a police force in the UK was an 
expression of the development of citizenship, as it separated the state’s 
monopoly of force into civil and military realms. The civil force does not confront 
an “enemy” but their fellow citizens, making the police’s position acutely marginal, 
having to exercise coercive authority while retaining at least grudging 
acquiescence from those over whom they use this authority. The public police 
cannot be realistically considered to be independent or isolated from the political 
and social environment in which they operate and therefore when considering 
changes being made to the police as an organisation, the environment and 
context in which these changes are being made must be mentioned. Throughout 
history, the police have been obliged to adapt their structures and resources, both 




Law Enforcement Before the Professional Police Force 
The maintenance of law and order has always been the responsibility of the 
community, tracing back to Alfred the Great during the 9th century, when if an 
individual was found to have committed a crime, then it was the responsibility of 
their family to bring them to justice (Gill and Mawby, 1990). If they failed to comply 
with this obligation, then a local man who was made responsible for law and order 
in the local community could be called upon, and he, in turn, could call upon 
members of the community to help him bring that individual in (ibid). It was not 
until the Anglo-Saxon period that a more formal system of law and order was 
organised, with the creation of Tythings, which was a formal grouping of ten 
households obliged to produce any individuals from those households who had 
committed an offence to court (Gill and Mawby, 1990). These Tythings 
themselves were then overseen by a Hundremen (a formal grouping of ten 
Tythings) formally controlled by the local Sheriff (Critchley, 1987, p.2). The arrival 
of the Normans in 1066 brought about the higher level of formality to this informal 
policing system, introducing the concept of a “constable” although this position 
remained an informal arrangement and nothing like the modern position of a 
constable within policing existing today (Gill and Mawby, 1990). Over time the 
Normans went on to create five tiers of hierarchy within the concept of “constable” 
with the apex of this hierarchy being the Constable of the Baste, working within 
the Royal Court (Gill and Mawby, 1990). The Statue of 1252 then established the 
role of the constable as one of equal authority to that of the local mayors and 
bailiffs (Critichley, 1978, p.5).  
The Statute of Winchester in 1285 saw a fusion of both these Saxon and Norman 
influences bringing about rationalisation and extension of the administration of 
law and order within local areas, confirming the duty and obligation places upon 
all within communities to help maintain the law and arrest any offenders (Gill & 
Mawby, 1990). The Statue of Winchester 1285 also outlined that every sizable 
town had to establish a Night Watch and Parish Constable. The night watch 
consisted of sixteen local unpaid, part-time male members of the community who 
were obliged to patrol the town walls and gates during the night hours. Any 
offenders found during those hours were handed over to the parish constable the 
next day, a vital member of the community who held the post for a year, unpaid 
(Gill & Mawby, 1990). The Statue of 1285 established the requirement for every 
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man to serve their King in the case of foreign force invasion or internal revolt. A 
subsequent Justice of the Peace Act of 1361 led to the creation of the Justices of 
the Peace, who were to enforce the law on the local level alongside the constable. 
Due to these new Justices being drawn exclusively from the higher social circles, 
the position soon becomes more formally aligned to the crown, the Justices 
became seen as superior to the office of constable (ibid). Ultimately this new 
hierarchy led to the parish constable becoming the local law enforcement agents, 
appointed annually to implement the policies of the local Justices (Gill and 
Mawby, 1990). This concept of a part-time constable spread out into the rural 
areas of England, where the principle of the Yeomanry developed and formally 
recognised in 1794 (Emsely, 1983). The Yeomanry were an armed and trained 
local voluntary force which was “…served by tenant farmers and small 
landowners and officered by the landed gentry and aristocracy” (Mather, 1959, 
p.149). They were well received and thought of considered as the “…pinnacles 
of country society” (Emsley, 1983, p.47).  
By the mid-20th century, the police had achieved a level of acceptance within all 
sections of the populations at the centre of the criminal justice system. The public 
police constabularies known today are less than two centuries old. In the UK the 
first established police forces were the City of Glasgow Police back in 1800, 
followed by the Royal Irish Constabulary in 1822. Back in England and Wales, it 
was not until 1829 with the establishment of a professional paid full time 
uniformed police force by Sir Robert Peel, the creator of the Metropolitan Police 
(Shpayer-Makov, 2002). With a long-standing suspicion of the army by the 
English populace, there was open opposition to the creation of a police force, 
who were seen as covert and overt agents of the state (Chapmen, 1970). To 
combat this public suspicion, the police force deliberately disassociated itself 
from the military by making their uniforms blue with top hats and remained 
unarmed but for discreet truncheon (e.g. Reith, 1943; Ascoli, 1979; Waddington, 
2000). In the beginning, officers were predominantly made up of working-class 
labourers due to the physical demands of beat patrol, with gentlemen and 
commissioned officers being actively discouraged from joining by the low level of 
pay, to avoid any taint from the military (Emsely, 1992, p.116). However, several 
reforms to the material benefits of being a police officer opened up the force to 
the lower middle classes (Ewen, 2006). These benefits included sick pay, job 
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security with a socially accepted employer, a guaranteed pension from 1890 and 
improved real wage by the 1920s, all which made the role of the police constable 
highly respected within society. Also noteworthy at the stage of establishment of 
the professional police was for officers to maintain a high moral standing within 
society and therefore stringent rules about behaviour were imposed upon 
officers. These included not being allowed to vote in elections to preserve their 
political impartiality, requiring permission to get married, not being allowed within 
an alehouse unless in the execution of their duty and being duty bound to wear 
their uniform both on and off duty 
(https://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofEngland/Sir-Robert-Peel/). 
The industrial revolution and widespread migration of people towards the major 
cities during the Victorian period, lead to many at the time to view the police as 
agents of the state, created to enforce the working class to conform to middle-
class images of respectability of the time (Storch, 1975). The creation of civil 
society was a common objective in the 19th century uniting the land-owning 
middle classes looking to protect both their social and economic infrastructures 
(Ewen, 2006). Some historians to argue that police forces were created as a 
rational response to rising crime and social disorder during this period of 
industrialisation and urbanisation (Ewen, 2006). Most areas continued to resist 
the implementation of an organised police force, fearing that it would be used to 
arrest opponents of the Government, stop protests and undermine free speech. 
The Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 allowed Borough Councils to organise a 
local police force, but few were eager to implement the law so that by 1837 only 
93 of the 171 boroughs had police forces. By 1840 there was still great disparity 
between different areas of the country with no single style of policing so in 1856 
the Government implemented a system for government inspections, audits and 
regulations for the first time and a County Borough Police Act forced the whole of 
the country to establish police forces, in response to political unrest. After various 
grants and Acts were implemented to merge smaller forces into larger ones 
based on effectiveness and value for money, amalgamations as the result of the 




Today there continues to be no unitary policing body across England and Wales. 
While there has been an international mixture of decentralised and centralised 
models of policing emerging (e.g. Mawby, 1990; Loveday & Reid, 2003), England 
and Wales have retained their decentralised character with each county force 
having its individuality, evolved from its history, geographical and demographical 
differences. Responsibility for policing across England and Wales is held by the 
Home Office while policing within Scotland is the responsibility of the Scottish 
Government. The recent move from eight regional forces into one national force 
within Scotland is an exciting progression in the wake of austerity measures and 
consolidation of resources across the UK police forces. Devon and Cornwall 
Police and Dorset Police are consulting the Government presently as they are 
considering a historical voluntary merger into one force. All current forces are 
mergers of smaller parish constabularies, however, never before have these 
mergers been proposed by the police forces themselves, instead historically 
being the result of governmental county line changes. This merger was offered 
as a possible solution to resource and funding issues (Devon and Cornwall 
Police, 2018 News).  Austerity measures appear to be driving more police forces 
to consider either collaborations and alliances especially with regards to back 
office delivery of service such as call centres but of frontline specialist forces such 
as firearms officers as well.  
“The police alone cannot solve many crime and order problems, but the …in 
partnership with others who have…time, money, expertise, ideas, energy, 
equipment and more, perhaps they can” 
(Kennedy, 1993) 
However, to work in partnerships with other agencies both from the public and 
private sectors, the police would have to give up some of their monopolies over 
law and order issues (a monopoly implied rather than actual), under the umbrella 
of public safety. Within the last decade, there has been a move towards having 
specialised units monopolising certain crimes such as modern slavery, which has 
removed both some of the strength, skill levels and creativity from the 
geographical commands, i.e. at the local, regional common level.  
Accountability and oversight of the public police within the UK is carried out by a 
number of key agencies and organisations. The Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC) oversees the police complaints system within England and 
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Wales, investigating the most serious complaints and allegations of misconduct 
with certain types of incidents being automatically referred to them such as the 
death or serious injury of a person following direct or indirect contact with the 
police. Such incidents included death in police custody, road traffic incidents 
involving police vehicles, firearms incidents where a police firearm has been 
used, restraints and self-defence incidents and any allegation of corruption or 
racism (IPCC, 2018). Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is the 
body with the statutory duty for independently assessing police forces 
performance and activity across England and Wales. HM Inspectors are 
appointed by the Crown, meaning that they are neither employees of the police 
service or government thus remaining impartial. Reporting to Parliament they 
also inspect and regular other policing bodies such as the National Crime Agency. 
A new layer of democratic accountability was recently included with the creation 
of the publicly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) under the Police 
Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, with responsibility to ensure that 
community needs are being met and making sure the police are answerable to 
the communities they serve (Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, 
2018). Therefore PCC’s are involved in setting the police and crime objectives for 
their area and the force budgets and appoint the Chief Constable, with the 
position and power to dismiss them if necessary (ibid).  
Other agencies of significance within policing include the College of Policing 
which was established in 2012 as the professional body for the police service and 
policing. The College of Policing was created to provide a professional framework 
for operational and training standards, professional development and knowledge 
base (College of Policing, 2018). Operating independently from the Government, 
the College of Policing is ultimately striving to be established as a statutory body 
once the necessary legislation is in place (ibid). This move to establish a College 
of Policing could be seen as a shift in providing research and evidential grounds 
and qualifications to the profession of policing with recent moves by forces to 
employ university graduates with direct entry and accelerated promotion 
schemes being introduced (College of Policing, 2018). There are also talks to 
include a policing foundation degree apprenticeships (PCDA) which will be a 
requirement for becoming a police officer both for recruits and those already 
working within forces (ibid).  
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The National Crime Agency is a newly created crime-fighting agency operating 
within the legal framework on Part One of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. The 
NCA consists of police officers and other professionals all working under the 
direction and control of a Director General with functions exercisable on behalf of 
the Crown. The NCA works in partnership with the police and other law 
enforcement organisations both within the UK and Internationally to fight serious 
and organised crime. This agency was included within this research due to their 
recent introduction of Specials within the organisation although while named the 
same, their function within the NCA is not the same as explored further later.  
2.3 Police Occupational Culture 
“Police culture is extremely powerful and overlooking its importance is 
frequently the cause of failed attempts at organisational change.” 
(Police Review, 1994, p.13) 
Police culture has been widely covered within the academic literature and 
includes the attitudes, values and norms created within the organisational 
occupational environment (Reiner, 2000). However, this is but just one of the 
many definitions of police culture with Handy (1993) arguing that culture is 
something perceived and hence not precisely definable. These norms, values 
and attitudes found within this occupational culture are in turn shaped by aspects 
of the polices role within society itself, such as officers isolation from the general 
public through shift patterns and the nature of the incidents to which they respond 
(Klackars, 1985). Not only that but police culture can influence how initiatives and 
reforms are relieved and interpreted by the organisation and individual officers on 
the street (Kiely & Peek, 2002). If the role of the Special Constabulary is to change 
then, it is necessary to consider how they are positioned and operate within this 
entrenched occupational culture as it has implications as to how they are 
deployed and integrated within the wider police force. Historically police forces 
have been viewed as particularly resistant to change due partially to this “…co-
existence of formalised bureaucratic and standardised working practices, with a 
deeply entrenched and pervasive occupational culture” (Fleming & Rhode, 2004). 
Some academics have argued that despite literature based upon the democratic 
mythology and Peelian principle that police officers are citizens in uniform; the 
reality is that they are set apart by the very authority they use (e.g. Bullock, 2015). 
For some this occupational culture and subcultures are deemed necessary for 
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officers to function in a job considered to be dangerous, unpredictable and 
alienating. Manning (1977, p.143) referred to police culture as the “core skills, 
cognitions and affect” that define “good police work” and includes the “…accepted 
practices, rules and principles of conduct that are situationally applied and 
generalised rationale and beliefs (Manning, 1989, p.360). Police culture, 
however, can be functional to the survival of police officers in an occupation 
considered to be unpredictable and alienating. The created bond of solidarity 
“…offers its members reassurance that the other officers will “pull their weight” in 
police work, that they will defend, back up and assist their colleagues when 
confronted by external threats and that they will maintain secrecy in the face of 
external investigations” (Goldsmith, 1990, p.93-4).  
The concept of a police culture originally emerged from the early ethnographical 
studies of routine police work, which uncovered a layer of informal occupational 
norms and values operating under the rigid hierarchical structure of police 
organisations (e.g. Cain, 1973; Manning, 1977; Holdaway, 1983). Researchers 
indicate that police culture includes a distrust and suspicion of the public (e.g. 
Skolnick, 1994; Westley, 1970; Sparrow et a.., 1990); a tendency to assess both 
people and situations in terms of the threat; a lay low and cover your ass 
orientation; a very strong emphasis upon peer loyalty and the law enforcement 
elements of policing (Paoline, 2003). This strong internal loyalty and camaraderie 
are similar to that seen within other disciplined organisations such as the military 
(e.g. Demaan, et al., 2017; Gipson, 2017, etc.). This work-based personality also 
includes a cynical, machismo and conservative political outlook among officers 
(e.g. Skolnick, 1996; Manning, 1989; Reiner, 1992). In general, there is a 
glorification of the action and excitement elements in contrast to the majority of 
routine police work which is often boring, with few jobs involving any arrest (e.g. 
Southgate & Ekblom, 1986; Skogan, 1994; Sykes & Brent, 1983).   
Manning (1977) suggested that the police’s ability prevent crime and induce a 
sense of public wellbeing functions to maintain police officers morale and sense 
of personal efficacy rather than being representative of actual police goals and 
achievements. Waddington (1999) also argued that these publicly expressed 
police attitudes bear little relationship to the privately expressed views of 
individuals bears little relation to the privately expressed opinions of the individual 
officers or their actual behaviour on the street. Instead, many officers 
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demonstrated views in line with those shown in that occupational cultural merely 
for the benefit and approval of fellow officers in their publicly expressed banter 
and frustration, rather than from an actual belief in those stances (Waddington, 
1999). Indeed today it is argued that it is far too simplistic to assume that all police 
officers think alike, that they are all paranoid and intolerant of the public or that 
they are intrinsically opposed to all change (e.g. O’Neill & Mark, 2007). Any 
occupational environment has its own development culture, and when 
investigating any aspect of an organisation and attempts to introduce various 
reforms, this culture needs to be considered.  
It has been argued by some, such as Kakar (1998) and Reiner (1998) that 
uniformed police work is unlike any other type of work, requiring officers to draw 
upon a broad and diverse set of cognitive and physical capabilities.  
“They are very often dealing with very difficult people, those who might be anti-
police, those that are violent, those that are drunk or on drugs and that makes it 
(quality of service) difficult.” 
(Deal & Kennedy, 1982) 
The unique nature of the role is why it is argued that police officers derive a large 
part of their organisational identity from the work that they do and from the 
qualities of the work such as physical demands, unpredictability, and their routine 
exposure to the darker side of human nature. As Westley (1970) argued, the 
police should be investigated “…as a social and occupational group”. However 
the modernisation of the police over the past few centuries (e.g. White, 1972) the 
police have been changed with respect to their role, tactics, supervision, 
procedures, rules and regulations and demographics with a fragmentation 
between new and old styles of police officers, ever more so than before (Haarr, 
1997). It has been argued within the literature that gender balancing within the 
police force was one of the most significant reforms regarding influencing police 
occupational culture (e.g. Benson, 2001) especially regarding aspects such as 
the masochism or hyper-masculinity value systems (e.g. Franklin, 2005). This 
value system values physical strength, aggression, violence, competition and 
dominance highly (e.g. Reiner, 2000; Loftus, 2009, etc.). Officers were 
distinguished through their involvement in hostile confrontation within their 
brotherhood, and this male-dominated culture has often been an obstacle to the 
successful implementation of other policing philosophies such as community 
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policing, as they were viewed as soft and the work of social services (e.g. Sadd 
& Grinc, 1994; Fielding, 1994; Clear & Karp, 1999). The all white and all male 
departments of the 1950s and 1960s have been replaced by every increasingly 
diverse workforce including not only females and minority officers, but openly gay 
and lesbian officers as well (e.g. Sklansky, 2006a). Another change is the number 
of higher educated officers within the workforce (e.g. Carter & Snapp, 1990) 
something to only increase with the strategic plans of the College of Policing. 
As part of new approaches to police management, there was a particularly strong 
drive for “civilisation” accelerated by the Governments refusal at the time to fund 
a bigger workforce when police officers were occupying posts which could 
arguably be more economically filled by civilians (Home Officer, 1983; 1988). This 
drive continued throughout the 1990s as a method of improving the quality and 
cost-effectiveness of the police service as a whole (Mawby, 1988). This resulted 
in civilians, who were once strongly resisted by the police themselves are now 
being unexceptional and present in most police forces (Walker, 2001). This 
increasingly diverse workforce has also seen the police associations becoming 
more like labour unions (Delaney & Feuile, 1987) suggesting that police officers 
sense of identity within the workplace and organisation as a whole is far more 
complex and varied than ever before, with historical work and assumptions made 
about police occupational culture less applicable. With the movement towards 
police professionalism, police solidarity has declined (Conlon, 2004, p.9) with 
ethnographic researchers reporting a marked movement towards 
“…segmentation and division”(Haar, 1997, p.66; National Research Council, 
2004, p.80-82). Mobilising this increasingly diverse workforce is essential as it is 
the workforce which provides the police service on the street to the public, and 
the drive to win the hearts and minds of their local communities (Skogan & 
Hartnett, 1997).  
Philosophies such as community policing have historically not been regarded as 
real police work with cultural research arguing that officers focus mainly on the 
crime-fighting activities of police work (e.g. Kelling & Kliesmet, 1996; Sparrow et 
al., 1990; Van Maanen, 1974) with the notion of fighting crime and locking up 
criminals remaining central to the idea of good policing (Holdaway, 1989). 
Militarism (Benson, 2001) has often been found within the police service, referring 
to the changing equipment and uniform worn by officers. Police research has long 
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indicated the symbolic power of the police uniform (e.g. Bickman, 1974a; Young, 
1999) of power and authority (Cooke, 2005). This visibility of the British police 
officer has long become linked socially to security and reassurance, a point 
utilised by forces to argue for the protection of the police visible frontline.  
Another significant aspect of police culture has been a sense of mission (Reiner, 
1992), a mission to serve the public so that the police are “…there to help, no 
matter who or what the problem is…” (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). While it would be 
understood of a member of the public ran away from a fight, a police officer could 
be condemned for leaving another in need. Reiner (1992, p.112) argued that 
police officers regard their work as a mission as it “..reflected in their sense of 
themselves as “the thin blue line” performing an essential role in safeguarding 
social order which could lead to disastrous consequences if their authority was 
threatened”. Chan (1996) also argued that changing police culture requires 
changes to the field of both management and street-level decisions. McConville 
et al. (1991,p.193) questioned the utility of law reforms as a method of changing 
police practice since the occupational subculture of the police appeared to resist 
any change and suggested that to change police practice, an attack on police 
occupational culture would be necessary.  
The development, transmission and maintenance of police culture are related to 
the demands and nature of police work itself (Reiner, 1992,p. 109). Indeed for 
some academics police culture works as a collective construction of social reality, 
ideas and theories employed by officers to make sense of their social and 
physical reality (Sackman, 1991, p.21). Officers, therefore, play an interpretive 
and active role in shaping this culture, influencing their understanding of both the 
organisation and the environment in which they work (Sharing & Ericson, 1991). 
Skolnick (1966) proposed that police officers need to be understood as craftsmen 
rather than bureaucrats as they develop skills from their social environment and 
experiences, learning from their colleagues’ practices around them. Westley 
(1970) also believed that the key to understanding the police is to investigate 
them as a social and occupational group, united by their work. In particular the 
bond of solidary between officers “…offers its members reassurance that the 
other officers will “pull their weight” in police work, that they will defend, back up 
and assist their colleagues when confronted by external threats and that they will 
maintain secrecy in the face of external investigations” (Goldsmith, 1990, p.93-
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94). As Rowe (2007) argued it is the officers at the street level, carrying out their 
day to day duties, who exercise considerable discretion meaning that their 
informal working rules can subvert or even obstruct various police reforms 
(Reiner, 1992,p. 231-2). Chatterton (1979) supported this view by finding that 
constables created their structure of “real policing” and displayed a level of 
autonomy regarding how they interpreted their beat and police duties. This “real 
police work” was the subject of exaggerated stories and bravado among officers 
(Kiely &Peek, 2002). The more officers identify with their peers rather than the 
organisational rules and policies, the more this could occur. Punch (1983) 
suggested that police culture has its primary allegiance, not to the organisation, 
but the job and peer group.  
Organisational culture can operate as an anchor during times of wide-scale 
change (e.g. Lewin, 1951) while dysfunctional cultures are often the catalysts for 
these changes (e.g. Osborne & Gaebles, 1992). Police culture, in particular, has 
long been successful in resisting and defeating attempts to implement changes 
and has contributed to longstanding criticisms of the public police being 
ineffective, inefficient and insensitive to changes (Chan, 1999). Public sector 
agencies regularly face cycles of planning and goal setting with little time to 
implement much of these plans (e.g. Wechsler & Backoff, 1986). The police 
service as an organisation operates within a hierarchical structure, yet there is 
operational discretion at the lower levels, with a response reactive rather than 
strategic, functional viewpoint making it considerably different to other agencies 
within the public sector regarding their inter rank culture (e.g. Savage & 
Leishman, 1996). The public sector has more complex goals and is strictly 
influenced by the political environment and faces continuous accountability and 
increasingly fragmented authority over the allocation of money and resources 
(e.g. Alford, 1995).  Police occupational culture therefore often refers to street 
level cop culture, rather than management cop culture (Reuss-Ianni & Ianni, 
1983) and the practices resulting from the interaction between the socio-political 
context of police work and the various dimensions of police organisations 
knowledge (Chan, 1996). The persistence of police culture can be a serious 
obstacle to any reform or change (Chan, 1996). Cop culture (Reiner, 1999) does 
vary from force to force, shaped by that forces particular crimes and diversity of 
those communities. These subcultures have shown remarkable tenacity to 
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remain, despite various reforms and reorganisation of patrol work (e.g. Holdaway, 
1983). Police culture is not entirely negative however and should be considered 
an essential function to the survival of police officers in an occupational 
considered particularly unpredictable and uncertain (e.g. Symonds, 1970; 
Schaible & Gecas, 2010).  
Research indicates that “…overtime and in the main, cops tend to think like other 
cops” (Conlon, 2004, p.320) and this aspect may have held the police back from 
being as inventive and innovative as it could be in the face of organisational 
change and restructuring. Beck and Wilson (1997) reported a long-lasting 
destructive effect of the socialisation process within police culture where recruits 
are paired with older, experienced, more cynical officers, resulting in their “minds 
being dyed blue”(O’Neill & Marks, 2007). In a follow-up study, Beck and Wilson 
(2000) reported a degenerative nature to police commitment essentially meaning 
that the longer an officer services, their strength of identification and involvement 
within the organisation decreases (e.g. Mowday et al., 1982; O’Rilly & Chatman, 
1986). In contrast, Shearing and Ericson (1991) argued that rather than being 
socialised into and guided by the police cultural aspect of their work activities 
police officers are constructing and making references to the culture as a guide 
to their actions. Corresponding with this ongoing drive for police professionalism, 
police solidarity declined (e.g. Conlon, 2004), with ethnographic researchers 
reporting a marked movement towards “…segmentation and division” (Haar, 
1997, p.66; National Research Council, 2004). Mobilising this diverse workforce 
is increasingly important as it is the frontline staff who delivers the policing 
service, and the fact that much of police work, relies on this localised street level 
of officers gathering intelligence (Goldstein, 1990). When the police forces are 
making decisions, the lower ranks should have a mechanism for input, as it will 
be these officers who ultimately need to win the hearts and minds of their local 
communities (e.g. Skogan & Hartnett, 1997).  
Police culture remains an inherently strong thread within the police as an 
organisation and one that has to be considered when looking at the integration 
and relationship between the Special Constabulary and their regular colleagues. 
Resistant to some degree to change, police culture has long held the police back 
in marketplace terms in efficiency and effectiveness but a the same time creating 
a professional environment in which members belong to robust, hardworking and 
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loyal teams. The Special Constabulary is in a unique position of having the same 
powers and duties as regular officers but not being regular officers who are 
immersed within the culture, the Specials remain as outsiders. Some Special 
Constables as Mawby and Gill (1990) reported absorbed the police culture with 
respects to its language, dress code and attitude, but essentially they do this on 
a part-time basis, coming in and out of it, working within their other occupational 
culture and family life. The fact that the Special Constabulary cannot join the 
unions such as the Police Federation which protects officers from outsiders and 
external threats, this is another way in how they are not truly immersed or 
members of the same organisation. The lack of union support for volunteer police 
officers is something discussed in more detail later within this thesis, as another 
example of how the Special Constabulary could be better integrated within the 
police organisation and culture.  
2.4 The Role of the Citizen within Policing 
“Country’s social problems are well beyond the ability of the police to 
deal with on their own” 
(Webber, 1990) 
The Special Constabulary is not the only group of volunteers operating within the 
criminal justice system or even within the police service themselves. There is a 
long tradition of public participation in maintaining local peace and order as old 
as English Common Law. In recent years across most Western-style democratic 
countries, there has been a general shift in responsibility for crime prevention and 
justice from the State to citizens (Uhnoo & Lofstrand, 2017). The effective 
participation of volunteers in government, public and the non-profit sectors are 
essential issues within democratic governments (e.g. Choudhury, 2010; Vigoda, 
2002). Local crime prevention partnerships between the public police and their 
communities have now become common (e.g. Garland, 1996; Crawford & Lister, 
2007) alongside the growing pluralisation of policing with a variety and mixture of 
public, private and voluntary actors engaging in policing activities (e.g. Loader, 
2000; Rogers, 2017). Rhetoric and focus remain upon the paid regular police 
force, leading to the role of the volunteers within this extended policing family 
being little scrutinised (e.g. Bullock, 2017; Dobrin & Wolf, 2016). Increasing 
citizen participation within policing has been marked by the idea that there is 
strong public concern about crime and that as the capacity of the formal criminal 
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justice system becomes every more limited the public need to experience crime 
in a new way (e.g. Garland, 2001; Persson, 2014).  
Today the benefits of volunteers working within the public police are being 
rediscovered, with volunteer recruitment being a common element to a number 
of policing programs and initiatives such as Community Policing. As austerity 
measures are felt throughout the criminal justice system, many agencies and 
bodies within the welfare state and community now depend upon some voluntary 
sector involvement (Bussell & Forbes, 2002). The volunteer sector now provides 
a sizable part of the UK economy, providing assets of around £40 billion (Palmer 
& Hoe, 1997). In 2000 it was estimated that half of the UK population volunteers 
some time to a community activity (Palmer, 2000) providing vitally important 
resource especially within human service organisations providing an essential 
link between the organisations and the communities they serve (e.g. Ellis, 1996). 
For example in some situations volunteers have been found to be better at 
reaching some socially excluded groups for example in distress youths, who were 
seen to trust volunteers more than paid staff as more likely to be there for the 
sole purpose of helping them rather than being paid to (e.g. Ronal et al., 2008). 
The results of this research suggest that the giving of your time for free can lead 
to people viewing individuals as more altruistic and therefore trustworthy although 
it is questionable whether this can be related to the context of the Special 
Constabulary, who while volunteers operate in the same way as their paid 
colleagues.  
As the economic landscape has become increasing restraint, there has been a 
corresponding response from the Government in calling upon more individuals to 
become involved in their local communities (e.g. Ackerman & Fisher, 1998) by 
volunteering their time and expertise. Volunteering itself is defined as a social 
and communal activity based upon the idea of enhancing social capital; 
strengthening the community and supporting the continuation of services that 
would otherwise have been more expensive or underprovided (e.g. Putnam, 
2000). The notion of volunteering is not a new one, with Routh (1972) nothing 
that “…throughout history, there have been individuals willing to give themselves 
in time, effort, resources and money to help their fellow man”. This contribution 
varies from blood donors, victim support groups, Samaritan's phone helplines and 
the Special Constabulary. Marx (1999) remarked that volunteers constitute “…a 
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big unrecognised army” and that a failure to manage these resources effectively 
could result in missed opportunities, inefficiencies, increased costs and a 
potentially dysfunctional relationship between volunteers and the paid workforces 
(e.g. Johnson, 1981; Twelvetrees, 1991).  
The study of volunteerism has always attracted a multi-disciplinary approach 
(Smith, 1994) as volunteers vary from providing a service to help individuals and 
communities through improving the quality of life, campaigns to change laws to 
working within various organisations (e.g. Courtney, 1994). Volunteering at its 
most basic forms is “…any activity in which time is given freely to benefit another 
person, group or organisation”(Wilson, 2000, p.215). This can range from 
someone staying late after work unpaid to help a colleague, to that of 
institutionalised unpaid helping behaviours such as volunteering in a hospital, 
charity shop, or church, used to benefit another (e.g. Hodgkinson, 2003; Wilson, 
2000) and usually “…involves contributions of time without coercion or 
remuneration”(Dekker & Halman, 2003). Volunteering can vary from a single act 
to the systematic pursuit of a volunteering activity which individuals can enjoy to 
such as degree that they launch themselves on a career centred around that 
voluntary experience. There are no standard practices within volunteering, and 
the diversity of those who choose to volunteers means that they cannot be 
considered as one homogenous group; instead of including a vast range of 
experiences and skills across an equally wide variety of ages and backgrounds 
(Bussell & Forbes, 2002). Indeed the type of person who volunteers can change 
in connection to the institution, group, organisation or form of volunteering that 
they are completing.  
Driven by motivation outside that of financial gain, the sociological literature 
suggests that there are a wide variety of factors which can affect volunteers 
motivation. These factors include building their self-esteem, obtaining new skills 
and experiences, for the role itself with the potential of a paid job in the same 
field, and building a social network around that volunteering activity (e.g. Rotolo 
& Wilson, 2006). Becker & Forbes (2001, p.230-329) argued that it is this 
obtaining of a social network which is a dominating mechanism leading to 
volunteering. Regarding volunteering within policing, Lowery et al. (1992, p.71) 
suggested that its roots lie in the “…Greek conception of prideful participation in 
community to achieve self-realisation and collective goals”. The more that the 
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public becomes involved within policing, the deeper their understanding of what 
the police do and the corresponding demands and conflicts which they face. 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) suggested that volunteering and public participation 
in crime prevention and social issues empower the local community to solve 
some of their problems and to facilitate their efforts to be more committed and 
creative in supporting the police in their work. This voluntary community 
involvement can range from being more active in neighbourhood watch, school 
interventions for youth anti-social behaviour to reporting non-police issues to 
other agencies such as the local council. It has been acknowledged within the 
academic literature that the police themselves cannot control crime by 
themselves, and public participation could be used to enhance police functions. 
Public participation ranges from providing local intelligence to solve crimes, 
getting involved in community-based initiatives to prevent crime such as 
community-based social groups for identified at-risk groups and putting in more 
preventive measures on homes and business for example; volunteering for 
charities providing services to crime victims e.g. witness care (e.g. Ren et al., 
2008; Sadd & Grinc, 1994). With law enforcement agencies facing ever declining 
budgets and diminishing resources, volunteer participation within the criminal 
justice system such as the Special Constabulary could become an effective 
means of compensating for the scarcity of police financial and workforce 
resources available to meet the incoming demand (e.g. Zhao et al., 2001).  
With regards to volunteering in the broader sense of community support for 
policing, the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme continues to be one of the most well-
known and largest schemes running, with 7.5 million members of 3.5 million 
households being involved in 150,000 schemes across the UK. Public-led patrols 
are also an increasing element of active community support ranging from very 
locally based schemes, e.g. resident and tenant associations who patrol their 
estates to those covering a wider area which an organised, structured model for 
examples the street pastors and street watch.  The Street Watch Scheme was 
introduced by Home Secretary Michael Howard in 1994, an official element of the 
Neighbourhood Watch Scheme, although they often operate independently 
(Williams, 2005). The Home Office recorded 20,000 in existence with members 
of the community “…walking with a purpose” (Home Office, 2000, p.4). These 
individuals voluntarily patrol their local areas in small groups and report anything 
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suspicious to the police. They have no police powers and are not police run, 
instead of working in partnership with the locally based police teams, with the 
direct purpose of being the police’s “…eyes and ears” (Home Office, 1994). The 
Home Office (2000, p.2) argued that this Street Watch Scheme in conjunction 
with the wider Neighbourhood Watch Scheme was “…one of the biggest and 
most successful crime prevention initiatives ever. Behind it lies a simple idea and 
a central value shared by millions of people around the country: getting together 
with your neighbours to take action and cut local crime”. There were some 
reservations about the success of this scheme; however, with Laycock and Tilley 
(1995) argued that while it may improve police/public relations, little was being 
reported or known.  Such schemes do effectively transform active citizens into 
responsible rather than autonomous citizens (Johnston, 1996, p.226) by 
providing their actions with legal validity (Beetham, 1991). Bennett et al., (2008) 
and the College of Policing What Works (2018) states that the evidence 
suggested that neighbourhood watch can reduce crime, however, there is a 
considerable variation in practice across schemes and therefore differences 
regarding observed reductions. The systematic review conducted estimated that 
overall for every 100 crimes, an average of 26 crimes were prevented (based 
upon 18 studies, Bennett et al., 2008) although it is hard to empirically measure 
the impact especially as most are often implemented alongside other measures 
such as property marking and security measures (College of Policing What 
Works, 2018).  
More recently there has been a move to have a structured form of volunteering 
within the police organisations themselves in the form of the Police Support 
Volunteers (PSV) programme alongside the Special Constabulary. The PSV 
programme has gained considerable momentum over the past ten years, set up 
to provide additional capabilities to the existing service delivery. As of 2012, there 
were 9,700 PSV programmes across England and Wales (HMIC, 2012). In 
contrast to the Special Constabulary, PSVs have no policing powers instead of 
being civilian volunteers with no stipulated hours required. PSVs are now 
performing over 100 roles within the police service, and a conservative estimate 
in 2012 was believed to be contributing around 800,000 hours in support of 
policing activities often in back office positions (HMIC, 2012). Approximately 45% 
of all PSV activities were linked to neighbourhood policing teams, where Special 
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Constables also operate (Home Office, 2012). Some forces are also utilising 
PSVs in a front office capacity, for example, Thames Valley Police used 124 of 
their 640 PSVs at the time in front counter roles in 31 of their stations (HMIC, 
2012). Other roles include watching CCTV for significant cases, monitoring social 
media dies during operations/events and in general for forces, and obtaining 
feedback from users of the police service.  
In summary, it can be seen that there are many ways in which volunteers can 
become involved within the broader criminal justice system and in policing itself, 
whether this is within the police themselves or in related and connected charities. 
However, in turn, the range of roles, approaches and philosophies involved under 
the umbrella of policing means that there is no co-ordinated approach and large 
areas of overlap. With uncertainty as to the core role of the police themselves, 
these volunteer roles are equally generic and multi-purpose with no structure. 
Where and what role the Special Constabulary play within this huge ranging 
context and landscape needs to be reviewed and specified.  
2.5 The Special Constabulary 
The Special Constabulary has been involved in UK policing for years (Carrad, 
2006) Yet Leon (1991) acknowledged that many of these accounts surrounding 
the creation and development of the force are open to interpretation. The term 
Special Constabulary being formally introduced by an Act of Parliament in 1673 
by King Charles the Second (Seth, 1961). Alarmed by the rising threat of public 
disorder, brought about the Crowns attempt to enforce religious conformity, King 
Charles the Second extended the existing duty of every citizen to assist with law 
and order by ruling that citizens could be sworn in as temporary constables for 
specific occasions (Seth, 1961; Leon, 1989). Citizens could be summoned by 
local magistrates and justices to be sworn in as Specials yet this was not a 
voluntary position, with a refusal to serve to incur a hefty fine or potential jail time 
(Seth, 1961). This Act of 1673 remained and was enforced on several occasions 
noted to call upon citizens as Special Constables, although nearly exclusively 
within the North of England (Seth, 1961). The next legislation pertaining to the 
appoint of Special Constables appeared in 1820, nine years before the 
Metropolitan Police Act (1829) and 27 years before the County and Borough 
Police Act 1856 which saw the formation of the modern day police organisations 
(Emsely, 1996; Taylor, 1998). With the renewed threat of a French invasion in 
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1803 the British Government called upon the public to enlist into the Special 
Constabulary (Leon, 1987, p.5) and the Act of 1820 clarified the powers in order 
to grant magistrates the power to compel members of the public to become 
Special Constables in times of public disorder.   
While created as an incidental police force to be called upon in times of tumult 
and riot (Radzinwizc, 1956) the demands placed upon the small early modern 
day police force meant that by 1923 the Special Constabulary had been 
established as a permanent police reserve (Leon, 1991). The Special 
Constabulary Act of 1831 became the basis of the constitution for the 
contemporary Special Constabulary, allowing them to act in adjoining counties in 
times of extraordinary circumstances. The Act of 1831 formally outlined that they 
should be issued with any articles or weapons deemed necessary for the 
execution of their duties with local authorities allowing an expense of five shillings 
per day although very few actually received this (Gill & Mawby, 1990). The 
Special Constabulary were utilised in various roles ranging from assisting forces 
at fairs and guarding poll booths in the 19th century Wales to policing the riots of 
Carmarthen and Merthy in 1831 (Seth, 1961). These events saw the Special 
Constabulary being singled out for particularly hard treatment by the crowds as 
many were from the same communities as the rioters and therefore viewed as 
traitors (Seth, 1961).  It was a further Special Constabulary Act of 1835 which 
introduced the principle of a voluntary Special Constabulary.  
The Special Constabulary continued to be called upon by various governments 
in times of need, for example, historical reports of 170,000 Specials being 
deployed in Kennington Common in London during the Chartist movements of 
the early 1840s by the Victorians (e.g. Mather, 1959; Smith, 1985). However, 
after the late 1840s, there was little call for Special Constables until the outbreak 
of the first World War in 1914-1918. It was during this period that the Special 
Constabulary was organised into a body of organised, and structured volunteers 
with roles being to protect the nation’s water supply from any German infiltrators 
and to fill in any policing gaps left by the subscription of young men into the army. 
Indeed after this, the Special Constabulary were deployed regularly, so that an 
Act of 1923 which allowed local magistrates to appoint Specials for preventative 
measures rather than only in times of emergencies, creating the Special 
Constabulary as a permanent body of volunteer officers. Around 130,000 
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Specials were active as a wartime police force supplemented by retired police 
officers recalled to duty during the Second World War of 1939-1945 while 
maintaining their full-time employment responsibilities (Gill & Mawby, 1990) until 
there became a need to invest in a full-time post-war constabulary (Gill and 
Mawby, 1990). Since the establishment of the regular, paid professional police 
force, there have been calls from the regular force and federation for the abolition 
of the Special Constabulary whose re-emergence within policing after World War 
II was predominantly down to pressure from the Home Office (Carrad, 2006). 
Other legislation of note with regards to the Special Constabulary was the Police 
Act of 1964 which officially cemented the basis of the Special Constabulary in its 
modern form (Mawby & Wright, 2008) when the Special Constabulary became 
subject to the same rules of conduct and disciplinary procedures as the regular 
paid full time force (ibid). The Special Constables Regulations of 1965 produced 
guidelines for the recruitment and management of the Special Constabulary while 
the Police Act (1996) provided Chief Constables with official responsibility for the 
direction and control of the Special Constabulary.  
Despite this history, there is a very brief mention of the Special Constabulary 
within modern criminological literature, in many areas a total deficit in knowledge. 
Most research specifically covering the Special Constabulary is historical, with 
only a few recent studies emerging investing issues such as recruitment and 
retention (e.g. Gaston & Alexander, 2001; Bullock, 2014). The English Historical 
Review (COL.CXXII, 497, 2007) acknowledged that the Special Constabulary 
had mainly been neglected in general by historians as well as a criminologist, 
especially within the literature surrounding the period of the new police being 
created, despite the large numbers of Specials being enrolled to assist them. 
Historians John Saville (1987) and David Goodway (1982) shed some light upon 
the extensive use of the Special Constabulary between 1839 and 1842; however 
mostly regarding noting their use, rather than their experiences. Likewise, 
historians of the early Victorian provincial police reform (Municipal Corporations 
Act of 1835, the County Police Act of 1839 and the Country and Borough Police 
Act of 1856) also neglected the Special Constabulary within their accounts of the 
new regular paid police force. While the academic literature around the role of 
the Special Constabulary is particularly sparse what little does exist highlights the 
problems of marginalisation of the Special Constabulary from the regular police 
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force, which tended to dismiss them as hobby bobbies (Leon, 1989). More recent 
research has also highlighted various organisational problems arising from the 
rapid implementation of different paid civilian support roles such as the Police 
Community Support Officer programme (Johnston, 2006) upon the role of the 
Special Constabulary.  
 
The most substantial study to emerge after the last this was the conducted by Gill 
and Mawby (1990) who covered their historical establishment and a number of 
qualitative interviews and observational investigations of the Devon and Cornwall 
Special Constabulary during the 1980s. Gill and Mawby (1990) highlighted at the 
time, that there was a lack of previous research, and that this absence in 
knowledge had been the driving force behind their study. Gill and Mawby (1990) 
argued that this lack of research had encouraged speculation about the Special 
Constabulary and that they instead should be considered as unique volunteers in 
that they have an expressed specific interest in the organisation in the first place, 
and that the work of the police was their motivation for volunteering. They also 
raised an interesting point that while the Special Constabulary allows members 
of the public to become directly involved within the policing of their local 
communities; they are also formally tied to the police forces rather than being 
merely affiliated, therefore allowing police forces control over these volunteers 
while gaining some cost-saving benefits (ibid). Gill and Mawby (1990) argued that 
how much training Special Constables needed was entirely dependent upon what 
they were expected to do, and therefore, as applicable within this study, if they 
are to assume more policing responsibilities, then they will need the skills to do 
so. However, if they are to remain an emergency force carrying out marginal tasks 
within policing, it is doubtful if much training would be necessary. The key to 
effective volunteer use is, therefore, effective policies (ibid). Overall Gill and 
Mawby (1990) found that the Special Constables within Devon and Cornwall 
Police felt that they were not used enough, with incidents of Special Constables 
turning up to go on duty but not being used, sitting in the police station or being 
told to go home. There was an acknowledgement from the Special Constabulary 
that the role of the Special Constable fit well within neighbourhood policing, few 
claimed that they actually favoured or would favour accompanying a community 
constable or being the liaison with Neighborhood watch due to a strong desire to 
be within response policing (Gill and Mawby, 1990). The public perception of the 
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Special Constabulary is an essential factor to include when considering the role 
they should ultimately fulfil. Indeed attempts within some police subdivisions to 
use Specials instead of regulars as the liaisons with the Neighborhood watch 
schemes had been met with hostility from the scheme itself, which saw Specials 
as an inferior alternative to the local involvement of paid regular officers (Gill and 
Mawby, 1990).  
The Special Constabulary Today 
Despite their deep historical roots (e.g. Gill & Mawby, 1990; Emsley, 1996) within 
policing as established above, Britton and Callender (2017, p.149) argued that 
the Special Constabulary “…represent one of the most promising and potentially 
radical areas of innovation within policing”. A unique form of volunteering when 
considered in conjunction with traditional acts of volunteering, today the Special 
Constabulary continue to be a workforce of part-time voluntary unpaid police 
officers with the same powers, uniforms and equipment as that of their regular 
paid colleagues, working under the same conditions, legal requirements, force 
polices and oath (Strickland and Lalic, 2010; Caless et al., 2010). The condition 
of service now includes sixteen hours duty a month, equating to around 200 duty 
hours commitment a year in assisting their regular police force, leading the 
Special Constabulary to be a vital manpower resource, producing greater 
workforce flexibility.  
Special Constabulary Demographics 
While the regular force was historically drawn from the working class labourers, 
Bunyan (1971) suggested that the Special Constabulary were recruited from the 
petit bourgeoise. There is some evidence that the background of Specials bears 
a close resemblance to that of regular officers (e.g. Gill, 1987; Hope and Lloyd, 
1984) but more recently Leon (1989) results showed a more significant proportion 
of professionals and non-manual workers within the Special Constabulary. 
Calass (2015) argued that in 1856 the catchment group from which the newly 
established paid police and Special Constabulary were mainly drawn the same, 
agricultural labourers who in 1830 had enrolled in large numbers within the 
Special Constabulary. However by the end of the end of the nineteenth century, 
the Special Constabulary moved towards those who could afford to volunteer, 
and these were shopkeepers and the industrial class who had a self-motivation 
for joining, in protecting their areas and communities. Volunteers have 
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increasingly become something that those with the time and moral commitment 
deciding to volunteer in this way. Volunteering can expose social divisions as 
volunteers are typically found to come from a higher educational, higher income 
bracket, with the social resources to help others (e.g. Wilson, 2000). 
Governments and the police service have long argued that the Special 
Constables increase the diversity within the police service in terms of 
characteristics and life experiences of officers (Leon, 1991; NPIA, 2008; 
Neuberger, 2009; Home Office, 2010; Bullock, 2015 ) with proportionally more 
officers of minority groups and terms of genders. Gill and Mawby (1990) also 
argued that traditionally the Special Constabulary had been advertised as being 
more representative not only by gender and ethnic background but by socio-
economic background as well. However, more recent research (Bullock, 2015) 
argued that while the Special Constables does include a potentially more diverse 
group of people regarding skills and life experiences, there are variations 
between the forces, and are rarely as diverse as the communities they represent 
come from and represent. It could be argued due to the nature of the volunteering 
within the Special Constable there is a tendency to attract those who have an 
interest in policing regardless, especially those with interest in joining the 
regularly paid police force. The academic knowledge about the relationship 
between volunteers and ethnicity has increased recently (e.g. Rochester et al., 
2010; Bullock, 2014) however it does remain that for some reasons certain 
minority ethnic groups are harder to draw into voluntary work in the police context 
with cultural tensions between the two communities.  
 
Overall the Special Constabulary also presents a younger volunteer profile to that 
seen within the paid ranks with 44% of Special Constables being aged under 26, 
which is considerably higher than the next youngest worker type (PCSO at 11%) 
(Hargreaves et al., 2017). These recent findings, therefore, reflects a profile from 
the recruitment of younger individuals joining the Special Constabulary with the 
view of applying for a regular police position in the future. The recruitment process 
and profile will be critically explored in more depth within chapter four, but due in 
part to austerity closing regular recruitment for a number of years, and individuals 
trying the role before committing full time.  The proportion of Special Constables 
aged over 40 during this period has also fallen from 24% to 18%, despite this age 
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bracket rising for all other police worker types (Hargreaves et al., 2017). These 
findings fall into place with those found by Gill & Mawby (1990) that in general, 
they are significantly younger than volunteers drawn from other samples. Leon 
(1991) noted that career orientation as a stated reason for joining the Special 
Constabulary diminished as seniority (and age) increased. It is clear that 
expressing both highly ‘instrumental’ and highly ‘tangential’ motivations, special 
constables are not a homogenous group and are differently motivated to 
volunteer. 
 
The Special Constabulary is an attractive proposition for police leaders and 
policymakers as fully warranted uniformed officers costing a fraction of the hourly 
rate of regular officers (NPIA, 2008). Since 2008, corresponding with the financial 
crisis, the NPIA has argued that the “Special Constables are highly cost-effective” 
and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO, 2011, p.7) supported this 
view, stating that the Special Constabulary “…is embedded within the police 
service providing efficient and effective policing to support achievement of force 
priorities”. The total cost per duty, per hour of the Special Constabulary, is 
estimated to be around £3.40 for the first two years of service (including training 
and equipment) which then reduces to less than £3.00 an hour after that (National 
Strategy for the Special Constabulary, 2008). This means that even at the highest 
cost of a Special Constable, it is one around one-eighth of the Home Office 
estimated cost of a regular police officer, and around one-seventh of the cost of 
a PCSO (National Strategy for Special Constabulary, 2008). This cost is also the 
full cost, and does not at the time; take into account of any other funding provided 
by the Home Office, meaning that the actual cost to the individual forces could be 
even lower. A survey completed for the National Strategy for the Special 
Constabulary in 2008 indicated that the average Special at that time, provided 
approximately 171 hours duty, excluding hours of training per annum, with the 
average basic training period being 90 hours, however there were wide variations 
between forces, ranging from 45 to over 200 hours per Special.  
 
Historically the Police Federation has always viewed the Special Constabulary as 
a threat to the full-time force. The 1986 deputy secretary of one Joint Branch 
Board wrote to the Police Review about the use of Specials as a means of policing 
on the cheap, fuelling the debate still further by referring to them as “public 
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spirited but completely misguided people” (Gill & Mawby, 1990). This concern 
from the Police Federation has assumed greater significance as the role of the 
Special Constabulary has expanded (Gill & Mawby, 1990). One area of particular 
friction is the rank structure within the Special Constabulary, with the First Police 
Advisory Board (1976) suggesting a separate grading system, as it alienated 
regular officers. When a representative from the Southwest Police Federation 
was interviewed (Police Fed 1), it became clear that while Specials Membership 
into the Federation was not seen as a negative, the rank structure was. The 
Police Federations Representative argued that regular officers had to go through 
a promotion process including written exams and an interview before a panel plus 
once they were promoted they had to take on responsibilities legally and 
professionally on incidents and welfare which no Specials Sgt would have to. 
Therefore the ranks within the Special Constabulary could be hindering their 
integration fully into the force and Federation.  
 
Gill & Mawby (1990) found that on consultation with the Police Federation in the 
late 1980s, that members felt that Special Constables work should be restricted 
so that they would not impede the increase in numbers of regular officers, or 
threaten the amount of available voluntary overtime. However despite this, Gill & 
Mawby (1990) found little evidence that the Specials themselves perceived their 
organisation as a threat to the regular force, instead of defining their role as one 
of support with many stressing that they would refuse a duty which they believed 
was depriving a regular of overtime. Legal representation is one of the critical 
issues for Special Constables and under the current status quo, volunteers who 
find themselves in trouble are more likely to be given legal representation by the 
Federation if they were with a regular colleague at the time of an incident, 
especially if called upon as a witness during the proceeding. However, if they 
were on their own, Special Constables are entirely dependent on the legal 
assistance scheme backed by the Home Office. A survey in 2013 run by the 
Police Federation of England and Wales (PFEW) found that 94% of members of 
the Special Constabulary who responded wanted to join the Federation. 
However, the Home Office advised in 2016 that this should not be the case and 
consultation is ongoing. Now a new survey commissioned by the National Police 
Chief’s Council lead for the Special Constabulary ongoingly intending to ask the 
Special Constabulary whom they would like to represent them on a national level. 
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Despite the challenges, the Federation Vice Chair Simon Reed did not believe 
that the issues surrounding the membership of Specials into the Federation as 
insurmountable. A working party had been exploring the issues surrounding this 
move from potentially changing the Federation legislation to accommodate the 
volunteer officers and crucially; they also examined how this move could be 
funded. The fact that the Federation is looking and investigating into Special 
Constabulary involvement has been welcomed by senior Special Constables, 
who believe that giving the volunteers the same standing as the regulars would 
be a significant step forward. Martin McKay, Chief Officer for Cumbria Special 
Constabulary recalled how “…specials were called on to provide support during 
the flooding last year and the Derrick Bird shootings in the summer” and believed 
that this would happen more and more with declining resources and that 
membership would be welcomed, although the cost will be the key issues. 
Whether Special Constables will be accepted into the Police Federation and 
exactly what form their membership would take remains to be seen, but the 
proposition is being taken seriously and thoroughly investigated. Ultimately with 
Specials likely to take on an increasingly responsible role in the future and with 
them becoming a feeder force for the regulars, giving them the same rights and 
benefits does make sense. If they have the same powers and increasingly carry 
out the same duties, why should they not have equal protection? Specials, 
therefore, do not have equal access to useful tools such as the specialist legal 
cover provided by the Police Federation.  
Governance  
The Special Constabulary is governed by a number of different policies and 
regulations including but not exclusively: the Special Constables Regulations 
1965; Special Constables (Pensions) Regulations 1973; Health and Safety Act 
1974; Special Constables (Injury Benefit) Regulations 1987; the Working Time 
Regulations 1998; Special Constables (Amendment) Regulations 2002; NPIA 
Circular Special Constables; Eligibility for Recruitment and the Police Complaints 
and Misconduct Regulations 2004. Special Constables are held to the same 
standards of conduct as regular police officers, and these are set in the Police 
(Conduct) Regulations 2012 (which do not apply to police staff, i.e. those on 
civilian employment contracts) and the College of Policing’s Code of Ethics. The 
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Standards of Professional Behavior (The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008) of 
which all Special Constables must uphold are: 
Honesty and Integrity  
That officers are, to be honest, act with integrity and not to compromise or 
abuse their position of power.  
(2) Authority, Respect and Courtesy 
That officers are to act with self-control and tolerance while treating 
members of the public and force with respect. To not abuse their powers 
or authority and respect the rights of all individuals.  
(3) Equality and Diversity 
That officers act at all times with fairness and impartiality and will not 
discriminate unlawfully or unfairly.  
(4) Use of Force 
Force is to be used only to the extent that it is necessary, proportionate 
and reasonable in all circumstances. 
(5) Orders and Instructions 
Police officers are only to give and carry out lawful orders and instructions 
while abiding by police regulations, force policies and legal orders.  
(6) Duties and Responsibilities 
That police officers are to be diligent in the exercise of their duties and 
responsibilities.  
(7) Confidentiality 
Officers must treat information with respect and access/disclose it only in 
the proper course of police duties.  
(8) Fitness for Duty 
Police officers when on duty or presenting themselves for duty are to be fit 
to carry out their responsibilities.  
(9) Discreditable Conduct 
Officers are to behave in a manner that does not discredit the police 
service or undermine public confidence while on or off duty. They must 
reform any action taken against them for a criminal offence, any condition 
imposed on them as a receipt of any penalty notice. 
(10) Challenging and Reporting Improper Conduct 
Officers must report, challenge or take action against the conduct of 




Across the forty-three territorial police forces in England and Wales by the end of 
March 2016, there were 43,827 cases involving officers (and Special Constables) 
that related to complaints or conduct matters of which 3,945 cases were finally 
assessed as relating to misconduct or gross misconduct (Hargreaves et al., 
2017). Of these 3,945 cases were investigated as misconduct or gross 
misconduct and proceedings were brought in 1,844 of those cases (ibid). 
Following hearings/special case hearings, there were a total of 359 dismissals, 
259 relating to officers and 100 to staff. Separately 100 officers and 27 staff 
members were found guilty of a criminal offence during this same period of time 
(Hargreaves et al., 2017). This is an increase on the 2015 figure of 37,105 
complaints recorded by Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) only 
of which 1% of which was against Special Constables (IPCC, 2015a, p.32). 
However, with the nature of policing has changed dramatically since the 
establishment of the Special Constabulary, the environment in which they are 
operating is also rapidly evolving. With the overall number of complaints against 
officer increasing, this could be an area of concern for the Special Constabulary, 
especially as they are asked to take on more policing responsibility. It of particular 
notes that Special Constables are being called upon to account for their 
behaviour whether it is on or off duty for any conduct or actions which could be 
seen to discredit the reputation of the police service (Beggs & Davies, 2009). With 
budgetary changes, force restructuring and the introduction of new entities such 
as the PCSO (Police Community Support Officer, a civilian role with no power of 
arrest), Highway Agency, Vehicle Inspectorate Staff taking on functions 
traditionally performed by police officers, the role of the Special Constabulary 
needs to be reassessed. 
A new Disapproved Register was established by the College of Policing to 
prevent officers from re-entering the police service if they have been dismissed, 
or resigned/retired while being subject to a gross misconduct investigation where 
there would have been a case to answer. The register becomes effective from 
the 1st December 2013 and forces voluntarily provide the College with the details 
of those officers.  A total of 833 officers appear on that register ranging from 
constable to chief superintendent with the overwhelming majority of those on it 
being reported by colleagues. This means that those who are found guilty as 
Special Constables would find themselves barred from ever being hired within a 
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police force across the UK, a significant move in ensuring the Special 
Constabulary is accountable and professional as their regular counterparts.  
Summary 
With an established long history alongside the regular paid police force, the 
Special Constabulary are now on the frontline of policing in the UK. Made up of 
young individuals seeking a career within the regular police force the Special 
Constabulary have a better blend of the genders and minority groups than that 
seen within the paid police force. However, with the nature of policing changing, 
there is a considerable risk for any young volunteer facing a conduct investigation 
as despite carrying out the same duties, they are not afforded the same protection 
or support. Special Constables should be fully aware of this risk and provided 
with the same legal support and protection, especially due to the implications for 




Chapter Three: The Themes 
This chapter outlines and introduces the historical information and academic 
literature connected to the key themes selected for the qualitative research later 
seen within chapter five. These themes were chosen due to their link to the role 
and experiences of these voluntary officers. The critical themes within this thesis 
investigating the role of the Special Constabulary within policing include the 
deployment of Special Constables, their recruitment, training, retention, their 
value within the wider force and ranks and leadership.  
3.1 The Role of the Special Constabulary  
Policing strategies were historically stable until the 1960s when rafts of initiatives 
were introduced to improve the effectiveness of the police to reduce crime 
including community policing with a particular focus upon the relationship 
between the police and their public after several highly public scandals 
(Rosenbaum, 1994). The use of volunteers in various capacities within policing 
and especially the Special Constabulary has long has been promoted as a bridge 
between constabularies and citizens. The Special Constabulary is involved in a 
wide variety of duties ranging from reactive and proactive policing, 
neighbourhood/community based policing, assisting with public events, and 
national emergencies (Mirrlees-Black and Byron, 1994; Caless, 2010). Special 
Constables provide local police managers with greater workforce flexibility, 
making considerable contributions to visible policing and reassurance within the 
communities. A national data benchmarking exercise for forces within England 
and Wales undertaken in 2016 found the majority of forces projecting growth 
targets for their Special Constabularies (Britton et al., 2016, p.23). Indeed national 
strategic projections indicate that PCCs and forces were planning a significant 
increase in the number of Special Constables, especially in the early years of the 
austerity measures 2009-2012. Overall figures projected were for there to be 
24,500 by March 2015, an increase of 58% (HMIC, 2012). Particularly within this 
context of austerity measures, the Special Constabulary were viewed as a way 
to increase policing capacity while reducing demand upon the regular police 
forces (e.g. Bullock & Leeney, 2016; APCO, 2013, p.4). However, the arguments 
for the increased use of volunteerism within policing are much broader with 
potential for local empowerment and engagement with the local communities, a 
58 
 
key point behind their use within neighbourhood policing (e.g. Johnston, 2003; 
Ren et al., 2006; Gravelle & Rogers, 2009; Bullock, 2014a).  
The role of the Special Constables has traditionally been within neighbourhood 
support teams, working local fetes, parades and providing visible community-
based foot patrols. Special Constables have long been deployed as Specials 
events, and to provide additional police workforce at a busy period, for example 
on weekend evenings. Leon (1991) found that such deployment was valued by 
senior police officers, who argued that they would struggle to resource such 
periods (Bullock, 2014). The use of volunteers within back office duties to allow 
for the police officers to be released for frontline duties (e.g. PSVs) has also be 
cited as allowing officers to be utilised on the front line, although the effect of this 
has not been proven. However as Whittle (2017, p.136) also argued that “…the 
roles and responsibilities of special constables have changed dramatically since 
the days when volunteer officers were just expected to turn out in an emergency, 
police the village fete or direct traffic” instead becoming utilised at the hard end 
of policing (e.g. HMIC, 2012; Bullock & Leeney, 2016).  
 The Government National Policing Strategy in 2008/2009 projected and argued 
that the special Constabulary could still have the most significant impact upon 
policing within this capacity. While Bullock & Leeney (2016) found that most 
Special Constables generally patrolled on foot and provided additional cover at 
labour intensive events, making them a more visibly deployment. These duties 
are not on the hard end of policing such as rapid response, therefore carrying 
little risk of injury, being heavy in manpower use, rarely make arrests and are little 
involved in the investigation of crime. With over 90% of the Special Constables 
who participated in the present study stating that they had conducted a high 
visibility foot patrol in the previous six months, and almost 80% indicating that 
they had attended community events, providing a visible presence remains a 
staple of the Special Constable remit. Indeed, with 28 of the respondents 
reporting that they were working for ‘Neighbourhood Command’ (neighbourhood 
and community policing), the majority of special constables are organisationally 
allied to community policing in this constabulary, something which reflects wider 
government and police service discourses and something to which we return to 
in the discussion of the paper. Indeed the National Strategy for the Special 
Constabulary in 2008 identified five specific areas within neighbourhood policing 
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objectives where they believed the Special Constabulary could make a 
difference. These included: 
(1) Crime Reduction – the use of Special Constables in carrying out 
uniformed patrols as a deterrent, to cover any police response to minor 
offences, to check persistent offenders were complying with their bail 
conditions, gathering vital local intelligence and to help trace and arrest 
offenders wanted on a warrant.  
(2) Public Reassurance – the traditional role of the constable, carrying out 
street patrols, with group deployments to known problem areas based 
upon gathered local intelligence. However, there is some overlap here 
with the primary duties of the PCSOs and could be seen as an under-
utilisation of the added policing powers of the Special Constables. 
(3) Attendance at and the Investigation of Minor Crimes – while the general 
public generally understands the need for prioritisation of policing 
resources, there is no doubt that police failings to visit scenes of minor 
crimes and to actively investigate them, is a significant source of public 
dissatisfaction.  
(4) Anti-Social Behaviour – if the Specials were used in deployable groups, 
the natural priority for the Special Constabulary would be mass 
deployment in areas of anti-social behaviour. Some forces are making 
even more specialised use of the Special Constabulary within this area, 
with some forces now training and using Specials for Level One Public 
Order Deployments.  
(5) Roads Policing- Special Constables can also be utilised to take part in 
checking vehicles for defects and association with crimes, preventing 
and prosecuting traffic offences. Some police forces provide Special 
Constables with both ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Recognition) 
and Speed Detection training.  
Therefore the 2008 National Strategy for the Special Constabulary suggested 
that the natural operation place for the Special Constabulary is within 
neighbourhood/community policing. They also argued that the Special 
Constabulary could meet the needs and policing objectives outlined by their 
strategy (National Strategy for Special Constabulary 2008) yet as can be seen by 
the data collected within this thesis. However, this research, set out in detail, later 
on, suggested that this is not where the Special Constabulary is performing the 
majority of their duties. With over 90% have conducted a stop and search, 80% 
reporting that they had been deployed on mobile response and two-thirds having 
made an arrest there is undoubted evidence that Special Constables are involved 
in reactive response (Bullock & Leeny, 2016). With 40% of special constables 
reporting having attended a crime scene or taken statements and one-third 
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having conducted interviews with victims, witnesses or suspects, there is some 
evidence of deployment in the more specialist arena of a criminal investigation, 
somewhat deviating from the findings of earlier studies. Indeed the research 
discussed further within this thesis, also suggests that increasingly Special 
Constables have a more significant role within reactive, response based policing, 
rather than within neighbourhood, community-based positions.  
What Special Constables ‘do’ has been viewed as important within police service 
and government discourse for some time, primarily because of the implications 
for wastage (Leon 1991). Indeed, demonstrating a certain caution in their position 
that neighbourhood policing should be the focus for Special Constables 
seemingly recognising the importance of deployment in motivating and 
(especially) in retaining Special Constables the NPIA (2008, p. 13) noted ‘that 
Specials deployed in challenging specialist or responsible roles have longer 
service than those deployed in less demanding tasks’. This, they suggest, 
indicates that ‘increasing the sense of “added value” encourages Specials to stay 
longer’ (NPIA 2008, p. 13). The need to give consideration to Special Constables 
‘undertaking a wide range of tasks’ (ACPO, 2011, p. 3) has been recognised. 
While wide-ranging experience has been viewed to be important for retaining 
officers; it is worth remembering that special constables are not a homogenous 
group.  
If volunteers are to demonstrate higher levels of dedication and professionalism, 
there is a need to ensure that they are supported and continually developed, 
keeping them up to date with the methods and challenges faced by modern 
policing. Special Constables ultimately need to feel valued, and their “…fantastic 
commitment to the force and the communities their serve” needs to be recognised 
(Special Constabulary Recruitment: Marketing and Retention Survey Report 
Findings, July 2010 NPIA).  There seems to be an established need for the 
Special Constabulary within modern policing, and there, therefore, needs to be a 
framework within which forces use the Special effectively and efficiently, focusing 
them on areas of policing where they could add the most value (National Strategy 
for Special Constabulary, 2008). If this professionalism of the Special 
Constabulary regarding their role, policing purpose, uniforms and training than 
forces need a long-term strategic plan with respects to how forces recruit, train 
and develop the voluntary force.  
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The Special Constabulary is unique in that they provide volunteers with legal 
authority and powers that come with the office of constable, and therefore, the 
expectations and regulations that come with that power. Volunteers have long 
been viewed as a way of facilitating civic and neighbourhood renewal and should 
be viewed as a way of regenerating pride and responsibility within the community 
(e.g. Home Office, 2001, 2004a; HMIC, 2004). However, as this chapter has 
highlighted the proposed role for the Special Constabulary within neighbourhood 
policing has a long and researched history yet both the police service and Special 
Constabulary have moved away from this role. Instead, neighbourhood policing 
is being dropped in favour of cheap manpower gap filling, frontline response 
policing, despite strong denials from forces that this is happening. While this may 
be an immediate short-term solution to keep the police frontline working and a 
favourite of young police paid career orientated Specials, is this the most effective 
use of the voluntary constabulary?  
The National Strategy for the Special Constabulary 2011-2016 aims to continue 
the professionalising of the development of the Special Constabulary and to build 
upon the progress already made by forces on the previous national strategies 
(i.e. the National Strategy for Special Constabulary 2008 as previous mentioned). 
The principal aims outlined bear little relation to the findings of the current 
research. They are necessary for the Special Constabulary to be more effectively 
led, delivering policing and community safety in support of force priorities 
(National Strategy for the Special Constabulary, 2011-2016). Interestingly the 
new National Strategy does acknowledge that none of the strategic objectives 
and aims is currently being delivered, with minor delays in being able to evidence 
the Specials additional skills, providing them with a broader range of duties, 
sharing good practice between forces or making the Special Constabulary more 
diverse (ibid). The National Strategy also acknowledged that there had been 
problems delivering common standards across forces, making sure the Special 
Constabulary’s contribution was marketed and rewarded, and in developing the 
leadership skills within the Special Constabulary leadership. Areas, where 
significant resistance was encountered, were when balancing operational needs 
with Special Constable availability and having effective performance 
management in place. The SC National Plan (2011-2016) also highlighted issues 
when making sure that the voluntary nature of the role is both respected and 
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understood by forces and striving for automatic consideration of the Special 
Constabulary in any police decision making.  
Another critical development within forces which has directly impacted upon the 
Special Constabulary was the establishment of Citizens in Policing who in turn 
released the Citizens in Policing National Strategy for 2016-2019, a living 
document adapting to various needs, demands for example. (Citizens in Policing 
Community of Practice, 2016). Citizens in Policing was created to increase the 
support for the Special Constabulary, Police Support Volunteers and Police 
Cadets within each police force locally and nationally (CoP, 2018). Citizens in 
Policing have therefore been involved in the creation of the Special Constabulary 
National Strategy of 2018-2023 developed to fit within the Policing Vision 2025, 
the policing plan for the next ten years, shaping decisions around forces 
transformation and how police resources are used. The Special Constabulary is 
part of this vision contributing as part of the police plan. This National Strategy 
highlighted the need to support and develop career Specials while acknowledging 
the legitimate pathway of Specials into the regular police service (Special 
Constabulary National Strategy of 2018-2023). The Strategy outlined that forces 
need to continue to be imaginative and innovative in how they utilise the Special 
Constabulary within their forces. The National Citizens in Policing Strategy for 
2018-2023 Priorities outlined were to raise the profile of the Special Constabulary, 
to widen the opportunities for the Special Constabulary while developing the 
force. The introduction of Force Management Statements which emerged from a 
recommendation of the Winsor Report requires forces to report their planned 
strength and activities, raising the opportunity to raise the profile of the Special 
Constabulary (ibid). The strategy states that while the Special Constabulary has 
its own needs, full operational effectiveness can only be achieved through a 
blended management approach and closer integration with the regular paid force. 
Therefore forces should factor in both the current and potential contribution of the 
Special Constabulary as part of their overall workforce rather than an addendum. 
Citizens in Policing also suggested that HMIC should factor in the Special 
Constabulary and that they should be evaluated on more than their number alone. 
The introduction of a national competency framework for the Special 
Constabulary also ensures that all Specials will be signed off on fundamental core 
skills of police officers (ibid).  
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With the police service changing to reflect the wider contextual social, cultural 
and political landscape, against the backdrop of every aspect of policing being 
challenged and tested for its relevance and value for money, the Special 
Constabulary have the opportunity to pay a valuable, cost-effective and 
differentiated role. While it remains clear that there are a role and place for the 
Special Constabulary within modern policing, in what capacity they should be 
remains to be seen. Police forces need to provide a framework within which the 
Special Constabulary could be utilised, so that they could become ever more 
effective and efficient in their deployment and role, focusing them upon the areas 
where they would add the most policing value. As the Special Constabulary grew, 
as indicated by the long-term financial reductions and outlined PCC plans, there 
will be an increasing pressure from Specials to get more exciting and varied roles 
that could fit their unique capabilities. Therefore there needs to be a strategy 
aimed at gaining these roles while ensuring that the Special Constabulary are not 
in competition with other members of the policing family. Simple strategies such 
as having a great structure to their deployment, and position within the force could 
have a meaningful impact upon the Special Constabulary as research indicating 
that the willingness to volunteers can be influenced heavily by whether that 
volunteering is perceived as rewarding and worthwhile (e.g. Handy et al., 2000).  
3.2 Deployment and Role 
Research has revealed two primary concerns about the deployment of special 
constables within contemporary police practice. First, there is a divergence 
between Special Constables’ expectations of their role and reality. Reflecting the 
often discussed police constable’s ‘cultural’ preference for ‘crime-fighting’ (see 
Reiner 2000), Special Constables state a preference for deployment within what 
they perceive to be the realm of ‘real’ police work. This perception of real police 
work includes responding to emergency calls, driving police cars and pursuing 
criminal investigations – rather than ‘mundane’ foot patrol (Gill and Mawby 1990, 
Leon 1991, Mirrlees-Black and Byron 1994, Gaston and Alexander 2001). Indeed 
one-third (12) stated that they were content with conducting high visibility foot 
patrol and allied tasks in the community. However, the majority indicated a 
preference for roles in rapid response teams, criminal investigation and areas of 
specialism (such as roads policing). At the very least, responses demonstrated a 
longing for variety. ‘I would like’, one respondent stated, ‘opportunities to engage 
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with residents but also the opportunity to get involved in more operations, 
response, [targeted patrol], traffic attachments’. More generally, a strong desire 
to ‘to give support to the regulars’, ‘to be treated as a regular’ and ‘to be 
operationally competent’ was revealed. 
Second, Special Constables report that they do not feel that their deployment is 
appropriate. Special constables give significant amounts of time and comprise a 
sizable resource. Indeed, respondents in this study gave, on average, 32 hours 
per month to this constabulary. However, that Special Constables feel that they 
are under or inefficiently used is a theme common in the extant literature (Gill and 
Mawby 1990, Gaston and Alexander 2001). Gill and Mawby (1990) noted that 
special constables regularly complained that they were under-used by the police 
service. Gaston and Alexander(2001) found that about half of serving special 
constables thought that the police service used them effectively all or most of the 
time, just over 40% thought that they were used some of the time effectively and 
10% stated that there were never or seldom deployed effectively. Special 
Constables have also reported poor administration, the pressure to work 
inconvenient shifts and a lack of understanding of the constraints posed by their 
full-time jobs (Mirrlees-Black and Byron 1994, Leon 1991). While Leon (1991) 
found examples of senior regular officers, who took a flexible view towards how 
much duty should be performed by Specials Constables and were appreciative 
of any efforts made by Special Constables, who are after all volunteers. Leon 
(1991) also found examples of senior regular officers who demonstrated anxiety 
to prove that all officers were competent, highly active and disciplined and so 
displayed little patience for special constables who did not report for duty 
frequently. In light of these findings, special constables participating in this study 
were asked their views on deployment and duties they completed.  
There is something of a schism in experiences. On the one hand, the responses 
indicated that the organisation of the shifts of special constables was well 
managed. Most reported flexibility in the shift patterns that they were offered 
agreed that the police provide convenient shifts, agreed that they were offered 
worthwhile duties and that they were fully occupied. On the other hand, 
responses suggest that the skills of special constables are not well used. While 
opening up the police service to a more diverse group of people with different 
skills and life experience is a theme within contemporary government discourse 
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(Home Office 2010), with just under 60% of special constables agreeing that their 
skills and experiences were put to good use. With just over 40% agreeing that 
their interests were matched to their role and one-third agreeing that their skills 
and experiences were matched with their role, there would seem to be something 
of a mismatch between skills, experiences and interests and the nature of the 
opportunities offered to special constables. In practice, there are very few 
restrictions on the use of Specials with the Police Advisory Board (1976) 
recommending that they should not be included in industrial disputes (Gill & 
Mawby, 1990) something which they were predominantly used for during the 
Chartist Movement and Industrial Revolution. The range of duties involving 
specials also varies between forces, with the traditional roles being routine 
patrolling and special events such as carnivals, fun runs, and fetes. (Gill & 
Mawby, 1990). “(B)oth assisted and spread the resources of the regular force. 
They also enabled the force to reward its experienced and longer serving specials 
with interesting work. It all helped to retain enthusiasm and keep specials in the 
force” (Home Office, 1987, para 60). 
A key factor in maintaining the enthusiasm of those volunteers without financial 
remuneration is the provision of exciting work (Gill & Mawby, 1990). Gill & Mawby 
(1990) also found that where a scheme emphasises maintaining specials interest 
by making them an integral part of the venture with benefits to the police, public 
and individuals specials (Home Office, 1987; Newton, 1987; also Veater, 1984). 
Gaston & Alexander (2001) looked to identify the extent to which the Special 
Constabulary were performing tasks which they enjoyed most, looking at the 
match between the individual and organisational needs (e.g. Herriot & 
Pemberton, 1995). On average they found that foot patrol (67.1%), mobile patrol 
(60.2%) and special events (37.3%) were the most liked duties irrespective to 
gender or if they were serving or former Special Constables (Gaston & Alexander, 
2001). There was a noticeable difference when the length of service was 
investigated with regards to the popularity of the three duty types mentioned 
above. The popularity of foot patrol rose from 54.7% for officers with 2-3 years of 
duty, to 84.7% for those with 15 years plus service (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). 
The popularity of mobile patrols decreased from 63.2% to 38.5%, for the same 
length of service groups, while policing special events also increased from 42.1% 
to 84.2% (Gaston & Alexander, 2001).  
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Gaston & Alexander (2001) then investigated the difference between serving 
Special Constables and former Special Constables. For serving Special 
Constables, the most significant gap between duties most enjoyed against most 
performed, were between the policing of special events (36.9% most enjoyed 
compared to 66.3% most performed), plain clothed observations (27.6% 
compared to 5.1%) and traffic patrol attachments (23.4% to 1.0%) (Gaston & 
Alexander, 2001). While foot patrol duties were the most performed and most 
enjoyed by both serving and former Special Constables, former Constables had 
performed this duty most frequent at 57.7%, they only rated this most enjoyable 
34.1%, compared to 42.1% and 38.4% respectively for those still serving (Gaston 
& Alexander, 2001). The length of service also had a large impact upon the 
difference between enjoyment and frequency for serving Special Constables with 
less than a year of service, who rated foot patrol as most enjoyed by 70.7% of 
respondents with this duty also being performed the most frequently by 90.3% 
(Gaston & Alexander, 2001).  
Across the various forces, Police Constabularies have been making very different 
uses of the Special Constabulary. Herefordshire Police, for example, allocated a 
Special Constable to each of their ten crime and disorder reduction partnerships 
(CDRPS) who were given the responsibility of raking through elimination prints. 
Herefordshire Police also had a Specials Sgt who supported the police scientific 
services team by taking over 400 sets of elimination fingerprints within the space 
of a year. Some forces set up regional operations, such as Operation Surrender, 
which involved Special Constables from six forces, (Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, 
Essex, Cambridge, Suffolk and Norfolk), sent out 150 valentine cards to people 
wanted on warrant for failing to appear at court, resulted in 14 individuals 
voluntarily handing themselves in or being arrested. Mark Hopkins, the ACC for 
Cambridgeshire Police, said that “…specials are a vital part of the law-and-order 
frontline performing key tasks, often in additional to demanding full-time jobs”.  
The relationship between the regulars and the specials is very important in 
maintaining Specials interest in completing hours, for example, East Dorset 
Police have a team of ten to twelve active specials which give nearly 30 hours 
duty a week, providing a clear picture of a team spirit between the two at that 
particular station. The Camden patch in London has been piloting a new local 
recruitment scheme for the Metropolitan Specials, in which the Camden patch 
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activity recruited individuals who lived and worked within the borough to join their 
local Specials unit. The aim is to raise the number of Specials from around 143 
to 300 by 2012, with people from the local area tackling local community issues. 
Some forces acknowledge and pride themselves on having no fixed strategy for 
the Special Constabulary instead departments come forward strategically, asking 
if they need specials. Each role is then reviewed whether or not that voluntary 
role requires a warrant card and if not, then the role is that of a civilian volunteer 
post and the department then adversities the position. Most forces want the 
specials on the frontline, and some forces have principally said yes to having 
Specials on PSU, but they are struggling to get the regulars all trained so are 
holding off on specials for the moment. With Cybercrime becoming a significant 
area of criminal activity and thus police investigation, many forces are looking into 
targeting recruitment of specials from companies where the Specials could come 
with the skills.  
The National Crime Agency 
The National Crime Agency replaced the NPIA in investigating complex, serious 
and organised crime, which impacts upon the UK and internationally (NCA, 
2015). The National Crime Agency uses a mixture of staff from police, non-police, 
customs and immigration (NCA, 2015). They have recently introduced “Specials” 
into their organisation through the Crime Courts Act of 2013; however, these 
Specials are essentially different from the Special Constabulary in most forces. A 
high ranking member of the National Crime Agency with the lead in creating the 
new Specials was interviewed for this thesis. That individual stated that their 
Specials are seen as unpaid employees, who sign a contract and mayor may not 
be given the powers of a constable to arrest etc. as it would be dependent upon 
the role they are performing, and as such there will be no ranks. They had only 
been introduced in the previous 12 months before the interview, so they were in 
the very early stages in the establishment of the role. They were looking to recruit 
30 individuals within their first year, which should have taken place. The National 
Crime Agency hoped to recruit individuals who could bring niche, high level skills 
to the agency; and at that point, they had ten individuals with skills such as cyber-
crime, forensic accounting and an academic specialist in counterfeiting and data 
management as just some of the example skills. The recruitment of Specials with 
regards to the NCA is business led, meaning that first, the gaps are identified 
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requiring niche skills, and then the recruitment begins. The NCA plans to start, 
therefore small, and to do it well, choosing whom they want to recruit when a gap 
in knowledge or expertise is identified.  
All NCA Specials are to be managed by the NCA Specials Coordinator, and all 
have enhanced security clearance due to the level of data protection, and the 
nature and severity of the crimes. There are no distinctions between regular NCA 
officers and the NCA Specials in providing them with the appropriate assets to 
conduct their roles; however, they will obviously not be paid. As unpaid 
employees, the NCA Specials are not entitled to holiday pay, pension or sick pay. 
However, they do get reimbursement for any reasonable expenses they incur in 
the course of their duties, and they were to be provided with all the training 
necessary for their role. They will also be compensated for any loss in the event 
of injury or death resulting from their activities as an NCA Special. The Crime and 
Courts Act of 2013 allowed for the NCA Specials to hold the powers of a 
Constable in England and Wales, providing the Director-General is satisfied that 
they are suitable and capable, and have the adequate training to exercise those 
powers. However, they will only be provided with these police powers to assist 
operational teams in instances where their background, knowledge and expertise 
would add specific value to operational activities. Their hours of duty are when 
they are needed, rather than in general; and they are then required to complete 
their duties within a reasonable period of time as requested by their manager, but 
primarily their hours worked will vary according to the business needs of the NCA 
from time to time.  
3.3 Special Constabulary Recruitment 
As the Special Constabulary has not always been voluntary, the recruitment 
process has also changed throughout history. In the beginning, the Special 
Constabulary were drawn nearly exclusively from the working middle classes 
those with property and a way of life to protect, in direct contrast to the regular 
police force (Gill and Mawby, 1990). The popularity of these groups of law-abiding 
members of the local communities becoming Special Constables led to the 1840 
Police Act, which allowed private organisations to appoint “additional Constables” 
who focused their duties around those organisations and areas (Steedman, 
1984). In the rural areas, Special Constables were workers and tenants put 
forward by their landowners for protection. For example, the Thames River Police 
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began as such a privately paid for police force until the Government took over 
funding (Radzinowicz, 1956a). Today there are still several Employer Support 
Schemes, for example, shop assistances joining as Special Constables patrolling 
the shopping areas where they work to assist those employers.  
During the late 18th and 19th centuries, there was open public hostility in the UK 
towards the establishment of a permanent paid for police force, especially as 
many witnessed the use of the police as instruments of state oppression during 
the French Revolution. When the Metropolitan Police was established in 1829, 
there was a conscious decision to minimise any parallels between the police and 
army. Policy decisions at the time were to avoid a two-tier system of recruitment 
like that which exists within the army, with a clear divide between officers and 
men and rank. Therefore the police force recruited men who were literate but 
“…who had not the rank, habits or station of gentlemen” (Gill and Mawby, 1990) 
with an extremely high turnover of initial officers for insobriety. From the 1930s to 
1950s there as the slow introduction of various recruitment processes with 
officers required to pass tests of general knowledge, reasoning, and numeracy.  
In direct contrast the Special Constabulary Act of 1831 allowed magistrates to 
appoint magistrates to appoint members based on recommendations from two 
reputable referees leading many being viewed as the most trustworthy, highly 
respected members of the local community. This led to the recruitment of 
Specials being primarily drawn from local traders, store owners, members of the 
middle classes with the money to volunteer (Gill and Mawby, 1990). From the 
1900s onwards Special Constables were still being appointed temporarily with 
annual ceremonies and additional enlistments if necessary for any emergencies 
(ibid). Post-war the Home Office set up a Committee in 1944 to outline the Special 
Constabulary post-war structure (Home Office and Scottish Home Department, 
1949). The committee at the time stressed that there was still a strong need for a 
reserve force post-war, and made case law by defining the role of the Specials 
more widely (ibid). The committee also made recommendations regarding the 
entry requirements such as a maximum age while during the war period those 
too old or young to serve in the army were sworn in as Specials; the process of 
appointment; the appointment of female Special Constables and the desirability 
that all Specials should be issued with free uniforms (Gill and Mawby, 1990). 
When the voluntary nature of the Special Constabulary was confirmed, it was still 
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possible to use compulsory enrolment with the example of William Lant of 
Hartlepool being appointed as a Special in1937 despite not having agreed to his 
nomination (Gill and Mawby, 1990). Overall the committee stressed that outside 
war conditions the Special Constabulary was a voluntary one and should not be 
regarded as a cost-saving resource away from the established paid police force.  
The Recruitment Process 
Today the recruitment process for those wishing to join the Special Constabulary 
is a lengthy selection process similar to that undergone by potential recruits to 
the regular police force, although there is some variation between forces. The 
national selection process includes a paper sift or online screening process for 
suitability before individuals are invited to attend a recruitment awareness event 
or straight through to an assessment day. The national assessment centre 
includes writing examples such as report writing, verbal and non-verbal exams, 
and interview and scenario role-play exercise. If a recruit is successful through 
all of these stages, they then undertake the medical and fitness test which sends 
the selection process, although a couple of forces still include a swimming test 
as well. Once arriving in their force areas before initial training begins all recruits 
are drugs tested, and DNA and fingerprint samples are taken as part of the overall 
vetting process, with some individuals, therefore, being precluded at this stage. 
Historically the Special Constabulary senior management team played a 
significant role in the recruitment of Specials such as sitting on interview panels; 
however, this has become no longer tenable due to time constraints and 
numbers. Most forces are looking to centrally manage the recruitment process 
automating the application process to increase efficiency and reduce costs. 
However, there is a risk that this move to make the process as similar to the 
regular police force will result in the same type of individuals joining as those who 
enter the regular force and exclude more individuals who could have joined the 
Specials uniquely in comparison to the paid police force.  
Recruitment drives for Special Constables have ebbed and flowed over time with 
various large-scale drives being launched by various Governments. For example, 
Labour in its 2001 White Paper Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform 
acknowledged that there had been a significant fall in the number of Special 
Constables and that they planned to reverse this decline (Strickland and Lalic, 
2010). In December 2003 the Home Office announced that the police forces were 
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to get a £2.5million governmental cash boost to recruit an extra 3,000 Special 
Constables with all forces receiving up to £70,000 per force for initiatives which 
were aimed at recruiting, training and managing their Special Constables 
(Strickland and Lalic, 2010). In 2008 the Home Secretary announced a further 
£2.25 million funding package to assist in the recruitment of 6,000 more Special 
Constables over the next three years to get a total of 20,000 Specials (Home 
Office Press Release, 2008).  The recruitment of Specials is predominantly done 
at the local level, except when the Government requires a significant number of 
Specials for large-scale emergencies. In 2008 nine Special Constabulary 
Regional Co-ordinators were put in a post with a primary goal for putting into 
practice the Green Paper requirements to increase the number of Specials across 
England and Wales with each position being funded by the Home Office for two 
years (NPIA, 2010). Despite this national initiative recruitment has primarily been 
done through local stands at fetes and local events, local advertisement in the 
newspapers and radio, however; most recruits are initially attracted through 
meeting another officer, Special Constable or regular police officer (Leon, 1989). 
After 1949 a large number of female recruits into the Special Constabulary 
lessened the consistent decline in numbers post-war. Recruitment during this 
period suggested that the middle classes were still the predominant recruitment 
ground with Seth (1961) noting that very few of London Specials at the time came 
from even the most respectable working-class areas. This means that when large 
numbers of Special Constables were later mobilised during industrial action and 
strikes, there appeared to be a class aspect to governmental action.  
In 2002 changes were made to the Special Constables (Amendment) 
Regulations meaning that recruits no longer have to be British, Irish or resident 
Commonwealth citizens to apply for the Special Constabulary. Now nationals 
from the EU with the right to stay in the UK without any restrictions can also apply 
(NPIA, Circular (WSU) (SC) (07)1). The effect of Brexit and the separation of the 
UK from the rest of Europe again may impact upon these recruitment regulations 
and is a future consideration within the research. There are those who by the 
nature of their full-time employment cannot serve as a Special Constable 
precluded by a conflict of interest. These include those working within the criminal 
justice system such as magistrates, justices, justice’s clerks and members of the 
Crown Prosecution Service and those working within licensing and security such 
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as clubs door staff. Other individuals may be precluded from the voluntary force 
due to personal circumstances or associations with various individuals through 
the vetting process.  
The Winsor report Part One (2011) suggested that forces should review how they 
process regular police officers who have retired, arguing that they could 
potentially join the Special Constabulary. Officers who had recently left the force 
could join without going through the full recruitment process; however, the 
previous service would not mean automatic entitlement, as forces may wish to 
interview individuals for suitability. Comprehensive training for these individuals 
would also be unnecessary, although it was recommended that they undergo a 
medical and fitness test (Winsor, 2011). Where necessary appropriate vetting 
checks should be done, and all officers would have to re-join the force as a 
Special Constable with forces considering whether they re-join the force at the 
same or equivalent rank/grade. However, this should not be presumed as skill 
and knowledge do not necessarily equate to rank or grade. The Winsor Report 
(2011) argued that fast-tracking experienced police officers into the Special 
Constabulary represent a valuable additional resource for both the Special 
Constabulary in terms of skills and the broader force as good return on 
investment, contributing overall savings in terms of recruitment and training 
(NPIA, 2012). These former regular officers would also significantly increase the 
number of Special Constables holding independent patrol status without the need 
for further training investment. This scheme, when suggested, was made against 
the background of budgetary cuts and some forces utilising Regulations A19 to 
retire officers with 30 years’ service forcibly and therefore was not well received 
by many. 
Mark Heard (Former PC) “It was a bit of a kick in the teeth really…I was shocked. 
On the one hand, they’re saying they don’t want me and then they’re asking me 
to come back in the same role for free” (Durden, 2011) 
Tony Fisher (Former PC) “It’s a bit of a slap in the face to get rid of you and then 
say do you want to come back for nothing…It was adding salt to the wound” 
(Durden, 2011) 
While this did stop forces from publicly advertising the scheme, there have been 




Some forces are investigating inventive and innovative ways of recruiting different 
types of individuals into the Special Constabulary, for example, some forces are 
designing and funding Special Constabulary pop up shops for each local policing 
area to support future recruitment drives and target hard to reach communities. 
Other forces are developing and producing ways to capture volunteering good 
news stories centrally to review so that it can be released both within the outside 
the organisation to be used as a recruitment incentive and raise general 
awareness. In 2009 a recruitment marking and retention sub-group formed a list 
of objectives which identified the market for Special Constable recruitment to 
support forces in their recruitment activity, identified blockages to recruitment in 
order to allocate funding to forces and alleviate any blockages found, and to 
research retention issues and activity (NPIA, 2010). This was obtained through 
an online recruitment marketing survey sent to all 43 police forces. The survey 
found that the most commonly used form of recruitment was through the police 
forces’ website (96.3%), word of mouth (85.2%) with only 11.1% of those 
recruited through modern media such as Facebook, YouTube or Twitter (NPIA, 
2010). Blockages identified were found within HR support, training, uniform, 
equipment and resources needed (NPIA, 2010) meaning that forces 
infrastructure was struggling to train and equip large scale increases in Special 
Constables physically. Therefore the NPIA (2010) argued that Special 
Constables should be internally marketed through the forces own intranet, aware 
nominations, internal force publications, senior officer reports and being included 
within the policing plan. It was argued that internal marketing would enable police 
staff and officers to obtain a greater understanding of the Special Constabulary 
role, ultimately adding to integration and organisational support. This could 
improve the Special Constables impression of feeling valued by forces, impacting 
upon retention rates (NPIA, 2010). 
Pay Incentive 
Payment has been considered at various stages in history as both a recruitment 
and retention took. Special Constables do not receive payment for their duties 
although they are eligible for reimbursement of legitimate expenses. In 1992 the 
regulations were changes with the Special Constables Amendment Regulations 
allowing forces to pay Specials a bounty payment of up to £400 providing they 
fulfilled certain strict criteria; however, this “fell out of use” (Home Office Circular 
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10/2003, paragraph 3). A 1997 review by the HMIC considered whether Special 
Constables should be paid and agreed with the conclusions of an earlier Home 
Office report that they should not (HMIC, A Special Relationship: Police Forces, 
The Special Constabulary and Neighbourhood Watch, 1997). Due to declining 
numbers, the Labour Government did change the rules with effect from the 10th 
of January 2003. The Special Constables (Amendment) Regulations SA 
2002/3180 allowed police authorities, following a recommendation from the Chief 
Officer to make proposals to pay a locally funded allowance to Special 
Constables within their force, however according to a Prime Ministers questions 
in March 2005 there had been little take-up of this scheme.  
The Special Constables (Amendment) Regulations of 2002 introduced a more 
concerted and deliberately innovative attempt to incentivise Special Constables 
to volunteer more often. Police Authorities were empowered to pay their Special 
Constables an allowance with the amount being decided upon locally subject to 
the agreement of the Home Secretary. A small number of forces implemented 
this scheme, namely Durham, Humberside, Cumbria and West Midlands Police. 
For example Durham Constabulary introduced a bounty scheme in 2004, costing 
£127,000 in 2010 where Special Constables were paid an annual bounty in return 
for agreeing to work 50% more than the nationally accepted 16hrs per month. In 
2010 the payments followed according to rank; Special Constables (£1,650), 
Special Sergeant (£1,900), Special Inspector (£2,200) and Special Chief 
Inspector (£2,500). Evaluation of the bounty payment regime was valued by 
participating Special Constables and contributed significantly to the number of 
hours for which they volunteered. However when compared with neighbouring 
forces, Special Constabularies which had no bounty scheme, no marked 
difference was found in the number of hours for which Special Constables 
volunteered. Therefore the evaluation concluded that such as scheme did not 
deliver value for money (Durham Constabulary Scheme Evaluation, S.C. Burn, 
2010) however it would have been interesting to consider the scheme in terms of 
Specials feeling valued and invested in by the force.  
The Increasing Use and Recruitment of Special Constables 
With the incoming role of Police Crime Commissioner in local election areas, 
nearly all those obtaining the office outlined large-scale recruitment drives, and 
the use of Special Constables across forces to alleviate decreasing resources 
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and funding. As highlighted above, the challenge would be to train and deploy 
these officers properly. As the Special Constabulary increase in numbers, there 
will be increasing pressure for Specials to be given more interesting and varied 
roles within the police service to fit their capabilities. An interesting point to 
consider that the National Strategy of Special Constabulary (2008) argued that it 
should be ensured that the Specials were not in competition with other members 
of the policing family. One issue facing the extensive scale recruitment of 
Specials has been the opening of recruitment for the regular police force after a 
four-year recruitment freeze. Both recruiting and training new Special Constables 
will become increasingly challenging as forces turn their attention to taking on 
regular officers with resources such as assessment centres being used once 
again for regular recruitment, although with regular officer numbers being much 
reduced overall. Speaking to the Police Oracle, ACC Michael Banks (the ACPO 
Lead on the Special Constabulary) stated that the same would become true for 
the professional development resources, adding that a way of keeping the flow 
of Specials coming through the ranks needed to be found 
(http//touch.policeoracle.com/news/article.html?id+61434 ). As the Special 
Constabulary becomes an increasingly desirable resource as budgets are 
squeezed, ACC Banks acknowledged that there were significant opportunities for 
the Special Constabulary in the current policing landscape including the chance 
to specialise but admitted that “the real difficulty we have at the moment is 
focused on throughput”. One example ACC Banks gave was that he was aware 
of a force with some 700 people wanting to become Specials and the challenges 
the forces found getting those applicants actually through the door. A larger 
Special Constabulary does have its advantages with volunteer officers providing 
some 2.5 million hours in 12 months, which would have cost the taxpayer 
approximately £38 million  
(http://touch.policeoracle.com/news/article.html?id=55982).  
Recruitment has been aided by the Coalition Government’s consultation paper 
calling for greater individual involvement in the public sector and in particular 
policing, including the promotion of volunteering opportunities including the 
Special Constabulary (Home Office, 2010:25). The eagerness from forces to 
expand their volunteer forces corresponds with the budgetary cuts with a national 
recruitment target of 24,000 for 2015, however after an increase until 2012, this 
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growth proved to be unsustainable with figures falling ever since. Most forces are 
undergoing a review of their Special Constabulary recruitment and retention 
processes, especially after the most recent recruitment drives failing to provide a 
significant increase in numbers. Forces need to ensure efficiently and cost-
effective, seamless recruitment processes with identified ownership at each 
stage so that outcomes can be mapped and published. By designing a Special 
Constabulary pathway programme and providing information, general awareness 
within the police organisation would increase and consideration being made to 
take accredit of any prior learning for Specials with independent patrol status 
when and if they apply to be a regular officer providing potential cost savings. 
While there are operational and financial costs associated with high volunteer 
turnover and wastage rates (Watson and Abzug, 2010), traditional volunteer 
management practices tend to concentrate on recruitment rather than retention. 
The consistent need for recruitment highlights the failings of voluntary 
organisations to successfully deal with retention issues through managerial 
practices (e.g. Brudney and Meijs, 2009). Despite the development of better work 
environments being proven to influence the retention of volunteers (e.g. Waikayi 
et al., 2012) few organisations have devoted resources or monetary funds 
towards the management and retention of volunteers as they do paid staff (e.g. 
Mook et al., 2007). Recognising some of these issues, Brudney and Meijs (2009) 
highlighted the need for organisations to move away from traditional volunteers’ 
management practices to those which would sustain engagement and encourage 
retention rates.  
During the Comprehensive Spending Review, the majority of forces froze their 
recruitment of regular paid officers so that when recruitment began again, forces 
looked to the Special Constabulary as a recruitment pool for new regular police 
officers. In September 2010 the Metropolitan Police Authority endorsed a new 
approach to recruitment where the focus was on Special Constables who had 
already achieved independent patrol status. This meant that they would have a 
ready supply of recruits who already had some training and on the street training, 
knowledge and experience. The Police Advisory Board endorsed this approach 
to recruitment viewed as significantly reducing the time required for initial training, 
lowering training costs by approximately £12,000 to £20,000 per recruit. 
Information from 2009 suggested that those who had previously been Special 
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Constables had the highest success rate in passing the regular police force 
assessment process than those recruits who had not. In 2009/10 9% or 1,758 
candidates stated that they had previously served or were serving as Special 
Constables (Winsor, 2011) and these candidates had a higher success (72.5%) 
than the 17,674 candidates who had not served as Special Constables (64.3%). 
Professor Disney as part of the Winsor Report Part One evaluating the average 
success rate for the national assessment process between 2006 and 2011 finding 
that those with previous experience of policing such as being a Special 
Constables, performed better with an increased probability of success of between 
7% and 10% (Winsor, 2011).  
The Metropolitan Police Authority recruitment process also made it beneficial for 
individuals interested in a regular police career to serve as Special Constables or 
PCSOs while also requiring participating in passing a course of accredited 
learning, police law and community certificate a national vocation level 3 
qualifications. The qualification covers topics such as communities, legislation, 
and policing before they become regular police officers remaining valid for three 
years. Metropolitan Police personnel would be eligible for the internally delivered 
course while external applicants would be required to finance the course 
themselves. The Metropolitan Police Authority believed that this shift away from 
the traditional recruitment process to one focusing upon learning before the 
application process reducing training costs, improving operational capability and 
reducing turnover of new officers by asking recruits to prove and invest in their 
development. The Police Federation while recognising the value of recruiting 
regulars from the Special Constabulary argued that it reduces and restricts the 
potential applicant pool and would ultimately have an adverse effect upon police 
workforce diversity (Winsor Report, 2011). This recruitment process would also 
have long-term effects upon the Special Constabulary retention rates with recruits 
joining with the sole purpose of becoming regular police officers, therefore, 
providing only a rolling short-term service for the voluntary force. Since this thesis 
began, however, this recruitment route is not being enforced with it not being an 
actual requirement although a large number of Specials were successful in 
obtaining a job within the regular police force.  
The use of the Special Constabulary as a career stepping stone is not new, with 
Gill and Mawby (1990) demonstrating that from the 1980s the Specials have been 
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viewed as a career step. Most recruits were initially attracted to the role by 
another officer, regular or Special (Leon, 1989 Scottish Police Advisory Board, 
1975) and reliance on word of mouth recruitment strategies had consequences 
for the type of people who got selected (Gill and Mawby, 1990). ACPO supported 
the steps being taken by the Metropolitan Police in recruiting future candidates 
from the Special Constabulary and further suggested that police staff should also 
be encouraged to volunteer within the PSVs and Special Constabulary (ACPO, 
2010). The Police Federation cautioned against the overuse of this approach as 
it would reduce police forces operational resilience, especially for critical police 
staff roles. ACPO also noted that the aims and attributes of the Special 
Constabulary affiliate with the governmental objective of increasing volunteers in 
general and that forces should encourage a national strategy for the recruitment 
of Special Constables (ACPO, 2010). The Winsor Report (2011) stressed that it 
should be borne in mind that the Special Constabulary was to be used in support 
of regular police officers and should not be seen as a replacement for regular 
police officers.  
As Special Constabularies contribution to policing becomes more in-depth, these 
volunteers will need to maintain a high level of dedication and professionalism to 
meet various targets which forces must support and continually develop if they 
are to keep up with the contemporary challenges of policing. With the growing 
complexity of policing, one of the challenges facing the Special Constabulary is 
how they are to cope with the full range of duties and expectations. Both the force 
and Special Constabulary need to be realistic about what can be expected and 
what role the Specials should play within the force and community should be. The 
National Strategy for the Special Constabulary (2008) made it clear that the core 
role of an officer is to patrol and reassure the local community, arguing that the 
Special Constabulary should play to its strengths, becoming embedded as a key 
element of neighbourhood policing to provide a consistent and visible presence 
within the community. If forces are to expect more from their increasing Special 
Constabularies, then they must be sure to value this voluntary force by including 
them within the wider policing plans and providing them with the equipment and 
training necessary.  
Northamptonshire Review (2014) found the same results with the primary 
motivation for people joining the Special Constabulary in Northamptonshire was 
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for a career in the regular police force, especially those of a younger age. They 
also found that advertising played a minimal role in encouraging people to 
become Specials. Indeed the review acknowledged that the pressure to increase 
the number of Specials in the short term had not been reflected in the long-term 
retention of Specials due in part to the motivations of those who are joining 
(Northamptonshire, 2014). A corresponding variable to motivations for joining is 
the age of those joining. Gaston and Alexander’s (2001) study indicated that the 
younger age group (those aged 18-21 and 22-25 years of age) joined with the 
primary reasons for becoming a regular police officer (62.5% and 30.3%). None 
of those aged 41 years and over and less than one in five (19.2%) of those 
between 36-40-year-old category gave this motivation for joining (ibid). 
In contrast, the older age group gave more altruistic reasons for joining, such as 
wanting to help the community, doing something worthwhile and concern for law 
and order. This data suggests that the motivation and age of the recruits have 
significant implications for the length of service provided and is another reason 
why Specials recruitment if they remain voluntary, should target an older recruit 
with a more stable family and work life. Gaston and Alexander (2001) stated that 
31.8% of officers who gave their main motivation for joining as helping the 
community were still serving, compared with only 5.7% of those who joined with 
an interest in policing or becoming a police officer.  
“I feel, having spoken to several Special Constable colleagues, that the main 
reason for leaving is that they tend to join the Specials as a way of gaining 
valuable experience in police work and social skills for when applying to join the 
regulars. When they are turned down, and when they see the majority of people 
getting in who have no experience of police work, they are disappointed and 
frustrated and very often feel that all their hard work and commitment has been 
a waste of time…”(Free text comment, Gaston and Alexander, 2001) 
Research, therefore, indicated that unmet expectations develop in the initial 
stages of employment and can result in a lack of commitment and increased staff 
turnover (e.g. Hiltrop, 1995; Louis, 1980) making it an essential factor in both 
police recruitment and retention. Regarding Special Constabulary recruitment 
and retention, forces need to make sure that applicants have the right motivations 




3.4 Specials Training 
A prominent themes within any research upon the Special Constabulary is 
training, with a number studies demonstrating that the training provided does not 
equip Specials with the know-how and skills needed to conduct their role (e.g. 
Leon, 1991; Mirrlees-Black and Byron, 1994; Davis, Smith and Rankin, 1999; 
Gaston and Alexander, 2001; NPIA, 2010; Whittle, 2014). One respondent in 
Mirrlees-Black and Byron (1994, p.18) noted ‘And the training I found to be quite 
unsatisfactory (dangerously so) Specials should at least know the basic law 
before they are lobbed out on to the streets’ and another ‘My expectations of the 
training have not been met. I do not feel confident to go out on the streets as a 
member of the constabulary’. Studies have also indicated that special constables 
are ignorant of basic administrative procedures, such as how to claim expenses 
(Mirrlees-Black and Byron 1994). Whittle (2014) found that almost 40% of the 
special constables who participated in his study reported that they did not feel 
ready for unaccompanied patrol after training and 46% did not believe the 
transition from training school to becoming operationally independent was well 
handled. Regular officers too are sceptical about whether special constables are 
adequately trained. Nearly 80% of the regular officers who participated in Leon’s 
study believed that the training of special constables was inadequate (Leon 
1991). The implications are potentially quite significant. It raises questions about 
the ways that special constables can judiciously be deployed within the service, 
it feeds the perception, held by some regular officers at least, that special 
constables are ‘amateurs’, and it is resented by special constables themselves 
because they do not feel operationally competent and they are unable to 
participate in all roles in the service. 
The suggestion is that the initial generic training provides a useful overview of the 
role but insufficient detail on the legal and practical matters that Special 
Constables find themselves dealing with due to the wide range of incidents and 
jobs they could be potentially facing. Indeed, it was common for special 
constables to state that they needed ‘better initial training on practical skills’. 
However, as well as drawing attention to the limitations of their initial training, 
special constables participating in this study drew attention to the need for 
continuous ongoing training, something that was not being given. The link 
between job designs, content and personal satisfaction have been investigated 
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within the literature and is an important factor when looking into wastage (e.g. 
Hackman et al., 1975). Training is a particular area which has been highlighted 
as very important to serving Special Constables with only a slight majority of 
(57%) reporting being satisfied or very satisfied with the training they were 
receiving with almost a quarter (23.7%) reporting being dissatisfied or very 
dissatisfied (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). When former Special Constables were 
asked the same questions, these figures declined with only 52.5% being satisfied 
and almost a whole third 32.8% reporting some degree of dissatisfaction. 
“. . . It would have been nice to have had things explained instead of just being 
thrown into the deep end and told to get on with it. When you have never done 
anything like it before, you are worried sick because it is other people’s lives you 
are dealing with, and you don’t know if you are doing the right thing” (Free Text 
Comment, Gaston & Alexander, 2001) 
Hiltrop (1995) remarked that “The organisation should be a vehicle with which 
individuals can develop personal pride and express important values about their 
work to their friends, family and relatives”. However within the Special 
Constabulary less than half (47.7%) of serving Specials and only 38.9% of former 
Specials believed that the police service are using them effectively all or most of 
the time (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). Instead with 43.3% of both groups asked 
felt that they were being used effectively, 10.3% of serving and 16% of former 
Special Constables stated that they were never or seldom deployed effectively 
(Gaston & Alexander, 2001). There are genuine dangers here of Special 
Constables further development not being utilised and with many force using 
Specials as instructors who have not been prepared for the role, ultimately 
meaning that competency could be affected although Gill & Mawby (1990) argued 
that this would be eventually reflected in the type of people becoming Specials.  
Overwhelmingly Special Constables surveyed in previous literature, placed 
enormous value on being adequately trained, not only in initial training but in 
terms of continuous development (e.g. NPIA, 2009; Gaston & Alexander, 2001). 
One of the most significant changes which Specials believed would make a 
difference, was “to have more training” and in particular further and 
developmental training (NPIA, 2009). All this evidence indicates that a more 
structured and frequent training for the Special Constabulary could have the 
desired effect upon their level of confidence and competence, significant 
especially if forces are looking to improve their professionalism. Indeed, this is 
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one area in which forces have tried to make some progress. However, most 
improvements have been made in terms of training provided within the 
probationary period of a Specials’ career. This helps them to gain independent 
patrol status (at which point they become most useful to the police force) with 
little or no improvement in the further development of Special Constables once 
out of probation.  
3.5 Specials Retention 
The high levels of attrition within the Special Constabulary is not a new area of 
concern and indeed has been the focus of recent projects including Mirrlees-
Black and Byron (1994); Alexander (2000); Gaston and Alexander (2001) and 
Whittle (2014). These very findings, however, suggest that forces are still failing 
to understand the nature of the problem or put in any measures in place to 
counteract these attrition issues. Literature on the retention of volunteers, often 
cities negative experiences within organisations rather than personal factors, as 
being behind the reasons as to why individuals choose to leave, such as a lack 
of relevant training, inadequate supervision, uninteresting duties (Alexander, 
2000) and feelings of being overburdened and undervalued (Locke, Ellis & Davis-
Smith, 2003). For the Special Constabulary in particular retention issues, lead to 
problems in costs, training and equipment and is one area which is very important 
in respect to the Special Constabulary getting a better long-term investment for 
their officers. Some evidence point to the majority of Special Constables serve 
for only two years or less (e.g. Whittle, 2014; Britton, 2017b) creating value for 
money issues for forces. Indeed Britton (2017b, p.7) found that attrition rates for 
the Special Constabulary have actually increased over the past five years.  
Neyroud (2001) stated that the Special Constabulary has long been a neglected 
dimension of public policing with governmental and police support being 
lukewarm, despite various series of relaunches and working parties. The Special 
Constabulary is a demanding form of volunteering, and legal changes such as 
the introduction of health and safety legislation have made it even more so by 
requiring higher standards of fitness and training (Neyroud, 2001). These 
increasing demands have meant that the Specials are attracting those individuals 
with interest in a career within policing and as a result, this has led to very high 
turnover and wastage rates. Factors often cited as reasons behind these high 
attrition rates include joining the regular force, updating of records, the domestic-
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work life balance, moving and changes in work commitments (e.g. Alexander, 
2000; NPIA, 2010). With these rates not only continuing but increasing it would 
appear that little has been done to prevent this loss. While all volunteer 
organisations experience “involuntary turnover” over which they have very little 
control (e.g. Jamison, 2003), there is also evidence to suggest that internal 
factors are also leading to Specials decision to resign. This could create a severe 
problem for police forces because the Special Constabulary is a significant part 
of police visibility. 
All voluntary organisations are investing and investigating ways to retain their 
volunteers, and the Special Constabulary is no different. Some of the 
predominant reasons why Specials decided to leave is seen as “…beyond the 
control of the police force itself…” such as work or study commitments, joining 
the regular force and for domestic reasons (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). Mirrlees-
Black and Byron (1994, p.51) did remark that“…it may be difficult for those 
resigning to identify one particular reason for leaving and, indeed the ultimate 
reason given may not be the original cause of the process of deciding to leave”. 
Presently police forces are attempting to improve their retention rates, through 
obtaining information from the Specials who exist or leave the force, through 
questionnaires designed to identify any reasons or problems behind their 
decision to leave. Then from these questionnaires, the forces could either deal 
with these issues or address them in order to stop other Specials leaving as a 
result. However, an NPIA survey (2009) of 13 forces which were using this 
method as a retention strategy stated that proactive intervention at a much earlier 
stage should be considered by forces, to negate these issues and to improve 
their retention rates further. By relying upon leavers’ questionnaires, forces are 
waiting until they are effectively losing staff before addressing any problems. In 
the specific literature on the Special Constabulary, Gaston & Alexander (2001) 
found that the most frequent reasons provided for resigning from the Special 
Constabulary were work/study commitments (22%), joining the regular police 
force (19%), domestic reasons (15%), inadequate supervision by Specials 
supervisors, a lack of training, not feeling valued, uninteresting duties and not 
being deployed in a worthwhile manner.  
Special Constables indicated that Specials wanted to be more effective at 
carrying out their duties and fulfilling their role. However, various constraints were 
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working against them, achieving this. These constraints included not being able 
to drive the police vehicles, a lack of training, a lack of equipment available, a 
lack of meaningful deployments and a generally negative attitude towards the 
voluntary force from within the organisations (Dash-O’Tool & Fahy, 2010). Other 
factors identified by Special Constables as having a particularly negative impact 
upon their volunteer experience and likely to make them consider leaving were 
negative attitudes from police colleagues, a lack of meaningful deployment and 
regular supervision, a lack of equipment and welfare support (Dash-O’Tool & 
Fahy, 2010). All of these factors impacted upon their impression and feeling of 
being valued by the force.  
Therefore in order to retain their voluntary officers, Hedges (2000) reported that 
police forces should: say thank you and give recognition for their contribution to 
policing, to provide a clear role definition, to provide continuous training and 
further development, meaningful deployments and effective management, to 
ensure their integration into the wider policing family through the monitoring of 
regular officers attitudes towards them and ensure that their supervisors had the 
skills to lead. Dash-O’Tool & Fahy’s (2010) findings also supported these points, 
with 19% of the Specials reporting a clear definition of their role as most important 
in feeling valued by their police force, relating to the original statement of this 
thesis that police forces need to clarify what the role of the Special Constabulary 
actually is.  
As already acknowledged within Special Constabulary recruitment, the blockages 
to their numbers are not limited to the marketing tactics but also their other 
internal processes such as training, equipment, uniform and HR (Specials NPIA, 
2009). Indeed most of these blockages are named as reasons for leaving by most 
Specials. Therefore forces should ensure that their retention strategies are also 
designed to resolve these issues within their internal processes as well.  It has 
been suggested that forces should consider an internal Special Constabulary 
survey to help identify areas that could be contributing their retention rates, and 
which could be used to enhance their retention strategies in the long term 
(Specials NPIA, 2009). Gaston & Alexander (2001) asked former and serving 
Specials to choose from a list of 19 options for the three main reasons for 
resigning. While these reasons remained the same as seen in the previous 
research, the five other most frequently cited reasons revealed a very different 
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picture. In Gaston & Alexander (2001) both former and serving Special 
Constables indicated that poor supervision, a lack of training, not feeling valued, 
uninteresting duties and not being deployed in a worthwhile manner, were all 
major factors in them either resigning or considering resigning. All of these factors 
are ones which senior police management do have a degree of control over. 
Gaston & Alexander (2001) also found that of those who had resigned from the 
Special Constabulary, over one-tenth (11.6%) had resigned within one year of 
joining. The number of Special Constables who had resigned then rose to one 
third (31.1%) within the first two years and with almost half of those resigning 
(49.2%) having gone within three years (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). When those 
who looked at the Special Constables as a stepping stone into the regulars found 
that this did not materialise, they became disillusioned and subsequently 
resigned.  
There were also some interesting gender differences within the data on former 
Special Constables. Female Specials, in general, were found to join at a younger 
age than male Specials, with 29% of females serving as Specials having joined 
aged 21 years or younger compared with 22.9% of men (Gaston & Alexander, 
2001). Female Specials were significantly more likely to have resigned within five 
years of joining than their male counterparts (ibid). There was also a significant 
difference for both males and females, across the former and serving Special 
Constables with regards to their marital status. Gaston & Alexander (2001) found 
that almost half of the men (47.3%) were married at the time of joining the Special 
Constabulary, compared with one third (33.3%) of women, and that women who 
joined were more likely to be single or divorced. While the marital profile for men 
was similar across both serving and former Special Constables, for women there 
were significantly more married and cohabited serving female Specials then 
those in the former Special Category (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). It was also 
established that females who were married or co-habiting on joining the Special 
Constabulary were more likely to serve for longer while over half of all divorcees 
(55.5%) had left before completing two years’ service, and 42.1% of those who 
were single had also left within this same time period (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). 
The majority (52.9%) of female Special Constables who were married on joining 
gave more than four years’ service before resigning (Gaston & Alexander, 2001).  
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The data collected by Gaston & Alexander (2001) suggests that those recruits, 
who were settled in their personal lives, and with fewer life choices still to make, 
were more likely to provide a longer length of service. Older and married recruits 
have much lower wastage levels than young and single recruits (ibid). This data 
needs to be considered by forces, especially in terms of Special Constabulary 
recruitment, as by repeating the same recruitment strategies as before, they will 
continue to recruit young individuals resulting in a high turnover and wastage rate. 
This data should instead be taken into account by police forces when they are 
planning their advertising and recruitment campaigns with more being done to 
attract the older (over 30 years) recruits with the aim of being a Special 
Constables, rather than joining the regular force.  
A sense of emotional attachment, of being “part of the family” is fundamental in 
terms of retaining volunteers and making volunteers fell satisfied in their role (e.g. 
Galindo-Kuhn & Guzeley, 2001). Emotional and task-orientated support are two 
of the most important factors for volunteers (e.g. Fuller et al., 2003) and 
corresponds to the reasons given by Specials Constables in their leaving 
questionnaires. Volunteer organisations lack the usual instrumental means to 
motivate and engage their staff such as wages (e.g. Pearce, 1993), and this 
means that there are on-going issues of attracting, motivating and retaining 
volunteers. Without these financial motivations, police forces must take into 
account why people are choosing to volunteer in the first place in order to 
maintain their interest in continuing service. As discussed in terms of recruitment, 
a large proportion of those joining the Special Constabulary are young and using 
the voluntary workforce to obtain a career within the regular police force. This 
means that they did not join the Special Constabulary to volunteer. Therefore it 
could be argued it will be largely unaffected by any means to promote their 
attachment and loyalty to the Special Constabulary. Instead, they are merely in 
transition onto a career within the regulars.  
Research has already indicated that when unmet expectations develop in the 
initial stages of employment, the result can be a lack of commitment and 
increased staff turnover (e.g. Hiltrop, 1995; Louis, 1980). Therefore it is important 
from police recruitment and management perspective, that applicants for the 
Special Constabulary have the right motivation and realistic expectations about 
what the role involves and can offer. The literature refers to this as the 
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“psychological contract” which Rousseau (1990) defines as the “…set of 
expectations held by the individual employee that specifies what the individual 
and the organisation expect to give and receive in the working relationship”. 
These contracts are dynamic and open-ended and are concerned with the social 
and emotional aspects of the employer-employee communication, not revolving 
around the money, and therefore apply to both volunteers and paid staff. Poor 
psychological contracts consequently lead to premature wastage with Sparrow 
(1995) saying “poor contracts act as demotivators and are reflected in higher 
withdrawal behaviour (lower commitment, absenteeism, turnover).  
Special Constables Numbers 
Despite large-scale recruitment drives across the police forces in England and 
Wales, the number of Special Constables in 2016 is lower than ever. This 
reduction continues with 16,042 Special Constables nationally at the end of 
September 2015 and only 14,864 by the end of 2016 (Hargreaves et al., 2017). 
Outside of PCSOs, the Special Constabulary had the largest reduction 
percentage of all types of police workers during this time period. When Gill & 
Mawby (1990) investigated Special Constabulary retention rates, they concluded 
that Special Constables stayed because they enjoyed the work and that the 
uniform provided them with an identity. Based on a small scale survey within the 
Metropolitan Police of those choosing to leave the Special Constabulary (Hope & 
Lloyd, 1984) Gill & Mawby (1990) suggested that these were those recruits who 
were more welfare-oriented and that they were leaving due to the priorities made 
on “real” police work. In that survey 42% of those who left suggested that it was 
certain features of the work that they saw as coming unpleasant, e.g. “Yes when 
I was doing police type work and no because I was asked to do some ridiculous 
hours on some mundane jobs that the regular police didn’t want to do” (Gill & 
Mawby, 1990). 
In 2013 after police forces outlined their planned responses to the 
Comprehensive Budget Review (2010), the HMIC (2012) reported that there was 
a planned sharp increase in the number of Special Constables with some 
suggestions that the national figure could rise to 24,800 by March 2015, which 
would be the highest figure for almost 40 years. This increase was to be achieved 
with an increase from just under 15,000 Specials in 2009 to just over 20,000 by 
2012 (Home Office, 2015). However Special Constable strength had decreased 
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year on year (2.1% rate) previous to 2004, then there was an increase until a 
peak figure was reached in 2012 of 20,352 (9.4%) (Allen & Dempsey, 2016). This 
corresponds with the various continued recruitment drives. However after this 
initial peak in 2012, despite the continued recruitment drives, the number of 
Special Constables has actually declined. In 2013 there were 19,011 Special 
Constables a 6.5% reduction on the previous year and a wastage rate of 25% 
(Berman & Dar, 2013). This decline continued into 2015 with the statistics 
indicating there were 16,101 Special Constables by the 30th March 2015, a 9.4% 
reduction on the previous year and a wastage rate of 31% (Home Office, 2015). 
However, in the 12 months leading to 31st March 2016, 4,606 Specials joined 
while 4,138 left (Allen & Dempsey, 2016). It should be noted that 10% of police 
officer joiners in the year to March 2016 were previously Special Constables. 
Hargreaves et al. (Home Office, 2017) reported there being 14,864 Special 
Constables by the end of September 2016, a decrease of 7.3% from 2015.  
3.6 Feeling Valued 
Feeling under-valued will undoubtedly have an impact on how volunteers 
experience their roles and are closely associated with retention numbers 
(Rochester et al. 2010). A simple thank you, the NPIA (2010) suggest, might be 
enough for special constables to feel valued. However, they also note that 
meaningful deployment and integration with regular officers foster feelings of 
being valued (NPIA 2010). Having dealt with the former, “we focus on the latter 
view the Specials were more of a liability than an asset’ (Seth 1961, pp. 83–84), 
views which are evident in more recent research. Gill and Mawby (1990, p. 131) 
drew attention to an ‘undercurrent of scepticism amongst the police themselves’. 
With Special Constables reporting that they were not integrated into the regular 
service, were ridiculed by regular officers and felt unwelcome, Mirrlees-Black and 
Byron (1994) found that the attitude of regular officers was a matter of 
disappointment for some. The NPIA (2010) also asked Special Constables who 
had negative experiences working for the police to describe those experiences. 
Almost a half referred to the attitude of regular officers and police staff (NPIA 
2010). Similarly, Whittle (2014) found that 20% of respondents to his survey felt 
that a divide between regular officers and Special Constables still existed, and a 
further 44% stated that there was a partial divide. While an undercurrent of 
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scepticism may remain, there is certainly some complexity to the relationship 
between the paid and voluntary police workforces.  
Special Constables report variable experiences from highly positive ones to 
highly negative ones (Leon 1991; Mirrlees-Black and Byron 1994). This variance 
might result from the nature of the personal relationships forged between special 
and regular officers. Research has revealed a distinction between regular 
officers’ generalised, sometimes negative, attitudes towards the Special 
Constabulary as a collective body and officers’ specific attitudes towards the 
individual special constables with whom they work which are often much more 
positive (Gill and Mawby 1990, Leon 1991, Mirrlees-Black and Byron 1994, 
Gaston and Alexander 2001). While over 90% agreed that they felt accepted by 
the regular officers that they worked with, this fell to just under 60% and 65% 
when considering the extent to which special constables felt accepted by regular 
officers on the whole and by the organisation as a whole, respectively. While the 
special constable may be more likely to feel valued at the micro-level than at the 
macro-level, free text responses, nevertheless, demonstrated that there is a 
minority of regular officers who hold pejorative attitudes towards the Special 
Constabulary. One stated that ‘on the whole, the majority of regular officers are 
accepting and welcoming, but there a few who have an openly hostile attitude 
towards specials’, and another ‘sometimes [regular officers] can come across 
derogatory against specials although this depends on Rota’. 
Gaston & Alexander (2001) found that 75.1% of serving Special Constables 
asked, did believe the police service valued them, all or some of the time, 
correlating with 64.1% of former Specials. Gaston & Alexander (2001) argued, 
however, that the group that believed they were being deployed ineffectively and 
were feeling undervalued should be considered with concern, and seen as a 
priority for forces. 33.4% of serving Specials asked, stated that they had 
occasionally or frequently considered resigning within the previous 12 months 
and 69.2% of respondents felt generally undervalued or never valued (Gaston & 
Alexander, 2001). Other studies have demonstrated that sizable minorities of 
special constables do not feel valued by the police service as an organisation. 
NPIA (2010) found that about a quarter of special constables did not feel valued 
by the organisation, a similar proportion to that found some years earlier by 
Mirrlees-Black and Byron (1994). Whittle (2014) found that almost 40% of special 
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constables surveyed did not feel valued or only felt appreciated to an extent. With 
half of the respondents in this study agreeing that they were personally valued 
and just over half that the Special Constabulary was valued by the police service 
as an organisation, a similar theme was evident here.  
An example of how forces are trying to acknowledge the role and work done by 
Special Constables to demonstrate value would be that it is only in 2017 that the 
work and in some cases sacrifices made by Special Constables throughout 
history were acknowledged. On the 20th January 2017, a plaque was placed at 
Howard Street police Station to commemorate the deaths of five Special 
Constables who were killed during one of the worst air raids on Great Yarmouth 
during the Second World War. It was the first dedication by Norfolk Police to 
officers killed while on duty or serving. At 5.02 am two parachute mines fell one 
exploding close to a Special Constable’s sub-station where give Special 
Constables were trapped and killed inside.  
Many Specials argued that to feel valued forces only needed to receive a thank 
you, support and integrate them with the regular officers, be provided with 
responsibility and regularly communicated with. The factors which had a negative 
impact were negative attitudes from police colleagues, a lack of meaningful 
deployment and lack of regular supervision, a lack of equipment and a lack of 
welfare support (Dash-O’Tool & Fahy, 2010). When asked about what the force 
could do for the Special Constables to feel valued, 19% stated that a clear 
definition of the role as most important, followed by more support from the force, 
training provision and integration into the police family (all at 14%) (Dash-O’Tool 
& Fahy, 2010). Hedges (2000) reported that in order to retain the special 
constables, police forces should: say thank you and give recognition for their 
contribution, provide a clear role definition, provide continuous training and 
development, remote IT access, meaningful deployment, monitor the attitudes 
towards the specials from regular officers and police staff, provide effective 
management, ensure their integration into the policing family, and to ensure the 
supervisors have the skills to lead.  
3.7 The Integration of the Special Constabulary within the Wider Policing 
Family 
Despite a long history alongside the professional police force, and the 
Governmental White Paper “Building Communities, Beat Crime” championing a 
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model of an extended policing family (Mawby & Wright, 2008), on the whole, the 
Special Constabulary remain distinct outsiders within the force. It has been 
suggested that this could be partially due to a problem of integration and 
communication with regular officers (e.g. Berry et al., 1998, p.241), the structure 
of the Special Constabulary and the fractured relationship between the two, 
especially in times of regular police job losses. Parodied as “hobby bobbies”, 
traditionally the relationship between the regular officers and Special Constables 
has not been a good one, and in many ways, this will conflict with any force plans 
for greater productivity, efficiency and the effectiveness of the Special 
Constabulary and police as a whole. Although they frequently work in tandem, 
attending the same jobs, performing the same duties, not all “real police” are 
automatically respectful of their voluntary counterparts (N. Duerden, 2010, The 
Independent). Gill & Mawby (1990) noted that despite all the studies into the 
police subculture the specials are not mentioned within this context, surprising 
and inexplicable omission since the specials has access to the stations and police 
cars, interviews and social clubs.  
The relationship between the regular force and the Special Constabulary 
historically has been problematic, with the motives, competency and 
effectiveness of the Specials being called into question by regular officers (Gill & 
Mawby, 1990). There have been persisting myths within the regular constabulary 
about the qualifications and experiences of the Special Constabulary, which tend 
to be based upon a stereotypical view of the volunteer force (ibid). Carrad (2006) 
stated that the police service frequently misrepresents policing as being a 
specialised occupation for which the Special Constabulary are inadequately 
trained or insufficiently experienced. Any shortfall in training Carrad (2006) 
argues, is the responsibility of the force itself, not a justification for treating all 
Special Constables as substandard officers. Carrad (2006) also claimed that the 
perception among regular officers that volunteers complete a small number of 
duty hours and consequently have a lower level of experience is often inaccurate 
with many Special Constables undertaking a substantial number of duty hours 
per year. Indeed many long-serving Special Constables are well-educated 
individuals with successful careers and have largely chosen not to join the regular 
police force because of financial disadvantages (ibid). These individuals often 
have experiences of law or allied fields which if utilised correctly could be a 
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tremendous asset to police forces especially if working within more specialist 
fields such as forensic computing or forensic accountancy (ibid).  
An example of the common attitudes of regular officers towards their Special 
Constabulary colleagues, PC Ellie Bloggs (a PC blogger turned author) in her 
published book Diary of an On-Call Girl (2007) wrote about the Special 
Constabulary: “Most of them work just one day a week so how could they be 
anything else? To be completely and brutally honest about it, there is sometimes 
the perception within the regular force that a lot of them have just joined up solely 
to swan about on their days off in uniform and have a bit of power. That’s not 
necessarily a negative, though. A lot of real officers also joined for that very 
reason”. 
Ultimately PC Ellie Bloggs argued the Special Constabulary are rarely cut from 
the same cloth, and therein lies the problem common to all TV police dramas: an 
assumed superiority vs presumed inferiority. “Not all police like them, no, it’s true. 
Special Constables cannot follow cases through to court, for example, and so 
they cannot really help with investigations. And many specials can’t even take 
statements properly because they don’t know how to. If you can’t take a 
statement, then you don’t fully understand the law”. (PC Ellie Bloggs, 2007) 
Often because volunteer officer can only work one day a week at most, or even 
a couple of duties per month, they obviously cannot carry the same workload or 
in most cases develop the same expertise as a regular officer. This means that 
often the results of an arrest done by a Special Constable will result in work for a 
regular colleague instead which could result in strained relations between 
regulars and Specials. PC Ellie Bloggs (2007) had to admit however that: “They 
are unfailingly enthusiastic. And they do like to arrest. And because the job is 
voluntary, there is no shirking among them. Would I be happier to see more of 
them out on the street doing just that? Why not? The more, the merrier, I say.” 
The same type of problems could be seen during the workforce modernisation 
move of civilisation, with the introduction of both civilian support staff and paid 
PCSOs (Police Community Support Officers). When the PCSOs were introduced, 
(regardless of views about their viability or the necessity of the role) they were 
met with wide spread reluctance and sometimes open hostility and some civilian 
support staff report being treated as second-class citizens (e.g. Loveday, 1993; 
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Berry et al., 1998; HMIC, 2004). However, it should be noted that due to having 
civilian occupational contracts, police support staff and PCSOs can be made 
redundant like in any other profession, while police officers cannot be due largely 
to their lack of rights such as the right to strike. Resulting in police forces making 
their manpower reductions largely from within their civilian support staff as a 
means of cutting costs, due partially to the difficulties with reducing police officer 
numbers through anything but normal wastage and retirement. Several police 
forces across England and Wales did use the A19 process, which means that 
those officers who have completed their 30 years duty can be forcibly retired. 
However, officers from a number of forces have taken this decision to court and 
have won the first round, arguing it is age discrimination. This means 
unfortunately that these forces, if forced to pay compensation will be facing more 
staff cuts, and arguably the only people these officers have impacted are those 
who will lose their jobs as a result of this court action.  
In 1991 the National Association of Special Constabulary Officers (NASCO) was 
formed by two Merseyside sub-divisional Special Constables, was there was no 
national organisation of any sort specifically for the Special Constabulary. The 
NASCO offered discounted police equipment, hotels; shops run by members, 
legal advice and produced the bi-annual magazine “The Reservist” which aims to 
promote the work and role of the Special Constabulary. One of NASCO’s most 
significant achievements was the cataloguing of all reservist police officers killed 
on duty since 1801 accounting for all 529 Specials, reserve and parish 
constables. The NASCO was met with heavy opposition from within the police 
service, and particularly from Chief Commandants and other senior specials. The 
Merseyside police force circulated a memo to all police forces stating that NASCO 
had not been officially sanctioned by Merseyside, meaning that many senior 
specials took this as active disapproval and Special Constables were asked not 
to join.  
While the relationship between the Special Constabulary and regular police has 
always been traditionally “precarious”, there has been some progress to 
improving this with Special Beat, a magazine reporting in 1993 that “…relations 
between volunteer officers and Regulars have historically been steeped in 
animosity and distrust. That ill feeling is now well on the way to becoming a thing 
of the past”. When Gaston & Alexander (2001) investigated that overwhelming 
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majority of both serving and former Special Constables felt that they were 
personally accepted by the regular officers (with 89.5% and 79.9% reporting 
being generally or fully accepted).  However when the question was changed to 
how in general are the Special Constabulary accepted, 26.1% of serving and 
41.6% of former Special Constables stated that they were either not accepted or 
were neutral, as one respondent commented “The general attitude of Regulars 
towards Specials is not acceptable. We are generally regarded as being in the 
way rather than utilised as a resource” (Gaston & Alexander, 2001).  
Most telling perhaps was regular officers attitudes towards Special Constables 
something which even the Home Office acknowledged was important: “…the 
attitudes of Regular Officers towards Specials at all levels of a force are 
fundamental” (Home Office, 1996). When Gill & Mawby (1990) asked regular 
officers their personal attitudes to Special Constables, while very few would admit 
to a negative attitude personally, only 60% claimed they were personally 
positively disposed to Specials and when asked about regulars’ attitudes in 
general only 15% claimed regulars were positive in outlook. Gill & Mawby (1990) 
noted that their findings painted a depressing picture with Specials 
underestimating the hostility towards them. Gaston & Alexander (2001) also 
found that when regular officers were asked why they believe Special Constables 
joined their answers differed significantly from those given by the Special 
Constables themselves, signalling a gap in the attribution of motives between 
them. From the regular officers perspective, 73.1% joined the Special Constables 
as a stepping stone to join the regulars, and while the altruistic reasons such as 
helping the community (28.1%) do feature prominently, many self-centred 
motivations were also attributed to the Specials (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). 
These included such as to improve their social life (9.8%) and to gain status 
(23.8%), to gain power (17.2%) or to wear a police uniform (20.1) (Gaston & 
Alexander, 2001) and these figures stood in stark contrast to the responses given 
by former and serving Specials.  
With the Special Constabulary becoming more involved in a wider range of duties, 
there are many more opportunities for Specials involved in their scope to become 
more knowledgeable and capablities should a crisis warrant their wide-scale 
deployment. However, this does mean that there are also more opportunities for 
the Specials to appear as a threat to the regulars overtime and perceptions of 
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their professionalism. Therefore the evidence from Gill & Mawby (1990) and 
Gaston & Alexander (2001) hinted at an undercurrent of antipathy or even hostility 
of some police officers to their Special Constabulary counterparts. Gill and 
Mawby (1990) were surprised that despite the huge collection of academic 
literature and studies into police subculture, the Special Constabulary is not 
mentioned within this context, a surprising and inexplicable omission since 
Specials have access to the stations, police cars, interviews and social clubs.  
The results were considerably different when they sent out a questionnaire to 
regular officers with a number of informal interviews, all confirming a caucus of 
scepticism. While not many regulars were ready to admit a negative attitude 
towards the Special Constabulary personally, only 60% claimed they were 
positively disposed to Specials. When asked about regular officers attitudes 
towards Specials in general, only 15% claimed they were positive in outlook, half 
were indifferent and over a third unfavourable (Gill & Mawby, 1990). Regulars 
tended to stress that they could not understand Specials’ motives. 
One Chief Superintendent interviewed stated that “As a policeman, I find it difficult 
to understand why they do it for nothing. I have been paid well in my career, and 
it just seems incredible that someone should want to do it for nothing. I suppose 
it must be the excitement of doing something different” (Gill & Mawby, 1990). 
While a group of regular officers in an urban force lamented the role of the 
Specials as “depriving policemen of bread and butter” one also added “We can’t 
think of any logical reason why someone should want to be a special…if the rules 
say, they are too young or too fat to be a policeman they shouldn’t be a policeman 
(via the Specials)…They’re nice people, but they’re a pain in the arse, they’re an 
embarrassment” (Gill & Mawby, 1990).  
While perhaps it is not unusual for professionals to view volunteers as a threat to 
overtime and their professional status, nor for them to see volunteers as well-
meaning but mostly ineffective amateurs, Gill and Mawby (1990) stated that this 
paints a rather depressing picture with Specials underestimating the hostility of 
the regular force. There would appear to be an undercurrent of scepticism 
sometimes build upon ignorance or misinformation, although there was 
considerable recognition for the advantages of having a Special Constable 




For the integration of Special Constables into the broader police subculture, 
Specials are trained by regular officers, learning the police vocabulary, a taste of 
real police work, meaning that some aspects of police subculture such as racism 
and sexism are also not uncommon within the voluntary police force. Gill and 
Mawby (1990) found that some male regular officers commented that females 
only joined the Special Constabulary because they were attracted to men in 
uniform, an observation unsubstantiated by the study. When asked one female 
special said: “You hear about sexist professions, but the police have got to be 
worst. I nearly left at one point because it was so bad. Still, it does not worry me 
so much now”(Gill & Mawby, 1990). These views are sexist and reflect a clear 
lack of imagination (Gill & Mawby, 1990) since women specials can be involved 
in at least as many tasks as men (Leon, 1989). 
Gill and Mawby (1990) also concluded that the regular police act as gatekeepers 
to what the Specials can and are working. This means that for the Special 
Constabulary to be deployed more effectively, regulars must be encouraged to 
appreciate the role and value of the police volunteer. Specials are playing a much 
more significant role as the modern police force develops and to a large extent, 
they could be seen to be a microscopic version of the police. Interestingly, 
however, the more professionalised they become and higher standards are put 
in place, the more people will ultimately be excluded. Instead, Gill & Mawby 
(1990) argued that there was a much greater scope for integrating specials within 
the present structure, through the effective deployment of specials. The Police 
Federation’s narrow perspective of Specials means that they will continue to view 
the Specials as a threat which will only inhibit their integration into the force. 
Regular officers, Gill & Mawby (1990) suggested should receive information 
about Specials concerning their role and powers, within their initial training as Gill 
& Mawby (1990) “…many will be surprised by just how much a simple “thank you” 
can do for specials moral”. They also argued that that Specials themselves need 
to consider the advantages of having a national machinery in place to represent 
Specials views and interests, which would become all the more important as their 
role expands, as at the time there was very little liaison between the forces and 
opportunities for consultation on learning from various ideas was extremely 
limited. Gill & Mawby (1990) also stated that as the regular professional police 
forces were finding it difficult to demonstrate effectiveness or efficiency, the 
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Specials achievements could only at best be modest. However, they argued that 
the existence of the Specials has more justification than merely those focussed 
on crime and that the potential value of this volunteer police force may be quite 
marked. The Special Constabulary remain outsiders due to the fundamental fact 
that they are not regular officers. Not only is their existence deemed a threat, but 
volunteer literature recognises the benefit of volunteers being in an ideal position 
to publicise any misdemeanours within professional bodies or agencies (Gill & 
Mawby, 1990).  
3.8 Leadership and Ranks 
The Institute for Public Safety Crime and Justice published a critical review of the 
Specials “experience” in Northamptonshire in December 2014. This review found 
that the promotion structure was not well known, well understood or well 
marketed within the force, ultimately impacting upon the promotion opportunities 
found by Special Constables. Gaston and Alexander (2001) argued that detailed 
formation about the experiences of Special Constables is essential and will 
ultimately enable police managers to identify any shortcomings within their 
training, inappropriate deployment and unfulfilled individual potential. Indeed they 
proposed that with more informative understanding, policies and practices could 
then be developed and put into place, to create and sustain a positive contribution 
for the volunteers while meeting the needs and demands of the organisation 
(Gaston & Alexander, 2001). Suitable training, deployment, supervision and 
recognition are all vital components to increasing an organisation’s effectiveness 
and are equally as necessary within the police service and Special Constabulary 
(ibid). They stated that the relationship between the Special Constabulary and 
regular force staff needed to be further developed to have an impact upon the 
organisational functioning, through the education of regular officers about the 
roles and motives of Specials to help reduce any negative perceptions and poor 
working relationships (ibid). Through the integration of these two working groups, 
the activities of both would only improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the police service as a whole (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). The net effect of the 
changes within the management of the regular police is that the Special 
Constabulary while retaining its fundamental constitution has been much altered 




Specials Leadership  
In 2008 a Home Office Green Paper, provided fledging funding for a leadership 
training program to develop and enhance the capabilities of the Special 
Constabulary. A Senior Leadership Programme (SLP) was therefore designed 
and delivered, specifically tailored for the Special Constabulary (College of 
Policing 2016). The aim for this course was to improve the Special Constabulary’s 
understanding of leadership and to provide delegates with the ability to establish 
a clear set of values, ethics and standards while being able to deal with a range 
of differing and often competing standards. The overall object for the Specials’ 
SLP was to increase the capability of the Special Constabulary’s senior 
leadership by equipping them with the skills and knowledge to support their 
Specials Chief Officers in relation to performance and value for money (College 
of Policing, 2016). The course featured six areas of particular focus including 
emotional intelligence, negotiating and influencing, values and ethics, 
performance management, organisational change and public confidence (ibid). 
However, this course was not compulsory and in many forces did not take place 
or even offered. The fact that forces were considering proving such leadership 
training suggests that they had realised that there were some issues in relation 
to Specials leadership. 
Summary 
Almost all forces recognise the advantage of having ranks within the Special 
Constabulary as a form of showing value; however, there are varying levels of 
success and implementation. This thesis argues that force needs to make a 
decision in terms of ranks for the Special Constabulary in line with the decision 
about the very nature of the workforce. For example, if the force is to remain 
voluntary, is there any real need for ranks within the voluntary force or should 
instead they be placed under the supervision of a regular sergeant. If however, 
they are to become a reservist force then they should retain those ranks, but there 
should be a proper promotion process in which they sit the same exams, 
interviews and procedures as the regular paid officers, and the ranks would, 




Chapter Four: Policing in the 21st Century 
This chapter covers the vital issues and challenges facing the public police and 
policing within the 21st century, in particular, the changing nature of policing with 
the recent reforms and austerity measures being implemented within the UK. The 
chapter reports on how the police are adapting and coping with these various 
challenges and how they all affect the overall role and experience of the Special 
Constabulary within policing.  
4.1 Policing Today 
The provision of sovereign security and the maintenance of peace may be one of 
the oldest functions of civil society; however, the public police and policing have 
dramatically changed since their conception. Policing in the 21st century has 
become increasingly complex, with greater accountability, political and media 
scrutiny, all within a landscape of constantly changing trends and policy (Home 
Office, 2011). Modern policing within the UK is facing a period of transformation 
and adaptation, in a climate of diminishing resources and funding, combining with 
a period of ever-increasing public demand and expectations, sociological 
changes and ever real threat of national security. The social, cultural and political 
landscape in which the police operate is fluid with the trends and thoughts of the 
time, especially in a time of recession. The market in which the police operate 
has to adapt to accommodate changes within society, new service providers, new 
approaches/thoughts on law and order, new laws and acts of Parliament (usually 
the product of a social crisis, e.g. the riots of 2012) and the development of new 
technology. The law and order market continuously change to accommodate 
deviations within society, new service providers, new laws and Acts of 
Parliament, and the development of new technologies. With the Criminal Justice 
System stretched beyond its means (Bottoms, 1995), the old traditional justice 
system is struggling to cope with and to adapt to these changes within the UK 
culture, society and politics. Despite the fact that recorded crime continues to 
decrease, the demand upon the police service has not reduced in the same way. 
The other two prominent emergency services have seen changes to their 
demand, with fire and rescue services experiencing a long-term downward trend 
while there has been an ever-increasing demand upon the ambulance service 
(Knight Review, 2013). This led to proposals such as the Knight Review: Facing 
the Future (2013) which proposed a merger of fire and rescue services with one 
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or more of the blue light services and sharing governance structures which could 
result in considerable monetary gains. However, this idea has not yet been put 
into action and was largely hindered by local relationships between the 
organisations, but remains a future potential. The Government has already 
invested over £81 million since 2013 to help drive these blue light collaboration 
projects, and while there are some good local examples, the overall picture 
remains varied (Policing and Crime Bill: Emergency Services Collaboration; 
Home Office, 2016).  
Powerful public agencies such as the police and social service, each have their 
agendas, aims and goals (e.g. Crawford, 1998) creating issues of ownership and 
accountability for aspects of public life. The lack of shared data and knowledge 
has made public organisational reform particularly difficult and time-consuming. 
Throughout the years, the public police have become more isolated from their 
public, largely due to operational advancements such as mobile vehicle units, 
centrally controlled radios and constant supervisory accountability (Chan, 1997). 
These operational changes combine to move them further away from the 
romantic image of the local bobby walking their local beat.  
This chapter will have a look at some of the aspects of policing which have 
changed and how this has affected the role of the police officer before taking a 
detailed look at the financial challenge which the police service is facing and how 
they are adapting to austerity measures. 
4.2 Nature of Policing in the 21st Century 
Multiculturalism is now a daily reality for the frontline police officer, especially 
within certain forces areas and towns, for example, the Metropolitan police serve 
a London populace with under half being white British as of 2012 (Swindon, 
2012). This means that officers must now more than ever be attuned to an ever 
increasing range of expectations from a variety of people and cultures, from the 
individuals they meet on their beat to the representatives of local agencies and 
groups. Multicultraism creates various pressures upon the police service such as 
ethnic diversity and cultural differences (Chan, 1997); a loss of respect for 
authority a threat to their very legitimacy (e.g. Peterson, 2008) and terrorism (e.g. 
Innes, 2006) which affect some aspects of everyday policing for officers.  
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Ultimately police forces are adapting their policing service to meet the demands 
of these diverse communities that they serve, a challenge which remains a 
number one priority for the public police (e.g. Kennedy, 1993; Bucker, 1973). With 
available police resources undergoing wide scale reductions, the departmental 
workload continues to increase (e.g. Kennedy, 1993) steadily.  
One of the challenges facing the police is the wide variety of incidents, situations 
and contexts to which they can be called upon to respond, regardless if the 
primary responsibility for that emergency lies with another emergency service, as 
there can be some aspect to public safety to be maintained. For example 
maintaining the scene of a house fire in case of arson even though the primary 
responsibility of dealing with the immediate incident first lies with the fire service, 
or for many mental health incidents even though ambulance may also attend. 
Due to this factor, Loader (1997) has questioned whether the police could ever 
be able to satisfy public demand given the range of contexts to which the public 
may assume the attendance of a police officer.  
Bittner (2005; 1967) emphasised that despite crime fighting being a traditional 
defining feature of policing, actual crime-fighting accounts for only a fraction of 
what the public police do. For example, Kennedy (1993) estimated that around 
50-90% of all emergency calls to the public police have nothing to do with a crime 
having being committed, with officers only making an arrest or intervention in 
about 5% of the calls to which they are dispatched. Instead, officers perform many 
hidden activities within the community. These activities range from playing an 
informal role in resolving conflicts and providing psychological security in the 
community by being a visible symbolic figure, returning stray animals, mediating 
quarrels and providing direction (e.g. Lipsky, 1980). Recently there is research to 
suggested that police officers within the UK spend approximately 40% of their 
time dealing with incidents triggered by mental health issues (these may be 
crime-related or not), against the backdrop of corresponding cuts in social and 
healthcare services. Between 2011 and 2014, the overall number of incidents 
recorded in the police logs relating to mental health rose by a third (Quinn et al., 
2016). Actual crime rates across England Wales have been consistently falling 
according to both recorded crime figures and the British Crime Survey (e.g. 
Simmons et al., 2002). This has led to reformers of the police to state that the re-
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evaluation of the police was needed especially in reference to the amount of 
money being spent on law and order.  
HMIC (2017) report outlined the current state of policing in England and Wales, 
drawing attention to the material pressures being put upon the public police 
forces, and the strain that this is creating. HMIC (2017) stated that the police 
could not continue to fill in the gaps being left by the failings of other public 
services especially those within children and adolescent mental health care that 
were too often using the police as a service of the first resort. This report also 
highlights the huge increase in online fraud, increased awareness of crimes 
against the vulnerable (e.g. the sexual exploitation and abuse of children), and 
the fragmented state of the police information and communications technologies 
leave them vulnerable (HMIC, 2017). Overall this report indicated that in 
comparison to the first PEEL inspections, 18 police forces now required 
improvements in at least one of the inspection themes. While providing some 
examples of excellence found in the recent inspections, the HMIC (2017) 
stressed the need for police leaders to priorities, and to put into place long-term 
strategic plans by ensuring that their staff are properly trained, supported and 
equipped to carry out their job and to overall increase the pace of this 
improvement. Historically the police have always been less developed regarding 
their use of technology, and this report again emphasised how far behind other 
organisation the police. Modern technology could give the police more 
adaptability and enhance their ability to exchange, retrieve and analyses the 
intelligence gathered.  
In 2012 Theresa May, the Home Secretary, issued the Strategic Policing 
Requirement (SPR) to ensure that the police forces could deliver a robust national 
response to any threats to public safety on a national dimension (Home Office, 
2015), a need highlighted by the recent terrorist activity in Europe. These national 
threats include terrorism, civil emergencies, serious and organised crime, public 
order and domestic cyber security incidents. These threats are highlighted as 
they would place unforeseen demands upon the local resources, and therefore, 
could only be addressed by police forces acting together and mobilising their 
resources across boundaries (Home Office, 2015). Crime and terrorism have no 
frontiers, so the SPR looks to provide an effective framework to inform the 
strategic assessment of these threats and risks for cross county capabilities (ibid). 
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During this period the College of Policing and National Crime Agency (NCA) have 
been established, and the PCC officers have come into effect meaning that 
consistency among forces on specific key specialist capabilities and resources 
can be arranged and directed across forces more effectively (Home Office, 2015). 
The SPR is something which the Special Constabulary should take note of, 
considering if any of these big national treats do materialise, the Special 
Constabulary will be needed particular at the local level to meet and maintain 
operational needs.  
Demand for Policing Services 
“Policing has reached a watershed in its modernisation programme, attempting 
to change its value discipline from operationally excellent to customer intimate. 
Operational performance needs maintaining, and yet there is an expectation on 
us to not only engage with our customers but understand their needs, 
motivations, and what they value most from the services they receive. Our drive 
to improve confidence and satisfaction may have led to us creating an 
“emotional bond’ between the public and police and consequently this may 
explain why the public contact the police first rather than a more appropriate 
organisation.” 
(Then Assistant Chief Constable of Norfolk and Suffolk Constabulary Sarah 
Hamlin, 2012) 
The provision of high-quality police service to the public against a backdrop of 
budgetary constraints is an ongoing challenge for the police (Bradley, 1998). 
Bradley (1998) argued that to provide this service, the police needed to have a 
better understanding of public expectations and the underlying attitudes and 
motivations for those expectations. Public perception and concern regarding 
crime and the police vary across different socio-demographic groupings (ibid). 
Bradley (1998) carried out group discussions with a broad cross-section of the 
general population, with a research design to ensure socio-economic and 
demographic variations between the groups selected. The report suggested that 
the police were more likely to influence the public’s view and demand for policing 
if they established a strong working relationship between them (ibid). The 
research also found that while the police often had a good working relationship, 
some social groups particularly young people and ethnic minorities believed that 
the police failed to address their concerns and perceived threats (Bradley, 1998). 
The report, therefore, proposed that the police service see the public not as a 
single entity but as a number of distinct publics, through segmented policing with 
different styles but not standards. This customer segmentation is a common 
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marketing approach. Therefore there would be anticipated practical difficulties 
implementing such an approach within a policing context (Bradley, 1998). 
Law and order, including the police, are all issues in which the public take an 
interest and are invested in, therefore making it important to consider the public 
experiences of the police service and how both can shape their views on police 
fairness and courtesy. The “new visibility of policing”(Goldsmith, 2010) has been 
brought about by the widespread availability of mobile recording devices, citizen 
journalism and online 24-hour news outlets, meaning that evidence of everyday 
police activity is now more immediately and widely available. The Criminal Justice 
System is remaining a topic of popular fascination (Reiner, 2000) and a central 
theme within the mass media (e.g. Ericson et al., 1991; Sparks, 1992; Reiner, 
1997a). Reality shows and crime dramas centred on the Criminal Justice System 
and emergency services continue to dominate ratings. Even the rising profile and 
importance of the Special Constabulary can be seen reflected within the mass 
media, with a recent TV reality series centring upon the Special Constabulary 
exclusively and their role within policing (BBC First Time on the Frontline 
Documentary). This media attention can also shape public opinion and 
knowledge, with specific issues being prioritised by the media as necessary, 
initiating a media agenda which can ultimately generate or shape public policy 
agendas (e.g. Rogers & Dearing, 1988). This is important as police strategies do 
not exist within a vacuum. Instead, they are shaped by the legal and political 
attitudes, and the local resources available (e.g. Cox, 1990). A very small 
proportion of the general population has any direct contact with the public police 
or the Criminal Justice System and therefore gains their knowledge of these 
organisations and processes from the media and other individuals (Dowler, K. 
(2003). 
Early literature indicates that the police are viewed positively (e.g. Black, 1970) 
despite some suspicions about state power and authority (e.g. Bayley, 1979; 
Lipset and Schneider, 1983). Perceptions of the Police (Office for National 
Statistics, 2015) indicates that in 2013/14 63% of adults on the Crime Survey for 
England and Wales, rated their local police as good or excellent, a small increase 
on 2012. Overall 76% had confidence in their local police for 2013/14 even though 
the proportion of adults having reported seeing a police officer or PCSO on foot 
patrol in their local area once a week or more was only 32%. This is a continued 
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downward trend since 2010/11 despite high police visibility being associated with 
positive ratings for the police. For example, adults would report high police 
visibility, 71% gave the police a positive rating (Office for National Statistics, 
2015). In 2013/14 victims in 74% of incidents reported being very or fairly satisfied 
with how police handled their case (ibid). The HMIC (2011) report Police Integrity 
found that the general public has a favourable view of the public police and that 
the majority trust them. The HMIC report Without Fear or Favour (2011) also 
found no endemic corruption within the UK public police. Most significantly the 
HMIC (2013) report Adapting to Austerity: Rising to the Challenge found that 
despite the considerable budget cuts, the police were continuing to make 
performance improvements, and that victim satisfaction levels remain high, which 
the HMIC (2013) acknowledged as impressive given that over 90% of the total 
staff reductions had been achieved by March 2013. The literature indicates, in 
general, the public has subjective feelings towards police performance while 
maintaining objectivity about the reality (Orr & West, 2007). In comparison to their 
international counterparts the UK populace have a positive view of the police and 
policing (HMIC, 2011) with good levels of trust and legitimacy (e.g. Bradford & 
Jackson, 2011; Loader & Mucahy, 2003; Walker., et al., 2009) despite declines 
in public confidence since the 1950s following various scandals and criticisms 
over excess use of force, sexism, racism and homophobia (e.g. Sheeny Report, 
Macpherson Report, 1999; Nash & Savage, 1994; Chan, 1997; Holdaway, 1997). 
These figures suggest that despite the budgetary cuts and difficulties the police 
are facing, these are not affecting public opinion currently.  
With public expectations of the public police growing (HMIC, 2015) and policing 
itself becoming more complex and challenging, police forces need to adapt to 
these changes while still protecting their communities. Force is being expected 
to achieve this while being every more accountable to both Government and their 
public while coping with fiscal austerity, structural reforms and the job of 
anticipating any threat to social order (HMIC, 2015). With the whole public 
services sector being to show the strain of austerity and limited resources with 
examples such as police officers transporting patients to hospitals as there are 
no ambulances available (HMIC, 2015) becoming more common, meaning that 
individual organisation are going to have to become more innovative and 




“There is no doubt that demand is changing in nature and much of it as a result 
of our revised approach to risk, threat, harm and vulnerability…understanding 
demand across the breadth of our business is critical. In recent years the Police 
Service has seen change on an unprecedented scale and is striving to 
transform in ways that will enable us to meet new types of demand with fewer 
resources…”. 
Chief Constable of Lancashire Constabulary Steve Finnigan (NPCC, 2017, p.3) 
A recent demand analysis conducted by the College of Policing (2015) indicated 
that the traditional downward trend in recorded crime might be changing. While 
police recorded crime and incidents, in general, have continued to decrease, that 
trend has now slowed, with some types of crime appearing to increase, e.g. rape 
and stabbings (CoP, 2015). While there was a 21% fall in crime from 2008/09 to 
2013/14, between 2012/13 and 2013/14, there was no change in recorded crime 
(CoP, 2015). Indeed corresponding with the fall in police officer numbers, police 
recorded crime has risen by 10% across England and Wales in 206/17, an 
increase which is accelerated, with a 3% increase in recorded crime to March 
2015, followed by a 8% rise by March 2016, and then a 10% increase to March 
2017 (Office for National Statistics, 2017). The 2017/18 Home Office of Crime 
Statistics also indicated that while lower-harm violence offences have stabilised 
higher harm violence has not. A 16% rise in offences involving knives or sharp 
weapons, 2% rise in firearms offences, 12% increase in homicide, 17% increase 
in vehicle-related thefts, 30% rise in a number of robberies from 2015/16 (Home 
Office, 2017). It is worth noting that some of these rises are focused within certain 
forces and that an increase in the number of police recorded crime does not 
necessarily mean a corresponding rise in the level of crime. Forces are also 
increasingly dealing with more costly crimes such as child sexual exploitation 
cases which involved a large number of specialised officers over a long period. 
The College of Policing also stressed that there were two indicators that the 
emerging pressures upon police forces, and the long-term effects of the 
budgetary cuts are starting to affect with decreased levels in police visibility and 
increasing request for mutual aid between forces (CoP, 2015). These figures 
could suggest, however, that with the number of police officers decreasing due 
to budgetary constraints, crime could be on the rise again.  
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A significant challenge for the police has been the shift from supply (service led) 
improvement to a demand side (citizen-driven, customer-led). Understanding 
police forces demand is crucial to the design and delivery of policing services, for 
the effective and efficient management of resources and is linked to capacity, 
capability and productivity (NPCC, 2017). It should be noted that demand upon 
police services are not always legitimate demand, instead of being displaced from 
other agencies or bodies or as the result of inefficiencies and ineffective use of 
resources. Policing services needs to be considered in part of the whole system 
in the provision of public services. The nature of police demand is complex with 
forces looking to understand, manage, and where possible to reduce it. Demand 
has been broadened out beyond calls for service to everything that the police 
service does (CoP, 2015) and therefore, there should be a reconsideration as to 
the role and scope of the service. Indeed demand is not just complex, it is also 
dynamic and varies with time from the baseline (demand for the police which 
always exists), to cyclical (regular events such as Christmas and acquisitive 
crime), seasonal (interchangeable demand varying with events or seasons e.g. 
peaking in summer months with tourism), surge (unexpected or one office 
incidents creating sudden increased demand) to various trending demand 
(localised problems, or trends) (NPCC, 2017). NPCC (2017) identified three 
forms of demand influencing the public police; public, protective and internal. 
Public demand is often seen as the number of incidents and reports of crime, very 
obvious and relatively easy aspects to count, although a large proportion of calls 
received by the police do not translate to incidents or crimes yet nevertheless 
utilised resource time. Protective demand relates to that created by needing to 
react to intelligence and act proactively in dealing with crime types, volume etc. 
Internal demand is the self-generated demand created by organisational 
processes, protocols, administrative tasks and bureaucracy.   
Police Reform 
The public sector regularly undergoes a cycle of planning and goal setting (e.g. 
Wechsler & Backoff, 1986) with usually little time to implement any of these plans. 
The police operate differently than most within the public sector in that it operates 
within a hierarchical structure with greater discretion within the lower ranks, often 
reacting to crime (e.g. Savage & Leishman, 1996). Recently there has been an 
emphasis upon the police to fulfil their role as a public service to the public rather 
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than their law enforcement role (Mawby & Worthington, 2002). This, in turn, leads 
to the introduction of various business and economical techniques for measuring 
costs and outputs, emerging under the rhetoric of new public management (e.g. 
Lane, 2000; McLaughlin et al., 2002; 2001). These initiatives led to police 
performance being measured in terms of the number of crimes being solves, 
tickets being issued, and arrests made. However, academics and practitioners 
alike argued that there were many aspects of policing which are difficult to 
measure due to their very hidden nature as discussed in earlier chapters. Many 
unobservable factors could potentially be connected to good police performance, 
such as taking the time to talk to a victim of a crime.  
4.3 Modern Recommendations and Changes to the Police 
Since the start of this thesis, there have been changes made both within law and 
policy, which has affected the police and policing within the UK. For example, the 
Policing and Crime Act 2017 received Royal Assent on the 31st January 2017 
containing a wide range of measures aimed at improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of police forces. This was done by allowing closer collaborations 
with other emergency services, enhanced democratic accountability for the 
police, fire and rescue services, increasing public confidence in policing, 
strengthening the protection of people under investigation, while ensuring the 
police and others have the powers necessary to prevent, detect and investigate 
crime, particularly to safeguard children and young people from sexual 
exploitation (Home Office, 2017). The HMIC also gained more powers to respond 
to emerging risks and concerns in policing allowing them to serve notice on forces 
to provide them with access to all information and premises for the purposes of 
the inspection (Home Office, 2017).  
In 2010 Lord Winsor of the HMIC, carried out a review of police pay and 
remuneration conditions, which until then had remained mostly untouched for the 
past 30 years. With Part One of the report published in 2011, the Winsor Review 
was hugely controversial and resulted in strong opposition from the police 
themselves, leading to the biggest demonstration by police officers in England 
and Wales on the 10th Mary 2012. More than 30,000 officers marched through 
London in protest against both the budgetary cuts and Winsor recommendations. 
Some officers were particularly angry that a civilian would decide their future; 
however, it must be noted that these recommendations came against a backdrop 
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of budgetary and workforce reductions. The Winsor Report sets out 
recommendations for the reforming and establishment of an improved system of 
pay and conditions for police officers and staff, in line with the three-year pay 
settlement ending that September 2011. Winsor saw these reforms as ultimately 
affecting the calibre of people joining the police, and therefore, the overall 
efficiency and effectiveness of policing. The reforms recommended equipping 
police forces with the steps necessary to provide higher quality public protection 
while still respecting the value and unique nature of policing. In the present 
conditions of financial restraint and the rigidities of the conditions applying to 
police officers and how their numbers can be reduced (through performance, 
misconduct or retirement or if in probation), this has placed the burden of job 
losses unduly upon police staff. This history of police pay reforms is a long one, 
usually provoked by the crisis.  
Winsor acknowledged that the most challenging aspect facing police 
management was changing the organisational culture (Winsor, 2011) and while 
some elements of that culture should be recognised for their strengths such as 
determination, courage when dealing with challenges and the danger of the job, 
and in general a hard work ethic, there are also less worthy aspects. Winsor 
(2011) argued that these weaknesses such as the way in which officers and staff 
are managed, needed to be corrected and that the notion that every officer does 
work of equal value, irrespective of hours worked and duties performed is 
unsustainable and should be discarded. The police pay remains based upon a 
scheme devised nearly 30 years ago, and since 1978 the society in which the 
police operate, and from which they draw their personnel has dramatically 
changed. Police officers are no longer underpaid in comparison to the average 
pay within the private or public sector with their pay scale rates typically 10-15% 
higher than some other public sector workers (ibid). In some regions, officers are 
paid nearly 60% more than the median local earnings (Winsor, 2011). Not only 
has their pay kept pace with the average rates of pay, but in relative terms, they 
are paid the best they ever have been, and the overall calibre of officers is at its 
highest point.  
The office of police constable is considered the bedrock of UK policing. Therefore 
Winsor (2011) outlined that the demands of policing should be acknowledged in 
the pay and conditions such as the risks, public responsibility and scrutiny, the 
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unsociable hours and absence of the ability to withdraw their labour. Winsor also 
recommended that a new system of determining differential pay within each rank 
or job category should be implemented. These recommendations could enable 
the police service to work within their reduced means for the short term, while 
implementing further reforms in line with long-term aims, giving an overall 
estimated saving of £217 million by April 2014 (Winsor, 2011). This means that if 
Winsor’s recommendations (2011) are implemented, it will concentrate the 
highest pay to those on the frontline and in the most demanding roles within the 
police service. This is a particularly salient point with regards to the use of Special 
Constables upon the frontline. If the HMIC is stating that frontline policing is one 
of the most demanding roles within policing, and frontline staff should be paid the 
most, then how can unpaid voluntary officers be used in such a capacity? The 
Special Constables now face the same dramatic social challenges as their regular 
colleagues yet within out the same support (e.g. Federation membership) or 
training. Police forces have recently outlined an aim to provide more of their 
officers with tasers as protection. However, forces stated that they would not be 
arming their Special Constables despite them attending the same jobs, and 
dealing with the same incidents as their regular colleagues. This statement was 
criticised by the Special Constabulary (Telegraph, Brooks-Pollack, 22nd July 
2014). Back in 2012, a paper was presented to ACPO Cabinet Officer regarding 
the issues of a taser being issued to Specials which was declined at the time for 
a variety of reasons (NPCC, 2012 ref: 000179/15). At the time it was argued that 
they would not receive the same level of training as regular officers, that in the 
last two years since joining they are unlikely to have developed the equivalent 
depth and breadth of conflict resolution experience as regular officers. Therefore 
with the added scrutiny and political interest in the subject matter, giving taser to 
Special Constables would be deemed controversial (NPCC, 2012 re 000179/15). 
However, this new decision has had support from current Chief Constables, and 
high ranking profiled Specials also pushing for a decision to be made. Policing as 
this research indicates for Specials has changed due to these voluntary officers 
now completing more and more frontline policing.  
The Winsor Reports and particularly Report One (2011) included a list of various 
recommendations for the Special Constabulary, in recognition of the growing role 
of the voluntary police workforce. As the National Policing Improvement Agency 
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already indicated the Special Constabulary’s profile within the police service 
should be raised, so that police officers have greater confidence in their ability to 
rely upon Special Constables services and assistance. A key issue with concerns 
with Specials being able to assist those first two years are a probationary period 
for Special Constables and dependent upon how many hours they can commit to 
will make a difference to how capable they will be. In those first two years they 
cannot work alone so could be a hindrance to the regular officer working rather 
than assistance.  The NPIA also indicated that financial incentive should continue 
to be considered for the Special Constabulary but that the present schemes had 
never been well assessed. The NPIA also stated that employer-supported 
policing (whereby a private or public sector employer encourages its employees 
to act as Special Constables, usually allowing some paid or unpaid leave) should 
be actively encouraged (Submission To the Review, NPIA, 2010).  
During the review’s seminar, Mr Blair Gibbs (Head of Crime and Justice at the 
Policy Exchange) argued that the police services needed to examine three areas 
with regards to the Special Constabulary. Namely, whether the responsibilities of 
the Special Constabulary were sufficiently rewarding, how forces could increase 
their commitment so they could be relied upon as a regular deployable force, and 
how to improve their incentive to work, with considerations being given to the 
provision of council tax reductions and travel subsidies or concessions. A key 
point here for this thesis is that if they want the Special Constabulary to become 
a regular deployable force, the re-imaging them as a reservist force would be best 
suited. The Winsor Report Part One concluded that the Special Constabulary is 
to be commended highly for the public service they provide and that police 
services should develop additional incentives and rewards to encourage Special 
Constables to increase their duty hours, and recruit more significant numbers. 
Winsor (2011) argued that recognition may be more important than rewards and 
suggested that Special Constables be eligible for all new police medals and police 
team recognition awards alongside regular officers and police staff. Winsor also 
recommended that Special Constables long service medal be moved from 10 
years to 5 years’ service. This last point, however, seems to highlight that 
volunteers are no longer providing the same length of service as they did once 
before and that this may be down to the recruitment of those wishing to become 
regular officers.  
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Annual fitness testing was also proposed for all deployable police officers 
(Winsor, 2012). This has had a direct effect upon the Special Constabulary with 
an annual fitness test being introduced with mandatory completion being 
necessary for remaining operational. This has particularly affected those Special 
Constables who have been in for a long time, with no previous fitness test being 
necessary or particularly part of the role. Historically working local parades and 
fetes these older officers who have made a career being the quintessential 
community-based officer, walking the beat in their local areas, without needing to 
meet the higher fitness demands of frontline policing. Some of these officers have 
left before having to pass, such as fitness test, and others have struggled to pass. 
In a time when the relationship between the public and police could be affected 
by the move of using limited resources on the frontline then a similar move of the 
Special Constabulary could leave a void within community-based policing. There 
is some argument that this void would best fit the Special Constabulary if they are 
to remain voluntary. Winsor (2012) also recommended a requirement for 
applicants to have some policing qualification, whether that be A-levels or 
relevant experience as a PCSO or Special Constable before becoming a police 
officer. This would have significant implications for Special Constabulary 
recruitment and retention, as most joiners would only be passing through the 
Special Constabulary in order to obtain the necessary experience before 
becoming a regular officer. These officers provide high duty hours when they first 
join; however, they only offer a short-term service to the voluntary force.  
Winsor’s (2012) most controversial recommendation in Part Two of the report, 
was for a direct entry scheme to enable high achieving individuals to join at the 
rank of a superintendent with the appropriate training and development, to bring 
with them their skills and experiences from other industries (Winsor, 2012). These 
recommendations have now mostly been implemented despite considerable 
resistance by the police forces themselves since this thesis began. Savings made 
through these recommendations are to be reinvested back into policing, reducing 
the need for forces to find savings from other avenues and to assist in protecting 
the frontline services. At present, it is not fully known the effects that Report Two 




4.4 The Financial Challenge 
Before 2010, the police within the UK had enjoyed a period of unpressured 
financial funding, with a sustained increase in central Government funding 
starting from the Edmund Davies reforms of the 1980s. Indeed the money being 
spent upon policing in the UK had doubled since 1994 from £6.45 billion to £13.7 
billion by 2008/09 (HMIC, 2010). Local taxation across all police authority areas 
also increased by a significant 236% from 1994 to 1996/97 (HMIC, 2010) with 
general funding increasing by 73% during that same time period (HMIC, 2010). 
Modern police forces have not had to manage their finances or workforces 
resources, particularly efficiently and never within a sustained period of 
restrictions or reductions. Until the financial crisis of 2008, the public police have 
always been viewed as a public and political focal point and financial priority.  
The financial crisis of 2008, which saw the near collapse of the Banking system 
had a significant impact on public service spending. It cannot be assumed that 
central police funding will ever return to pre-2010 levels after 2018 and indeed 
there are signs that fiscal uncertainty will continue for the foreseeable future 
alongside the additional complexity and uncertainty of Brexit. The Independent 
Office for Budget Responsibility estimated in 2010 that public sector net debt 
(PSND) could potentially rise from 77.7% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2015/16 to 107% by 2060/61 (Winsor, 2010). This could mean that public sector 
finances are likely to remain under restraint, although recent terrorist activity may 
result in some increase in certain aspects of the police budgets.  
The Comprehensive Spending Review (HMIC, 2010) announced in June 2010, 
outlined an average cut of 20% cut in the Central Government Budget to the 
public police. This funding reduction did vary across the different forces from 14% 
to 22% of their overall income. Forces across England and Wales estimated a 
cut of approximately £2.1 billion by 2014/15 (HMIC, 2010) with non-pay related 
savings also being estimated to be around £0.1 billion. This Central Government 
funding represents around 50-90% of all funding received by the police (HMIC, 
2010) and running alongside this funding reduction, the Government proposed a 
local taxation freeze for a year, so that forces could not offset these cuts through 
the rising of local taxation (ibid). Before this emergency budgetary announcement 
in 2010, the money being spent on policing had been steadily increasing, having 
doubled since 1994 from £6.45 billion to £13.7 billion by 2008/09 (HMIC, 2010). 
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During this same time period, the local taxation funding across all police 
authorities has also increased by a huge 236% by 1996/97 (ibid). Seen as a 
public and political priority, the public police had enjoyed a period of huge 
budgetary increase, but no more, with savings of nearly £2.2 billion to find, every 
police force started to form a different place. However, with varying contracts in 
place, for example on land and histories which did not make it easy for them to 
achieve these reductions in spending.  
Police Funding 
In England and Wales, the public police are funded through three main routes, 
the main route being through the Central Government funding which is received 
through various grants including the Home Office Police grants, Specific Grants, 
National Non-Domestic Rates (NNDR) and the Rate Support Grants. The rest of 
the polices financial funding is made up through Local Council Taxation and by 
the forces themselves through sales, fees, and reimbursed services, special 
police services and funding through the local authorities for some aspects of 
policing such as for local PCSOs. There is controversy about a public service 
being able to raise funds by being paid for their services however it should be 
noted that the majority of these funds are raised through charging football clubs 
for the policing of matches.   
The HMIC Police Grant (England and Wales) for 2013/14 is paid by the Home 
Secretary to the local policing bodies to be spent on various areas of policing, 
although these local policing bodies have now been replaced by the Police and 
Crime Commission. The aggregated amount of these grants as outlined by the 
report for 2013/14 for police purposes was £7,792,585,520 made up from the 
£4,725,433,50 in Home Office Police Core Settlement and the £3,067152,019 in 
DCLG formula funding. The Greater London Authority is separated for their 
funding, as they receive additional funding in recognition to the distinct, national, 
international and capital city functions that the Metropolitan Police provide. This 
additional special payment is over what the formula funding allows, and therefore 
the separate National, International and Capital City Grant were created of 
£185,000,000. In 2013/14 nationally total government funding dropped for 
policing by 1.9% taking into account all various police grants and funding, 
including £161 million for the Welsh Government. However, that drop is in line 
with the 20% funding cuts announced in the first Comprehensive Spending 
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Review of 2010. In total policing in England and Wales received £8.66 billion in 
2013/14. Chancellor George Osborne announced that the Police Service would 
be spared further cuts in 2013/14 but could potentially face an extra 2% in 
2014/15. In 2013/14 it was announced that the counterterrorism funding would 
continue to be ring-fenced throughout the CSR as it was deemed critical and a 
total of £563 million had been allocated for that year.  
The current Chancellor Philip Hammond presented his Spring Budget on the 8th 
March 2017 stating that there was a need to protect public services better; 
however, there was no specific mention of emergency service finances. Brandon 
Lewis the Minister of State for Fire and Policing on the 1st February 2017 provided 
a written statement (HCWS446) in which it stated that the final police funding 
settlement for 2016/17 (HCWS510) would be protected at flat cash levels 
compared to 2015/16 assuming that precept income is increased to the maximum 
amount available in both 2016/17 and 2017/18. The Police Grant Report (England 
and Wales) for 2017/18 outlined the grants allocated to policing by the Home 
Secretary although it does not set out central Governmental funding to local 
policing in its totality. The report does not cover police grant for capital purposes 
or the safeguarding of national security nor any grants paid to local policing 
bodies by the Welsh Government. The aggregate amount of grants for police 
purposes made under section 46 of the 1996 Police Act is determined as 
£7,509,016,194 for 2017/18. Funding allocations for both financial years are 
based upon the Police Allocation Formula distribution from 2013/14. Moreover, 
obviously, vary for each force dependent upon that formula.  
The Police Allocation Formula is used by the Home Secretary to decide how 
much each police force receives, and has various stages. The first stage of the 
formula is to divide the funds between the different activities that the police 
undertake, broken down into five key areas: crime, incidents, traffic, fear of crime 
and special events. The proportion of total funding is then distributed according 
to the population scarcity, taking into account the particular needs of the rural 
forces. The second stage then involves dividing the funding for each of these 
activities in the context of the workload indicators for each police force. These 
workload indicators are calculated to estimate the work each force is expected to 
have in each key area compared to the other forces, and are calculated using 
socio-economic and demographic indicators correlated with each workload point. 
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The workload indicators are used rather than data on the actual crime levels to 
account for the known variations between the different forces recording practices 
and to avoid any perverse incentives. The formula consists of a basic amount per 
resident, with a basic amount for special events, and top-ups for the five key 
areas, population scarcity and the area costs (taking into account the regional 
differences in costs).  
For the 2013/14 year, the Government decided to apply “damping” to each pot of 
money a force receives in the financial year, keeping the reduction in cash terms 
to 1.6%. This method has proven controversial in some forces because where 
the police funding formula determines a more significant financial need; damping 
seeks to take away some of that money to ensure other forces, which get less 
from the formula, have a minimum funding level and are therefore topped up. 
Forces which get more of their funding from Central Government that the council 
tax precept also stated that they were suffering more as a result of damping 
because it is being applied while government funding is being decided.  
4.5 Adapting to Austerity 
The UK police face a difficult task in absorbing the savings required without a 
resulting reduction in their overall effectiveness, in particular to their frontline 
services. It has been estimated that approximately 81% of force budget goes on 
workforce costs and staffing, with a further 10% on supply and services costs, 
2% on transport costs, 5% on-premises costs and 1%  on capital financial costs 
and 1% on capital financing costs (CIPFA, 2010/2011). Many forces sought to 
find these savings from infrastructure reforms and collaborations with 
improvements to their IT systems, reforms for efficiency within the wider criminal 
justice system and their internal processes; however, these savings have their 
limitations. Police forces had to take immediate and substantial steps to reduce 
their biggest category of costs, namely pay.  
If police forces were to rely upon the turnover of officers only to achieve the 
necessary cuts, it would take over seven years to achieve the required levels 
rather than within the expected four years as outlined by the Government (HMIC, 
2010). Forces had only four years to achieve the desired budgetary cuts, and 
therefore in order to achieve the financial reductions required, forces have to 
reduce their workforce by 16,200 police officers, 1,800 PCSOs and 16,100 police 
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staff between March 2010 and March 2015 (HMIC, 2010). The total projected 
police workforce reduction across England and Wales (excluding Scotland) of 
34,100 personnel, bring police officer numbers back to 2001/02 levels (HMIC, 
2011). In 2011 the HMIC (2011) reported that around a third of reduction had 
already taken place, with numbers falling by 11,200 between March 2010 and 
March 2011 leaving approximately 23,000 to go within March 2011 and March 
2015 (HMIC, 2011). HMIC (2011) warned that forces would find it very hard to 
maintain the current level of officer availability with these projected reductions.  
“Force’s capacity to cut crime and ensure officers are visible and available to 
the public can only be sustained if the proposed workforce reductions are 
balanced out by compensating improvements in efficiency. The challenge for 
forces isn’t just to balance the books, but to transform the way they deliver 
policing services.” 
(HMIC, 2012, Adapting to Austerity, p.29) 
The National Audit Office (2012) argued that there are three phases to the 
organisations approaches to budget reductions which are; tactical efficiency 
savings (quick wins, prioritising localised cost savings by making various 
processes more efficient), strategic operational realignment (better utilisation of 
the people, processes, technology, procurement and capital, changing customer 
expectations and alternative service delivery models) and sustainable cost 
reductions (structured cost reduction plans/transformational changes embedding 
cost management and continual improvements). These changes can potentially 
cost regarding time and initial costs; however, they may be crucial to the 
sustainability of the police service (HMIC, 2012). For example, the National Audit 
Office (2012) reported that shared services in practice increase cost in that they 
add more complexity and often are tailored to local requirements. Despite this, 
they stressed that shared services as one of the way forward for dealing with 
reduced budget and workforce while maintaining a high level of service. 
An example of this would be the National Police Air Service. This saw the 
consolidation of individual forces air support units into a national service provides 
helicopter support to all forces, 24 hours a day, for 365 days a year. 97% of 
England and Wales population would not be more than 20 minutes flying time 
away, and when fully operational is estimated to save forces around £15 million 
a year (HMIC, 2012).  
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Both the police services and Government have made a push for efficiencies in 
procurement expenditure in particular with the amount spent on ICT systems. 
Various approaches have been investigated, including creating a framework on 
which all forces could purchase as one customer to obtain maximum savings 
possible with new contracts, making them between 4-6%cheaper overall. Other 
options being considered was the creation of an online purchasing portal (the 
National Police Procurement Hub) where forces could buy from the top 500 
policing suppliers, reducing their costs on transactions and allowing individual 
forces to control the scale of economics on basic commodities by limiting the 
range of suppliers used (HMIC, 2012). Other individual forces have developed 
their approaches such as Lincolnshire Police working with G4S Security 
Company to allow officers to remain on patrol after an arrest, saving an estimated 
350 police hours by utilising security personnel to convey prisoners to custody. 
While there could be contention about the use of non-police powers to convey 
individuals to custody especially when considering the health and safety risk for 
the detainee while in custody, the decisions about their actual detention remain 
with the custody sergeant.  
 In 2011 the HMIC carried out an initial review of police forces to investigate how 
well they were coping and adapting to the financial challenge set out by the 
Comprehensive Spending Review (HMIC, 2011). Overall this review found that 
all forces had identified how they intended to make or in some cases exceed the 
required savings, or wherein the stage of doing so (ibid). The consensus was that 
forces were planning well. However, the report expressed concern about whether 
forces could transform their efficiency to enable them to sustain their current level 
of service while reducing overall costs (HMIC, 2011). The Central government 
Capital Grant was reduced from £200 million at the start of the Comprehensive 
Spending Review (2010/2011) to just £87 million for 2011/12 (HMIC, 2012). 
Forces had an estimated savings of £2.1 billion to find by 2014/15, and by 2011 
around £1.6 billion were to be met through proposed workforce reductions leaving 
£0.3 billion to be found through non-pay costs (HMIC, 2011). Indeed a third of the 
proposed workforce reductions had already taken place by 2011, with it 
transpiring that those forces which planned the most significant reduction 
proportionately of police officers were not necessarily those forces which faced 
the biggest budget cuts (ibid). Data submitted by 42 forces in 2011, suggested 
119 
 
that by March 2015, police frontline would reduce by 2%, while non frontline 
personnel would fall by 11% (HMIC, 2011). Some forces had already seen their 
budgets reduced during the Comprehensive Spending Review and were 
therefore already operating with a moderately low proportion of their officers in 
non-frontline positions, meaning that they were going to struggle to protect their 
frontlines. As argued by Bradford (2011) frontline police officer numbers are 
viewed as one of the important factors in governing a force’s ability to fight crime; 
meaning that these forces, in particular, would have to improve their frontline 
officer efficiency more than others.  
Based upon the supplied data and proposed plans outlined in 2011, 22 of the 42 
forces (who supplied data) would have to cut more than 30% of their non-frontline 
workforces to protect their frontline (ibid). HMIC identified ten forces in particular 
who would have to reduce their non-frontline forces by more than 50% to protect 
their frontlines, with a further 12 forces having to make reductions between 20-
49% (HMIC, 2011). There were also eight particular forces highlighted where the 
number of officer positions being proposed to be cut was higher than the number 
of officers they had in non-frontline roles. This means that these forces would be 
unable to achieve the necessary savings simply by redeploying these officers into 
frontline roles. These large-scale reductions would be extremely difficult if not 
impossible, to achieve without it affecting the service provision being offered to 
the public.  
The majority of forces planned to reverse the trend of civilianization from the 
previous years, to meet the proposed workforce reductions with a 19% reduction 
in police staff numbers (HMIC, 2011). A consequence partly of employment 
contracts, as there is no provision to force the redundancy of police officers 
unless they had served their full 30-year contracts (A19 policy) while civilian 
workers can be made redundant. Police officers can only be removed through 
underperformance regulations or misconduct proceedings, and retirement at 30 
years’ service. With wide-scale manpower resources reductions, all forces 
undertook demand analysis in 2011 to ensure these resources were directed both 
efficiently and effectively. This means that forces were reviewing various means 
through which to improve their efficiency with a mixture of national and locally led 
programs (HMIC, 2011). Data supplied by all 43 forces indicated that: 19 were 
remodelling their neighbourhood teams, 23 looking into shared service centres, 
120 
 
24 considering certain outsourcing aspects of their organizations, 28 were 
creating new local policing models, 29 considering inter-force collaborations, 31 
reallocating their workforces, 34 remodelling response teams, 37 remodelling 
middle management, 38 reviewing their shift patterns, 39 remodelling their back 
office positions and all 43 were undergoing demand analysis.  
HMIC (2011) did warn that police forces must ensure that they safeguarded their 
service to the public while effectively reducing costs, and to achieve this, they 
must be making informed decisions about where and how to achieve these 
savings. Throughout all the budgetary reductions, it will be vital that police forces 
contain the effects of any inflation upon their costs, especially with regards to 
workforce salaries and fuel. The scale of these measures will vary from force to 
force, depending upon what the money is spent on, for example, a force covering 
a large geographical area can expect higher fuel costs (HMIC, 2011). With few 
incentives within the policing system for police leadership to drive these changes, 
there is a danger that it could lead to increased fragmentation between forces, 
therefore to counteract this, forces need to share quality checked information 
which the HMIC (2011) stated required reduced bureaucracy between forces, 
joint ventures and a common language. Through measures implemented such as 
the Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables being held to account 
for the performance of their forces maintaining a well-performing frontline service 
to the public is a key factor for police leadership in this time of austerity.  
The Home Secretary in 2011 announced a program to reduce police bureaucracy 
with the aim to save time equivalent to 1,200 police officer posts. This program 
consisted of measures such as simplifying personal appraisals; more efficient 
emergency call handling and an ACPO led review on the guidance and doctrine 
so that the majority of charging decision would be moved from the CPS back to 
the police (HMIC, 2011). HMIC (2011) stated that 22 of the 43 forces supplying 
data reported having benefited from various improvements to their business 
processes such as the introduction of an appointment system for non-urgent 
calls. With the current Government ruling out any changes to police forces 
boundaries or potential mergers between forces as a means of achieving 
economies of scale, such as considered under the previous Labor government, 
some forces have organised their collaborations. 28 of the 43 forces reviewed, 
reporting planning to reduce or eliminate their number of BCUs (HMIC, 2011). An 
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example of these collaborations is Project Athena, which involved ten different 
forces who have aligned their business processes and combining to sources their 
crime, intelligence, custody, case preparation and IT systems. While some forces 
have entered into collaborations, nearly all forces reviewed had considered the 
possibility in order to achieve cuts, with 29 having identified cashable savings to 
be made through collaborations and 23 considering implementing shared service 
centres (HMIC, 2011). There has been a proposed merger between Devon and 
Cornwall Police and Dorset Police however after consultation with the public the 
PCC for Devon and Cornwall has publicly declared that the business case does 
not have her support, on consideration of council tax differences between the two 
forces (PCC Devona and Cornwall, 2018). However, it could also be argued that 
as the merger would mean only one PCC and one Chief Constable that there is 
also a political motive to remain separate.  
The HMIC (2011) reported that 24 forces were considering outsourcing some 
aspects of their practices, something not uncommon in policing, with ten forces 
already outsourcing elements of their custody process which do not require police 
powers. Some examples of outsourcing including South West One, a joint venture 
company established in 2007 between Somerset Country Council, Taunton Dean 
Council, IBM with Avon and Somerset Police joining in 2008. This joint venture 
has the aims to improve the services and save money by providing back office 
and customer services (HMIC, 2011). Other examples include Cleveland Police 
who in June 2010 entered a ten year outsourcing arrangement with private sector 
provider Steria, whose services cover information technology, call handling 
finances, human resources, estates and procurements. Most forces are already 
outsourcing their forensic service (HMIC, 2011). The HMIC (2011) review 
advocated the standardisation of firearms, ammunition and public order 
equipment across the forces, which would make it easier for officers to work more 
effectively together during major incidents.  
A further HMIC review in 2012, reported that the police had risen to the financial 
challenge, and had largely reduced their spending while maintaining their level of 
service. The overall crime levels during this period continued to fall by a further 
3% between December 2010 and December 2011, although there were rises in 
some offence categories (HMIC, 2012). Overall levels of public satisfaction 
increased from 83.4% to 83.9% during this time same period (ibid). The HMIC 
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(2012) report surveyed approximately 1,322 members of the public and found 
that the majority had not noticed any changes in the level of police officer visibility 
or availability within their local areas during the period of 2010/2011. A sample of 
999 calls indicated that the majority of forces were no slower in responding to 
emergency calls despite smaller workforces. What had dramatically changed, 
however, was the way in which the public could gain access to the police.  
Between March 2010 and March 2015 around 260 police station, front counters 
were due to be closed with these closures being offset by the opening of 140 front 
counters in different locations, e.g. libraries and supermarkets (HMIC, 2012).  
Police forces were looking to achieve £0.5 million in revenue savings through 
changing and ultimately shrinking their estates in 2013/14, further rising to £1.6 
million in 2014/15, the traditional public interface of the police are disappearing. 
When surveyed 57% of the general public stated that they would never support 
the closure of their local police counter with a further 29% indicating that they 
would support closure if the building remained in police use (HMIC, 2012). This 
is an important factor considering the traditional position of the police front 
counter as the physical mainstay of the public police presence within the 
community as an iconic system. With the visible police presences disappearing 
and the front counter, there is a risk that the police become more distant and out 
of touch with their public. This is where the Special Constabulary could have a 
significant impact if a large proportion of community policing were given to the 
Special Constabulary to take ownership of. However, at this point, this was seen 
as a theoretical risk since public satisfaction remained high throughout this time 
period.  
HMIC (2012) Concerns  
Some concerns were raised in 2012 as to how long the current level of police 
service could be maintained, with some forces having gaps within their funding 
plans. HMIC (2012) highlighted that fact that most forces still needed to transform 
their efficiency in preparation for further future spending reviews, with the key 
finding being that forces were balancing the books through workforce cuts and 
reduction in spending on goods and services. While frontline staff had been 
protected so far in 2012, the nature of the frontline had been altered in most 
forces, leading the HMIC (2012) to express major concerns about the 
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sustainability of this level, although they do note that at that stage the level of 
service had been so far maintained.  
Despite being largely protected, the police frontline had not been completely 
preserved with indications of an average planned frontline service reduction of 
6% (HMIC, 2012). Forces were planning to increase the proportion of their total 
workforce working in frontline positions by March 2015 (HMIC, 2012) with nearly 
half of forces planning to have 90% in frontline roles. Frontline positions remain 
defined as where the officer is responding to 999 calls either in a response role 
or neighbourhood policing position reactively dealing with calls for service. This 
means removing officers from any non-frontline roles although some officers in 
specialist and key positions would remain such as firearms, criminal investigation 
and intelligence work. As police officers can be called in at any point, they are 
more resilient to fulfil critical roles, especially as they are prohibited from any 
industrial action. With all of these changes and influences, it appeared that in 
some areas the police staff redundancy schemes were actually oversubscribed 
and governmental changes to the pension and pay arrangement from the Winsor 
report (2010; 2011) led to some police officers being more willing to leave (HMIC, 
2012). This has led to some police forces be ahead of their outlined 2011 plans 
especially with regards to the required headcount and are therefore projecting 
greater savings.  
With cultural changes and frontline workforces reducing, forces are adapting to 
changes within political, societal and cultural of the UK. However, as forces look 
to fill in the manpower gaps within key areas of both frontline and back office 
processes being produced by decreasing officer numbers, the distinction 
between response, investigation and neighbourhood policing teams has become 
less distinct. This means that officers are carrying out an increasingly wide range 
of activities within their respective roles to allow for the more effective 
management of peak workload times, especially within rural areas. By 2012, 
there were already 5,600 fewer police officers and PCSOs fulfilling response 
functions than in 2010 (HMIC, 2012). With around 2,300 officers within 
neighbourhood policing roles, some forces have merged their response and 
neighbourhood teams, while widening the scope of those neighbourhood teams 
to include a supporting or backfilling role for their response functions (ibid). This 
shift away from clearly defined functions fulfilled by distinctive teams, towards a 
124 
 
more fluid system of multi-skilled officers, has allowed forces to be more flexible 
with a smaller workforce. However, this does mean that the respective teams and 
in particular, neighbourhood teams are being pulled away from their day to day 
responsibilities to meet the more immediate demands. This means that the police 
have become ever more reactive to crime, rather than having any proactive, 
intelligence gathering local basis. This is particularly dangerous in these times 
where intelligence gathering and local intel could play a role in counter-terrorism 
(e.g. Innes, 2006) and disrupting locally based organised crime, e.g. county lines 
drug supply (National Crime Agency, 2017). This means that there is an opening 
for the Special Constabulary to take on a more significant role within 
neighbourhood policing and to take control in driving neighbourhood initiatives 
forward. Local restrictions also mean that forces are potentially planning to put a 
further 6% of their budget into investigation teams, who are even less visible to 
the public (HMIC, 2012) leaving a potential void in visible policing at the local 
level, of importance to the public in maintaining that high level of public 
satisfaction.  
Another key change occurring in nearly all police forces across England and 
Wales was the planned increase in the use of the Special Constabulary to extend 
forces’ frontline capacity. HMIC (2012) reported that nearly all forces had outlined 
plans to recruit around 9,000 Special Constables by 2014/15., which would be an 
increase of 58% from March 2010. However, the HMIC (2012) reported that the 
Special Constabulary were already being used in a frontline capacity such as on 
response at peak or busy times, and agreed that the Special Constabulary could 
provide forces with further flexibility and reliance during the periods of workforce 
reductions. However, a key question here needs to be asked. Should they be 
used in this way? What is the purpose of the Special Constabulary as this would 
translate to policing on the cheap?  
It should be noted that policing has on “one-size-fits-all” answer and various 
police forces are deploying their frontline resources in different ways. The way in 
which resources are deployed depends upon the professional threat 
assessments particular to those force areas. While policing activities remain 
fundamentally unchanged, the traditional descriptions and distinctions, such as 
between response, investigation and neighbourhood, as mentioned earlier, has 
less resonance with how local policing is now being structured (HMIC, 2012). 
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With a reduced workforce available, forces are implementing more efficient work 
practices with a more fluid workforce to ensure police tasks expected by the 
public such as visibility patrolling and responding to emergency 999 calls can still 
be fulfilled.  
Just fewer than 20% of police budgets are spent on goods and services, which 
include their IT systems, facility management, plus uniform and equipment costs 
(HMIC, 2012). In 2012 forces were aiming to make approximately 24% of their 
savings from these non-pay costs although this varied across forces from 8% to 
over 50% (ibid). This variations between forces with regards to these non-pay 
costs are largely due to the fact that they are all started from different places. 
Some forces had already slimmed down their spending before the review period, 
while others are tied into existing contracts, and some have already made savings 
through collaborations with other forces (HMIC, 2012). These savings were to 
lessen the reductions required from pay-related savings.  
HMIC (2012) acknowledged that it was difficult to predict the overall effect that 
these changes being made by the various police forces, driven by economic 
restrictions, would have upon the existing police operational model or how this 
model may ultimately have to change with the likelihood of an extended period of 
austerity beyond the immediate spending review. It was this extended period of 
austerity which was of major concern for the HMIC in 2012, stating that while 
most forces had met their budget reductions required, other forces were 
deliberately choosing to drive a more radical restructuring of their forces rather 
than simply balancing the books in anticipation of this extended period of 
austerity. 
The National Audit Office (2015) report Financial Sustainability of Police Forces 
in England and Wales stated that by the end of 2014-15 police forces within 
England and Wales had been successful in reducing their costs since the 
beginning 2010/11 stage. Crime levels had also reduced over this same time 
period suggesting that those forces were continuing to achieve their aim in 
tackling crime. However, NAO (2015) maintained that crime statistics are limited 
measures of the actual demands being placed upon the policing services. The 
NAO (2015) report also states that overall, many of the savings which the police 
forces had achieved were through tactical or efficiency savings, rather than 
through any transformation of their service, something which they warned would 
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need to be done, if forces were to meet the long-term financial challenge, and to 
fully address the changing nature of policing.  
Police forces across England and Wales have made savings of £2.5 billion since 
2011, and there has been a real term 25% reduction in central government 
funding to the PCCs from 2010-2011 to 2015-16 (NAO, 2015). Police forces 
reported plans for 96% of their savings with the remainder to be met through the 
use of reserves, however from 2015 to 16, forces also estimated needing to make 
a further £656 million in savings (NAO, 2015). To achieve these reductions, 
forces would be reducing their workforce by more than initially planned, with a 
reduction in workforce of 37,400 (Johnston and Politowski, 2016) resulting in an 
approximate decrease of 16,659 police officer (NAO, 2015). It has not only been 
police officers, as there has been a significant reduction in police staff and PCSO 
figures. By March 2015 there was a fifth fewer police staff (nearly 16,000 rather 
than the original 12,500 planned) and a reduction of a quarter of the PCSO 
numbers (initial plans outlined a cut of 2,000, actual figures more than 4,500) 
(Johnston and Politowski, 2016). As with all of these reductions, the percentages 
varied between forces and ultimately will have a different impact upon those 
forces. For example, Surry Police lost 1% of their police officer numbers, but 
Cleveland Police lost around 23% (Johnston and Politowski, 2016). These figures 
correspond with the fact that Surrey Police rely the least upon central government 
funding and therefore took a 12% real term financial reduction (ibid). This 
increased workforce reduction was a concern previously mentioned by the HMIC 
(2012) and the NAO (2015) reported that forces had a poor understanding of the 
demands for services within their force areas. NAO (2015) also argued that they 
had insufficient information to determine how much further police funding could 
be reduced before policing services became degraded, or when individual forces 
may need support. 
4.6 Assessment and Review 
The College of Policing carried out the first estimated national analysis into the 
breadth and complexity of the work undertaken by the public police, assessing 
the incoming and ongoing work that officers are carrying out. The Estimating 
Demand on the police service report (2015) indicated that after a decade of 
decreasing police recorded crimes and incidents, that trend had now slowed and 
some types of crime and incident in particular rape and public safety and welfare 
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are now on the increase. Over the past five years, police officer numbers have 
been failing so that by 2014 there was one police officer for every 445 members 
of public an increase of 50 plus people per officer since 2010 (College of Policing, 
2015).  
Over the last year, certain crimes, especially violent crimes, have seen a 
significant increase. The Office for National Statistics state that there has been a 
small but genuine increase in murder and other violent crimes, including a 13-
14% increase in gun and knife crimes in 2016. Overall there has been a 9% rise 
in overall crime in police recorded crime figures while the Crime Survey for 
England and Wales indicated a 5% fall over the same time period. However, even 
within the Crime Survey for England and Wales, there was an increase in violent 
crime including a 10% rise in robberies, 35% increase in public order offences 
and a 12% rise in sexual offences including rape (Home Office, 2017). For 
example, the Metropolitan Police release figures for 2016, indicating that gun 
crime was up 42% and knife crime rose by 24%. The HMIC inspection (2017) 
highlighted some areas of serious concern such as a shortage of detectives and 
the quality of the initial stage of investigations. This means that despite a stable 
level of crime at the beginning of the budgetary cuts, as time has gone on 
significant crimes are starting to increase, suggesting that the police are no longer 
coping to maintain crime levels.  
Also highlighted within the report (College of Policing, 2015) is the factor that the 
public police deal with a wide range of non-crime incidents which are not captured 
in police recorded crime. These non-crime incidents account for around 83% of 
all Command and Control (C&C) calls to the police. These means that the police 
are having to respond to demands which are not recorded in their statistics 
overall, suggesting an unknown demand overall upon forces (College of Policing, 
2015). Police unknown demand is those who will not necessarily result in an 
arrest or conviction but are those involving safeguarding and the protection of 
vulnerable individuals. Other non-crime incidents that police are frequently 
required to attend are suicides, missing persons, mental health incidents (the 
number of sections orders for mental health has risen over the last five years. 
This is something which concurs with HMIC (2017) report that failings in the 
mental health services have led to police becoming the first resort in such 
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incidents), and various protection demands (child protection and safeguarding, 
multi-agency protection arrangements, domestic violence etc.).  
The College of Policing also states that due to the changing types of crimes over 
the last decade means that the cost of crime for police has not fallen like the 
official crime numbers have (2015). Indeed the increase in some particularly 
complex crimes such as child sexual exploitation has incurred increased costs. 
Overall demand upon the police has increased in some areas especially those 
associated with protective statutory requirements such as Multi-Agency Public 
Protection Panels with increasing incidents with vulnerable populations especially 
those with mental health issues, a finding that concurs with the HMIC State of 
Policing report (2017). Overall the College of Policing provided two indications for 
the emerging pressures on public police resilience, the decreased level of police 
visibility within their local communities (a threat to the relationship between the 
police and the public, the underpinnings to policing by consent) and the 
increasing requests for mutual aid between forces (College of Policing, 2015). 
Mutual aid calls, in particular, had increased substantially over the past few years, 
for example, in 2012, there were 20 requests, and in 2013, there were over 80 
(College of Policing, 2015). While this may signal better efficiency in the sharing 
of resources, it could also signal that forces are no longer able to maintain both 
the baseline demand and any surge demands brought about by particular events 
or incidents.  
Recently the Government increased the budget of the HMIC (Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabularies) by nearly 66% for the period 2014/15 (NAO, 
2015) with a remit to provide more substantial evaluations of police forces 
performance during the budgetary restrictions. It had become clear from previous 
HMIC inspections that forces had little understanding of their service demands 
and that there was insufficient information to determine when forces might or 
could run into difficulty. As part of this wider Government remit, the HMIC 
announced in 2013/14 a new inspection programme called the Police 
Effectiveness, efficiency and Legitimacy assessment (PEEL) intending to provide 
a clear, annual evaluation for the public to review how well their local police force 
was performing (HMIC, 2015). These annual reports would provide a better 
understanding about the financial sustainability of forces, covering aspects of 
policing and the police organisation such as criminal investigations, resources 
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allocation, which could then be compared year on year, and with each other. Each 
year these inspections will introduce new aspects such as the planned 2017/18 
assessments to include how well forces would manage their response to a 
terrorist threat (HMIC, 2017). The HMIC (2015) stated that the police could not 
become complacent or be adequately assessed in terms of performance by those 
limited figures. The HMIC (2015) maintained that the crime threat continues to 
evolve and develop, meaning that police forces need to constantly look for new 
innovative ways in which to adapt and improve their capabilities.  
In the first year of PEEL inspections, the majority of police forces were graded at 
least “good” on a range from inadequate, requires improvement, good and 
outstanding, and in that first inspection, forces were given six graded judgements 
out of the overall assessed 13 questions (HMIC, 2015). However, with the 
minimum standard required being good, most forces had much work to 
accomplish before they were to attain an outstanding grading. In terms of 
efficiency, only five forces were graded as outstanding, and three were found to 
require improvements, suggesting that there were some signs that forces were 
starting to struggle long term with the financial reductions and changes been 
made. Overall forces had achieved the savings required of them by the budgetary 
cuts, the difficulties faced by individual forces to accomplish this had varied 
widely, depending largely upon their underlying financial resilience and their 
understanding of their cost bases (HMIC, 2015). With no indication that things will 
become easier financially for forces, the police have to assume future cost 
savings will be needed and while most have protected their frontlines so far, there 
were signs that this had been to the cost of neighbourhood policing in particular. 
Evidence obtained by the HMIC (2015) indicated that neighbourhood officers 
were increasingly being asked to cover other duties, outside of their dedicated 
duties tackling and identifying local problems and priorities. HMIC (2015) 
expressed concerns about the potential erosion of neighbourhood policing teams, 
as while these teams still existed on paper, their workloads and remits continued 
to be increased and broadened. This highlights the particular importance for the 
future role of the Special Constabulary within neighbourhood policing in 
particular, as a sustained and proactive neighbourhood policing team could 
ultimately counteract the adverse effects of reduced workforces in their local 
areas, and help maintain the public confidence. The HMIC (2014) report Policing 
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in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge already indicated that some forces, and in 
particular the smaller forces and those with less financial movement to 
manoeuvre were beginning to show the strain in providing their core public 
policing services.  
There has been a long debate within police force effectiveness, with the focus 
often being on their workforce capacity, i.e. the number of police officers, the 
proportion of those officers on the frontline, and the overall size of their budgets. 
However, HMIC (2015) in their establishment of the new PEEL assessments, 
emphasised the importance of other issues such as the skill level and quality of 
these officers, the technology and equipment available to officers and police 
leadership. Due to the recruitment freeze of the regular police force, some forces 
risk an ageing and relatively expensive workforce with decaying skill levels 
(HMIC, 2015). HMIC (2015) judged 18 forces as requiring improvements in the 
way in which they investigated crime, in particular burglary and assault, with the 
quality of initial investigations being below that the public could reasonably 
expect. This could be argued to be due to a deficit in the skills and experiences 
of the investigating officers and a lack of appropriate supervision. HMIC (2015) 
found that officers in some forces did not have the skills, training or access to 
specialist support or equipment that they needed to conduct thorough 
investigations. Officers within 42 of the forces told HMIC (2015) that the online 
learning packages did not meet their needs, and that they had limited 
opportunities for officers to talk to one another during training and to challenge 
each other’s views. The HMIC (2015) reported that some forces had become 
over-reliant upon online training packages.  
A significant finding from HMIC (2015) found that while historically measured 
crimes are falling, this did not necessarily mean that all crime is reducing but 
rather adapting and changing. Cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime are not an 
emerging threat, but the reality of modern crime. While traditionally crimes such 
as frauds, harassment and the sexual exploitation of children may have 
happened within the everyday space of the community and therefore been 
affected by police officers carrying out patrols within the community, now modern 
technology means that these crimes can happen in far greater numbers within 
cyberspace. HMIC (2015) reported that the police are already failing to combat 
these crimes, and specifically cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime, and there is 
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little evidence to suggest that they have a proper understanding of the capacity 
necessary to deal with these modern types of crimes. This opens the possibility 
for forces to follow the lead of the National Crime Agency, who already recruit 
skilled specialists in a voluntary capacity as “Specials” to assist on a case by case 
basis. Austerity is set to continue, so forces will have to make the shift from merely 
surviving the budgetary reductions to thriving in a world of sustained cost 
reduction (HMIC, 2015). This means they must achieve efficiency within all 
aspects of their organisation and practices, especially if they are to remain 
smaller workforces for the future, so this must ultimately become a smaller, more 
effective innovative workforce. The Special Constabulary could be an avenue 
through with the police forces obtain highly skilled experts in a voluntary capacity 
to assist on major cases and when needed. This would appear to be a logical 
step forward; however, police forces continue to fail to make effective use of 
Special Constables other/everyday skills. Therefore this move would take a 
significant push from the regular forces themselves. This would mean that forces 
could utilise volunteers more effectively; however, in many respects, this is not 
the role of a volunteer to fill these manpower gaps.  
With public expectations of the public police growing (HMIC, 2015) and policing 
itself becoming more complex and challenging, police forces need to adapt to 
these changes while still protecting their communities. Force is being expected 
to achieve this while being every more accountable to both Government and their 
public while coping with fiscal austerity, structural reforms and the job of 
anticipating any threat to social order (HMIC, 2015). With the whole public 
services sector being to show the strain of austerity and limited resources with 
examples such as police officers transporting patients to hospitals as there are 
no ambulances available (HMIC, 2015) becoming more common, meaning that 
individual organisation are going to have to become more innovative and 
potentially rely upon their voluntary sectors more. 
In the first year of PEEL inspections, the majority of police forces were graded at 
least “good” on a range from inadequate, requires improvement, good and 
outstanding, and in that first inspection, forces were given six graded judgements 
out of the overall assessed 13 questions (HMIC, 2015). However, with the 
minimum standard required being good, most forces had a lot of work to 
accomplish before they were to attain an outstanding grading. In terms of 
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efficiency, only five forces were graded as outstanding, and three were found to 
require improvements, suggesting that there were some signs that forces were 
starting to struggle long term with the financial reductions and changes been 
made. Overall forces had achieved the savings required of them by the budgetary 
cuts, the difficulties faced by individual forces to accomplish this had varied 
widely, depending largely upon their underlying financial resilience and their 
understanding of their cost bases (HMIC, 2015). With no indication that things will 
become easier financially for forces, the police have to assume future cost 
savings will be needed and while most have protected their frontlines so far, there 
were signs that this had been to the cost of neighbourhood policing in particular. 
Evidence obtained by the HMIC (2015) indicated that neighbourhood officers 
were increasingly being asked to cover other duties, outside of their dedicated 
duties tackling and identifying local problems and priorities. HMIC (2015) 
expressed concerns about the potential erosion of neighbourhood policing teams, 
as while these teams still existed on paper, their workloads and remits continued 
to be increased and broadened. This highlights the particular importance for the 
future role of the Special Constabulary within neighbourhood policing in 
particular, as a continued and proactive neighbourhood policing team could 
ultimately counteract the adverse effects of reduced workforces in their local 
areas, and help maintain the public confidence. The HMIC (2014) report Policing 
in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge already indicated that some forces, and in 
particular the smaller forces and those with less financial movement to 
manoeuvre were beginning to show the strain in providing their core public 
policing services.  
There has been a long debate within police force effectiveness, with the focus 
often being on their workforce capacity, i.e. the number of police officers, the 
proportion of those officers on the frontline, and the overall size of their budgets. 
However, HMIC (2015) in their establishment of the new PEEL assessments, 
emphasised the importance of other issues such as the skill level and quality of 
these officers, the technology and equipment available to officers and police 
leadership. Due to the recruitment freeze of the regular police force, some forces 
risk an ageing and relatively expensive workforce with decaying skill levels 
(HMIC, 2015). HMIC (2015) judged 18 forces as requiring improvements in the 
way in which they investigated crime, in particular burglary and assault, with the 
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quality of initial investigations being below that the public could reasonably 
expect. This could be argued to be due to a deficit in the skills and experiences 
of the investigating officers and a lack of appropriate supervision. HMIC (2015) 
found that officers in some forces did not have the skills, training or access to 
specialist support or equipment that they needed to conduct thorough 
investigations. Officers within 42 of the forces told HMIC (2015) that the online 
learning packages did not meet their needs, and that they had limited 
opportunities for officers to talk to one another during training and to challenge 
each other’s views. The HMIC (2015) reported that some forces had become 
over-reliant upon online training packages.  
Policing Vision 2025 
At its second joint conference, police chiefs and PCC’s launched a vision for 
policing in 2025 in which police made better use of digital technology, were more 
integrated with other agencies preventing crime and delivering effective service 
at the best value for money to the public (Policing Vision, 2025). This Policing 
Vision 2025 set out a future for policing over the next decade and will shape 
decisions about how police forces use their resources. Developed by the 
Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) and the National Police 
Chief’s Council (NPCC) in consultation with the College of Policing, National 
Crime Agency, staff associations and other policing and community partners. All 
chief constables and PCCs then signed the vision. 
The five priorities outlined by this vision for reform are: firstly that local policing 
remains the bedrock of British policing but overall becomes more integration with 
other health, educational, social services and community projects. This would 
allow for earlier intervention in resolving issues which later cause crime and anti-
social behaviour, therefore in the long term reducing demand on policing and 
other services. The overall ambition of this priority is to have more multi-agency 
teams or hubs which will pool funds rather than individually addressing the 
problems. That specialist policing capability such as armed policing, surveillance 
and major investigations will be delivered through a network, making them more 
affordable with surplus costs being made available to reinvest into other priorities. 
In response to the dramatic increase in criminal activity online, police officers will 
be trained and equipped to respond to these new crimes. To save resources 
processes for sharing evidence will become completely digital, and the public will 
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have the option of contacting the police and reporting crime directly and easily 
online. The College of Policing would work alongside forces to enhance the skills 
and powers needed to meet the challenges with a focus on making policing more 
representative of the communities while building a better balance between 
personal accountability and the bureaucratic fear of making mistakes (NPCC, 
2016). Finally, business support functions such as IT and human resources will 
be consolidated into cross force or integrated with local authorities and other 
emergency services to reduce costs.  
Back when she was Home Secretary Theresa May approved the purchase of a 
£1.2bn emergency services network (ESN) to be a cheaper option in replacing 
the Airwave communications system currently used by police, fire and ambulance 
services. However, now the Commons public accounts committee found out that 
ESN will be delayed for nine months, which could leave emergency services 
without a proper means of communication for nearly half a year. Questions were 
asked at the time as to why a system was bought which the National Audit Office 
found to be inherently high risk as it had never been implemented anywhere 
before. Brandon Lewis, the minister for policing and fire service, has stated that 
there would be no gap with the existing Airwave system continuing until the 
transition could be completed.  
Summary 
The recent budgetary restrictions have forced the public police within England 
and Wales to become a more efficient and effective service while managing their 
reduced workforce. There is some argument that these changes are not 
necessarily negative, as it has forced the police to conduct long-overdue reviews 
of their processes and expenditures after having enjoyed a long and sustained 
period of increasing budgets and manpower increased. Public services, including 
the police, have long argued that more staff equals a better service; however, 
there is limited evidence that this is the case. In many ways, these financial 
reductions and constraints are forcing the police to become more innovative and 
forward thinking than ever before, and to collaborate between themselves to 
achieve the same level of service to the public. However, there are some 
concerns that while the public police appear to have achieved the short terms 
goals of reducing their spending, this is being done through the most obvious 
means such as manpower reductions, the selling of land and property, and 
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moving public access to the service online. There is a risk that the long-term 
consequences of these immediate reactionary decisions could lead forces into 
difficulties later on such as if there are any further budgetary reductions there are 
no other areas other than manpower for them to find these reductions.  
Police forces are forging ahead with changes both operationally and structurally 
with the long-term policing landscape remaining uncertain. As other public 
services also retreat within their own tightening budgets, demands upon the 
police may increase, and public confidence so reliant upon the visibility of the 
police and their community relations, there is a significant risk to these 
relationships. Most forces innovation so far whether in terms of collaborations 
between forces, outsourcing or personnel reductions have been implemented 
within the existing models of policing, making that any further reductions may 
need to be more innovative or radical. Wide-scale financial reductions have 
resulted in corresponding decreases in police workforce numbers across England 
and Wales, forcing police services to adapt both how they operate and how they 
are delivering the overall public policing services. However, recent assessments 
have raised concerns that forces are no longer coping with the restrained budgets 
and may be unable to protect their frontline officer numbers any further. Not only 
will it become financially unsustainable at some point, but in the context of 
reduced budgets, the police risk defaulting to a wholly reactive model of policing, 
that can only respond to a crime, rather than having any proactive or deterrent 
factor upon crime.  
If the police are to continue to have any meaningful impact on crime levels, these 
reduced resources must be directed more efficiently and effectively. One strategy 
would direct resources into preventative strategies to reduce the demand for 
police services in the first place. In the next few years, the shape and agility of 
the police forces will be what matters, not the size of their budget. In many ways, 
the black and white discussions focusing upon police numbers, have obstructed 
the debate about how and when officers and staff will be deployed, and the ability 
of the Chief Constable to alter either. To enable forces to adapt and deal with the 
challenge ahead, they must be empowered to fulfil and drive it themselves. With 
reforms and recommendations being proposed for the complete overhaul of the 
police from their workforce numbers, pay and conditions and operational 
structures, many of these changes have direct implications for the Special 
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Constabulary and how they operate as a workforce. The role of the Special 
Constable, in a mirror move to that seen within the regular paid workforce, has 
become increasingly frontline. Not only is this the most demanding type of police 
work as highlighted by Winsor (2011) which makes it questionable how 
volunteers with limited training should or could be expected to meet the same 
demands and expectations. If the Special Constabulary is to remain a voluntary 
force rather than reservists, then the position in which they can logically make the 




Chapter Five: Study Findings 
This chapter outlines the key findings which emerged from the qualitative 
interviews conducted for this thesis under the context of the selected themes 
already presented earlier within chapter three.  
5.1 Specials Recruitment 
When interviewed the ACPO member acknowledged that a large proportion of 
the newly recruited Special Constables joined with the intention and inspiration 
of joining the regular paid police force and that overall the recruitment drives had 
failed to produce career Specials. Therefore some forces are reviewing the 
prospect of having more targeted recruitment for harder to reach communities 
and the potential to introduce a minimum length of service when joining the 
Specials; however, both of these have ethical issues.  
ACPO Member “It makes sense to recruit from the specials however it needs to 
be made clear to the specials that it does not mean that they will be recruited into 
the regulars…one matter of difficulty is the recruitment of career specials…this is 
something which is a problem…looking into targeted recruitment…maybe having 
a minimum time to serve within the Specials…being clear about the reality of the 
role.” 
The ACPO member also stated that it was important that the Special 
Constabulary should be installed within the wider policing family, integrated into 
everyday policing.  
ACPO Member “The specials are part of the policing family…what duties they 
fulfil will differ between forces, but we need to avoid them being seen as “spare 
parts”…specials should be involved in neighbourhood policing, public events and 
within road policing for example…” 
The ACPO member had a strong belief in the voluntary nature of the Special 
Constabulary and that rather than the payment they should be well deployed and 
briefed. While agreeing that there were issues that needed to be addressed 
achieve this, they also argued that the structural model of the Special 
Constabulary did not need to change.  
ACPO Member “I believe that the volunteer model is the best model…they should 
remain a volunteer force and not a reservist…the specials don’t want 
payment…what they want is to be well briefed and well tasked, to feel like part of 
the team…these are the important issues....” 
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It could be argued that those in leadership roles have an invested interest in the 
Specials remaining a voluntary unpaid workforce, especially in terms of 
budgetary restrictions.  
The Association of Special Constabulary Chief Officers encouraged the 
increased use of a national strategy for the recruitment of Special Constables. 
They also stated that Special Constables should not be seen as a replacement 
for paid police officers, rather that they should continue to support officers as 
volunteers (Submission to the review, Association of Special Constabulary Chief 
Officers, 2010). The views expressed by the Special Constabulary Chief Officers 
asked fell in line with those outlined by the ACPO member spoken to, with all 
acknowledging the very high turnover of Specials and corresponding wastage 
rate was a considerable issue.  
SC Chief Officer 1 “It’s a logical step that many specials allied, and indeed many 
have joined…and that actually this has resulted in a recruitment problem for the 
Special Constabulary resulting in a very high turnover.” 
SC Chief Officer 2 “…have obviously lost a lot of specials to 
recruitment…turnover is very high…having to add in extra recruitment courses to 
try and catch up…” 
SC Chief Officers argued that the large-scale recruitment driven by forces had 
been undermined by the lack of infrastructure in place to cope with the number 
of recruits being processed and with turnover being so high, the numbers were 
not sustainable. Unlike that proposed by the Metropolitan Police, they highlighted 
that there were no plans to make service within the Special Constabulary a 
necessity for regular recruitment. In line with the opinion expressed by the ACPO 
member, they also recognised that one of the biggest issues facing the Special 
Constabulary was the need to recruit career Specials. 
SC Chief Officer 1 “We are looking into targeted recruitment for career 
specials…cannot prescribe anything though…” 
SC Chief Officer 2 “The chief is very keen to target and reach those with skills 
and from areas not traditional reached though…” 
The main recruitment issue raised by serving Special Constables themselves was 
the increasing lack of “career specials” joining the forces. Career Specials are 
defined as those who join with the apparent purpose of remaining as a Special 
Constable with no significant objective for joining the regular force. Without a core 
body of career Specials, the Special Constabulary will struggle to have the 
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infrastructure in place to deal with a significant increase in Specials something 
raised by Special Constables Chief Officers.  
SC Inspector (7 years duty, rural) interviewed stated that forces “…need more 
career specials.” 
Specials interviewed made it very clear that they believed that the Special 
Constabulary should not be viewed by forces as a recruitment pool instead forces 
should be utilising targeted recruitment with it being made clear to those joining 
that it was not a route into the regular police force in direct contrast to what forces 
are proposing.  
SC 1 (2 years duty, urban) “The specials are letting anyone in…there is a lack of 
people staying and doing a good job.” 
SC 2 (13 years duty, urban) “There has been a steady trickle of recruitment…but 
this seems to be all younger specials who all want to get into the regulars…they 
see the specials as the means to get into the regulars…misguided…need to 
recruit more career specials…instead in the long term it would be a better 
investment with a better return to look into the problem of recruiting and keeping 
career specials…” 
Many of these individuals joined the Specials to await regular force recruitment 
as this was halted across many forces in the initial stages of the budgetary cuts. 
Others join the Specials first to get a sense of what police work is and if it is for 
them. Due to recent reductions to the starting salary of police officers those who 
had prior training and experience within the Specials could achieve a higher 
starting wage. There also seemed to be an issue with the type of individuals being 
recruited, with it being argued that forces were largely recruiting very young 
recruits despite better retention rates for older specials. These young recruits 
were not always seen to have the right attitude within the Special Constabulary. 
SC Superintendent (7 years, urban) “we need the right people in the 
volunteers…” 
SC temporary Inspector (4 years duty, urban) “…we have had a steady number 
of specials in the force around the 500 mark, but there are plans to increase this 
up until 750…we have a mixed broad of ages, although I believe there is better 
retention with the older specials…” 
SC 3 (1-year duty, rural) “people think the specials are the easy way in…this is 
not the case…” 
These findings fall in line with Harron (2005), who outlined the Motorway 
Syndrome in which different types of recruits were identified, resulting in different 
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Special Constabulary careers. Harron (2005) argued that land one is those slow 
(disciplined) Specials who joined out of a desire to provide a service to the 
community. These would be the career specials that interact with the service 
performing duties, ultimately providing the foundations of the Special 
Constabulary with an average service lifespan of 3-15 years (Harron, 2005). Lane 
two is described as the erratic Specials who join with ulterior motives of joining 
the regular force within a short period (usually 6-18 months). These Specials 
make a significant impact in their short Specials careers by performing lots of 
duties and having a high arrest rate however if they do not obtain entry to the 
regular force, the cost to the force is high as they are usually gone within 12-36 
months (Harron, 2005). Lane three is, therefore, those demanding Specials who 
joined the force with enthusiasm and commitment; however, they are also the 
hardest to manage due to their desire to develop further. If they are supported, 
they will usually move into managerial positions; however, they are also most 
likely to leave with feelings of discrimination or underdevelopment if they are not. 
It would appear from the data gathered that forces are predominantly recruiting 
lane two Specials who are around for a very short period of time and making no 
lasting long-term impact for the Specials. Lane three specials which are also 
leaving with a certain level of negative feelings and experiences, suggesting that 
a targeted more strategic long-term Special recruitment plan is needed by forces. 
Of the actual recruitment process, most Specials interviewed across the forces 
were impressed with the higher standards and were keen for the entry process 
to move towards that of the regular police force process and that the standards 
should not be dropped. However, as the literature has already outlined, the higher 
these standards get, the more people will be excluded. If one of the Special 
Constabularies main strengths being the link with the community with regular 
officers being drawn from all across the nation to a greater degree than the 
volunteer force, surely forces should be looking to include individuals from social 
groups, socio-economic and ethnic minorities who otherwise might not apply to 
the regular force due to either life situations or jobs that already pay more than 
that received by police officers. These individuals would not apply to the regular 
force as they could have small children and be unable to work shift patterns all 
the time. This is where forces should make a decision about the aim and role of 
the Special Constabulary as it will ultimately impact on whom they should recruit. 
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In recent years the recruitment process for Special Constables has come into line 
with that of the regular police forces. This means there is are interviews, 
scenarios and fitness testing. With every stipulation, police forces risk excluding 
certain groups of individuals, reducing their diversity and representation of the 
local community, undermining the unique strength of the Special Constabulary. 
Socially excluded groups are those who are harder to reach, and by making the 
process the same as the regular force, forces will ultimately receive the same 
type of recruit as they do for the regular force, i.e. young, white males wishing for 
a career within the regular force. Again this a key point for police forces, what is 
the purpose of the Special Constabulary? If it is to be a reservist force, then yes, 
the same type of recruit is the ideal candidate. However, if they are to remain a 
voluntary part-time police workforce whose unique selling point is that they are 
members of the local community working within policing then that should be 
utilised and strengthened by the inclusion of all members of that community. 
There would be no requirement for the recruitment process to be precisely the 
same, and therefore the purpose of this voluntary workforce should be changed 
to that of one based within local, neighbourhood/community based policing. 
SC 4 (7 1/2 years duty, urban) “I am the twitter ambassador for my force…there 
has been a recent push for specials recruitment and twitter is being used as part 
of this…I talk to those who are interesting in applying…in the last few weeks 
recruitment has opened and the process has changed…higher standards…more 
discriminating…I think it should be more towards the regular process…entry 
standards shouldn’t drop…should be at the same bar.” 
Overall it would appear that Special Constables themselves want to be held to a 
higher standard like their regular counterparts as considered combined with the 
issues around integration with the wider force, as it could improve their status 
with their regular colleagues.  
SC 5 (23 years duty, rural) “We need to be localised or sector recruitment…at the 
moment it is centrally organised at HQ…in competition with other emergency 
services to gain volunteers…” 
SC 3 (1-year duty, rural) “The recruitment process was very good…the old 
system you went for open evening station visits to talk with other specials…now 
there is a fitness test, an online test plus an interview…” 
SC Superintendent (7 years duty, urban) “we have dedicated rural recruitment 
evenings…with the local areas being targeted through the local newspapers…” 
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Specials interviewed did raise the point that as recruitment has become more 
centrally controlled by force HR, those working in the rural areas, in particular, 
were not seeing many recruits with arguing locals are unlikely to travel far for 
recruitment purposes yet may be more interesting in locally held events. 
Types of Recruits 
The Special Constables interviews for this study across the four forces, raised 
concerns about the calibre of individuals being recruited and in particular the 
types of recruit even though they were for the majority positive about the 
recruitment process. Many indicated especially early after the budgetary cuts that 
forces were in such a rush to increase the number of Specials that some were 
recruiting those they might not previously have considered. With regards to the 
types of recruits, the majority of Specials older Specials have been shown to have 
a better retention rate (e.g. Gill and Mawby, 1990).  
SC 6 (13 years duty, urban) “in (force)there were attitude issues especially in the 
younger Specials, but I haven’t found this a problem in (force)…as there is a 
higher level of training and specials work well as a team…” 
It, therefore, could be argued that large numbers of young recruits need more 
management and where this is lacking, can produce more personnel issues. This 
is an interesting point to consider, especially if the core body of career Specials 
is not being developed; the management of these recruits will become harder.  
SC 7 (1-year duty, rural) “…people think the specials are the easy way in…this is 
not the case…” 
The above quote from a Special was a sentiment commonly heard, and 
corresponds with the motivations for joining the Special Constabulary that these 
recruits have. Just because someone has served as a Special Constable does 
not guarantee them a position within the regular police force with them still having 
to go through the full recruitment process for the regulars.  
In order to maintain volunteers’ interest, there needs to be some understanding 
as to why they joined in the beginning.  A 2010 survey of Special Constables 
found that the following reasons provided for why they joined to volunteer: to 
improve their interpersonal skills, gain transferable skills and experiences, build 
their self-confidence, make a difference in their community and gain a better 
understanding of police work (Dash-O’Tool and Fahy, 2010). These findings 
agree with previous surveys conducted (e.g. NPIA, 2010). The motivation of 
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volunteers is essential when considering how to both recruit and retain volunteers 
when financial motivation has been removed. Sociological literature suggests that 
there are a wide variety of factors which can affect volunteer motivation from their 
sense of identity, the attitudes within the organisation, the education and training 
that they receive, role/jobs that they are deployed/did and social networks (e.g. 
Rotolo and Wilson, 2006). Becker and Forbes (2001, p.230-329) argued that it is 
these “…social networks, rather than beliefs, dominate as the mechanism leading 
to volunteering…”. 
Overwhelmingly the main motivation for joining for current Special Constabulary 
recruits is as a means of obtaining a career within the regular police force or 
because they found it interesting and was considering a career within the police 
at a later stage. It could, therefore, be argued that those joining the Special 
Constabulary do so with a distinctive purpose and reason for them selecting that 
particular voluntary organisation rather than the act of volunteering itself.  
5.2 Specials Training 
Initial Training and Probationary Period 
Within the study findings, it appears that police forces have taken on some of the 
criticism raised within the previous literature, with new longer and more in-depth 
initial training packages. It came clear from those interviewed that many Specials 
approved of the new longer initial training weekends and that Specials were 
starting active duties with a much greater grounding in law.  
Temporary SC Inspector (4 years duty, urban) “Our initial training is ten modules, 
covering two days every other weekend…after that you attend mandatory first aid 
and PE which is one day…then we have district training which is four days a 
year…we are asked what is a need, or we ask around as to what it will be on for 
example drink driving, public order, statements…” 
The probationary period and procedure for Special Constables did differ 
depending on the force, ranging from a year to two years. However, all forces did 
have some type of probationary booklet of skills which Special Constables have 
to fulfil to be granted independent status. In some forces, this booklet was called 
a SOLAP while in others it was a PDP. The content varied between forces and 
could change depending on the year. There were some suggestions that the 
longer probationary period could be counter-productive as individuals could lose 
interest and quit during the process.  
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SC Inspector, (7 years duty, rural) “We have a one year probation period in which 
you complete you Solap (probation booklet of skills)…we then complete four 
separate training modules a year usually on a Saturday and Sunday every two to 
three months.” 
 SC 2 (13 years duty, urban) “We have the SOLAP which is the probation period 
and booklet process in Avon and Somerset which can take from 2-4 years…it can 
be onerous…tutor officers are approved by the regulars…and it is signed off by 
the regulars, not specials…it takes too long and it a very difficult and long 
process….taking too long…” 
SC 5 (23 years duty, rural) “Our initial training…when I joined, it was a six 
consecutive weekend course…now they are doing more training, but it is spread 
over months…usually takes seven months to get them through the training…far 
too long…people are losing interest and are quitting during the process…” 
SC 7 (1-year duty, rural) “We have a SOLAP…which is a booklet which has to be 
completed for probation…takes about a year to complete…I got it completed a 
long time before this and had it signed off and everything…yet I had to wait two 
months to have it signed off…” 
SC 8 (1-year duty, rural) “Initial training is about 16 weeks long from August to 
December…every another weekend…it covers most things although there does 
need to be more thought put into it…for example, there was no basic training on 
drink driving…” 
Gill and Mawby (1990) argued that there is a danger that police forces are relying 
upon Special Constables being in the main very committed and enthusiastic 
volunteers, in order to withstand very long recruitment and training process. Many 
of the Specials were indicating that the initial training was particularly long for a 
volunteer to commit to weekends and evenings. For regular officers training, they 
receive weeks of training, full time and are obviously paid for that time as well. 
Volunteers are being asked to obtain a certain level of training around all of these 
other commitments and responsibilities. Then once out of the frontline, these 
volunteers are being asked to deal with the same types of incidents etc. as these 
regular officers despite this difference in training.  
The type of trainer being used was also not identical with some forces using 
Specials to train other Specials during their probationary period while others are 
using force trainers. Other forces are employing regular officers to be Specials 
tutors either in an official or unofficial capacity. Specials trained and mentored by 
regular officers did report a higher level of integration into the regular officer 
teams and a higher level of competence.  
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SC 2 (13 years duty, urban) “….are far more professional, where specials are 
tutored by regulars which means you’re learning curve is much greater and you 
can gain knowledge from the regulars… are less competent to deal with jobs, are 
tutored by other Specials…it was a culture shock moving forces…there was a 
huge difference…” 
 SC 7 (1-year duty, rural) “My probation period is served on response…so I am 
based on response working within a village…I work with “my team”…I have a 
regular tutor…” 
SC 8 (1-year duty, rural) “My tutor is a spotter at football, and experienced SS 
and op support…It is really good system…you can benefit from their experiences 
and knowledge…” 
These findings, therefore, suggest that the use of regular officer as tutors for 
Special Constable recruits is the advantageous way forward for both the skill level 
within the Special Constabulary and for their integration within the police force on 
the whole.  
Continual Development and Training 
An area where the majority of concern was raised by nearly all Specials 
interviewed was further development or continual training, and the general lack 
of consistency and direction of this training across forces. 
SC 9 (2 years duty, urban) “We have one-day training…four training days over 
the years…covering nine compulsory modules…” 
SC 2 (13 years duty, urban) “We receive training every month which is 
mandatory…not compulsory what it is on…what is needed, or practical…this 
training is very good and of a high calibre…” 
In some forces, this additional developmental training was compulsory while in 
others Specials are running it themselves, based upon practical operational 
needs.  
 SC 4 (7 ½ years duty, urban) “The training…rubbish training…second Tuesday 
of every month…always on stuff, you don’t need to know like terrorism, or it is 
repetitive, and useless…there is a missed opportunity…need the space for 
feedback on the knowledge gap…need a wish box of core skills, law changes…” 
Specials indicated that they do not mind giving up a weekend or day for training 
but only if it was worthwhile.  
SC 4 ( 7 ½ years duty, urban) “In the northern district…every station or group 
come together all day on a Saturday…claims yet another weekend on useless 
training…need a social life away from the specials…if I felt like I learnt something, 
it would be worth it” 
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Other Specials reported that now regular officer recruitment has re-opened and 
forces are preoccupied with providing their training and CPD for the Special 
Constabulary has been placed last on the list. 
SC 7 (1 year duty, rural) “We do have some training…it is completed by a regular 
but there are only limited trainers available and regulars training comes first…” 
In other areas, the Special Constabulary has taken over providing their further 
training.  
SC 5 (23 years duty, rural) “We run our own in-house training by appropriate 
trainers brought in…we are left to decide if we need training and what we need it 
on…we are left to organise it…while this is good in that we can ask for training, it 
does mean that sometimes people can go a long time without training…do have 
mandatory training, for example, the PPT and first aid which we do with the 
regulars…” 
While it would appear that there are many courses available to the Special 
Constabulary within forces, it would also appear to be incredibly difficult to get 
onto these courses. The level of training available to Special Constables also 
varies considerably from force to force. Some forces, for example, provide blue 
light response driver training to their Specials while others are only allowed up to 
compliant stop. Driver training, in particular, was mentioned by multiple Specials 
wanting more availability and access as it directly impacts their ability to complete 
duties. It was noted that rural stations managed to get more of their Special 
Constables onto driving course with regular officers directly pushing for them to 
get the training. This may be because it would directly impact the Specials ability 
to support their regular colleagues while on duty from rural, large geographical 
stations.  
SC 10 (2 years duty, urban) “…there are courses available to specials however 
you have to fight for these courses…it’s very difficult to get on…” 
Temporary SC Inspector, (4 years duty, urban) argued “We get driving only once 
on solo patrol…but compliant stop training hard to get on…some have response 
driving course…but it’s extremely hard to get on but possible.” 
Across forces, there was inconsistency as to the training that Specials could get 
and skills they could be utilised. For example, response driving was made 
available to Specials in some forces but not many. Often those within rural 
stations had been granted places on more training as due to the low number of 
regular officers working in their area it was cost-effective for forces to utilise 
Specials to a much higher degree. 
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 SC 2 (13 years duty, urban) said that “There are a few specials who get response 
training, the blue and twos …it are a three-week course, but a very privileged few 
get on the course…something like one or two a year…” 
 SC 4 (7 ½ years duty, urban) “There are courses out there…but it is very difficult 
to get on courses such as PSU or the driving courses…there are no special 
provisions made to let specials do the courses such as the response course 
which is three weeks long…” 
SC 5 (23 years duty, rural) “I am semi-unique in that I have got a response driving 
course…these are available to specials but are very difficult to get on…however, 
due to their being very few regular officers in my station, I can usually always get 
a car…” 
SC 5 (23 years duty, rural) “I also do training alongside other agencies due to the 
variety of duties such as training with the coastguard and mountain rescue…” 
While Specials technically have access to the same training as regular police 
officers; however, the majority of these courses are not for Specials and therefore 
do not make it easy for Specials to gain access logistically. For example, regular 
officers will get paid time to attend training, while Specials would have to take 
unpaid leave from their other occupation.  
5.3 Specials Retention 
The Special Constables interviewed in the course of this thesis, expressed 
concern about the incredibly high turnover of the Specials, especially when forces 
are looking to increase their value for money and efficiency.  
SC 1 (2 years duty, urban) stated “…the turnover of specials is very high…why 
pour money into recruitment when you are not keeping people....” 
Some explained how they had very few Special Constables within their small rural 
station, yet very few were of independent status and others who were, were 
choosing to leave.  
SC 7 (1 year’s duty, rural) “We have eight specials in our station…one in 
training…one HR section officer, two probationers and one special is leaving to 
be a PCSO…we are losing a lot at the moment…” 
The aspirations of those who join with the Special Constabulary were also cited 
as affecting their retention rates in two ways. Those who were successful in 
becoming a regular officer would leave to start their new career, while those who 
were unsuccessful would see no point in continuing as a Special Constable as 
they never intended to volunteer. Specials management are then expected to 
manage these officers. 
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SC Temporary Inspector, (4 years duty, urban) explained: “…retention is a very 
important issue however…we have had a double hit with those getting into the 
regulars and those leaving because they are hacked off…” 
The link with the age of the recruits was also apparent and rose as an issue with 
regards to the type of applicant coming through recruitment.  
SC (7 ½ years of duty, urban) indicated that as the “…age has dropped and as 
such duration has dropped as well…the young get bored…there are more young 
than ever before…need career specials…it is a shame that the force is not 
targeting areas and individuals…” 
In the absence of a coherent retention plan which could target these young 
recruits who fail to join the regulars combined with the continued recruitment of 
the younger age group makes little sense in the long term for forces. With a lack 
of Special Constables with longer lengths of service and independent patrol 
status, the Special Constabulary as a whole are becoming concentrated with 
probationer Specials making it difficult for Specials to manage themselves. In 
some forces where Specials are being left to train probationer Specials, this 
imbalance could mean that single management Specials are looking after 
multiple probationers. Given the large-scale recruitment drives across the police 
forces nationally, with hundreds of applications, forces are not making the best 
use of their recruitment resources.  
While ACPO praised the Association of Special Constabulary Officers (ASCO) 
for their work in devising and introducing a national strategy to increase the 
number of Special Constables in 2008, the actual effects of this are yet to be 
seen. A number of forces acted on a suggestion from ACPO by trying to use 
financial incentives to increase the retention of Special Constables, but on the 
whole, these failed. More recently Winsor (2011) raised the suggestion that 
Special Constables should instead receive recognition for service, with the 
eligibility for the long service medal being reduced to five years from ten, and that 
Special Constables should qualify for police awards. However, it could be argued 
that all these suggestion will ultimately fail to improve retention rates because the 
underpinning problems are that the wrong individuals are being recruited. It could 
also be suggested that those who are receiving the long service medals were 
going to provide long service in any event because they were the individuals most 
likely to stay although no less commendable. The reason that police forces are 
still experiencing a very high turnover among their Special Constabulary and poor 
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retention rates (something found in most volunteer organisations it must be 
noted) is because they are recruiting, on masse, young recruits with many life 
decisions to make, who will understandably move on very quickly either into the 
“job” or as their circumstances change. Until recruitment changes, retention rates 
will not change either.  
Another illustration of the gap between policy and empirical information is that 
despite one of the most common reasons given for resigning form the Special 
Constabulary are the pressures of work or study commitments, forces still appear 
to make it difficult for Special Constables to transfer between forces. If Special 
Constabularies are to become more professional and meet the designated 
standards, there should be no reason why a Special cannot transfer between 
forces easily. Indeed this should be actively encouraged, especially for those with 
long service and rank. 
SC 5 (13 years’ duty, urban) interviewed stated: “…transferring between forces 
was very difficult…” 
The retention of Special Constables has been historically very poor with a very 
high turnover rate, as in any volunteer organisation; however, for the Special 
Constabulary, in particular, this causes problems in costs, training and equipment 
etc. The key point to recruitment and the retention of Special Constables is 
whether they should remain, volunteers or reservists. This factor would play a 
role in what type of individual they should be targeting for recruitment and that in 
turn could lead to better retention rates as recruits would have a clear idea of 
what they are signing up for and to. Overall forces need to have some long-term 
strategic plan in place when it comes to recruitment and retention as both will 
have an impact upon the training, costs and capability of the part-time workforce. 
Most responses by police forces tend to be immediate and short-term, to deal 
with the problem at the time, rather than having a long-term agenda in place. 
Targeted recruitment and a minimum length of service within the Special 
Constabulary before an application can be completed for the regular force may 




5.4 Feeling Valued 
The Specials interviewed reported feeling that there was a lack of recognition for 
all the work and hours that Specials were providing to the forces and their public. 
They felt unappreciated by both the police forces and by the wider public. There 
was in their view, a marked discrepancy between the kind of work they are 
completing, such as dealing with frontline incidents and the perception that the 
public has of them, is that Special Constables only deal with local events such as 
local parades. As can be seen from the data gathered, while that may have been 
the case, it certainly is no longer the case.  
 SC Inspector, (7 years duty, rural) stated “I believe that the Special Constabulary 
should be recognised more…we are never mentioned in the news etc…just not 
recognised really that there are 1000s of volunteers putting their lives on the line 
in their communities…” 
SC 5 (23 years duty, rural) proposed that “It would be nice to get more PR…there 
is an attitude that specials just do fetes…” 
Special Constables also reported not being thanked for their input by police forces 
and generally had the impression that they were considered last by those making 
the wider policing decisions. They also believed that those making an important 
policing decision such as the PCCs had very little understanding of what and who 
the Special Constabulary are. Instead, they merely saw them as a source of 
cheap police labour, and a means to reduce costs. Rather than being seen as a 
voluntary force helping their community, they had become a body of unpaid 
regulars.  
SC Inspector, (7 years of duty, rural) stated that “Our PCC didn’t know anything 
about the specials…when thanking all the police…included the regulars, staff and 
PCSOs but not the specials.” 
 SC Superintendent, (7 years duty, urban) believed “We are losing our 
identity…now just unpaid regulars…” 
 SC (7 ½ years of duty, urban) becoming “Specials are second class citizens…in 
the pecking order, we come below PCSOs…” 
The issue for the Special Constabulary is not a matter of being paid. Interviewees 
just wanted to be treated well, to be provided with interesting shifts, and that if 
these basic requirements were not met, then Special Constables would vote with 




SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) stated: “Specials are a gift not free…” 
 SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) explained “…we are a motivated free force…Gucci 
courses are what keeps us…I use to be in the military, and I’ve worked with the 
TA…it’s about how you treat them…forces want us but don’t want to pay…need 
to spend money to keep us otherwise specials will vote with their feet…need to 
spend smart money on future deployments…keeping motivated 
specials…cheaper to keep people in the long run.” 
The ACPO member interviewed did acknowledge that it was very important that 
the Special Constabulary was not treated as a “spare part”, only to be used when 
needed by the regular police force, but instead, they should be installed as part 
of the wider policing family, becoming integrated into everyday policing.  
ACPO member “The specials are part of the policing family…what duties they 
fulfil will differ between forces, but we need to avoid them being seen as “spare 
part”…Specials should be involved in neighbourhood policing, public events and 
within road policing for example…” 
However, this would not appear to be how the Special Constabulary feels that 
they are viewed. Instead, the data gathered suggested that the Special 
Constabulary believe that they are considered at the bottom of the policing family, 
an after though used when the regular force needs something. 
5.5 Integration of the Special Constabulary: Relationship with Regular 
Officers 
Within this study, the response of the Special Constables asked was in line with 
the previous literature and research into this area. They reported very good 
personal relationships with the regular officer teams that they worked within. 
There were hints from those who had been in place for a while that there had 
been some resentment from the regular force and that in others areas the general 
relationship was perhaps not as good. The connection between Specials and 
response was pointed out as particularly good, especially in areas where regular 
response officers were acting as tutors for Special Constables. For some Special 
Constables in small rural stations, the relationship was also very good due to the 
lack of regular colleague resources, meant that Specials played a significant part 
in making their regular colleague's jobs easier and carrying some of the 
workloads.  
SC Inspector, (7 years duty, rural) “The relationship with the regulars is 
brilliant…there used to be a bit of resentment, but you get what you put in….it’s 
built on trust, once they know that you will muck in and get the job done they are 
really good…I have heard that in Bath itself it is a bit more them and us.” 
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SC Temporary Inspector (4 years duty, urban) “I enjoy response…response are 
much happier to allow specials to fit in…” 
SC 5 (13 years duty, urban) “The relationship between the regulars and specials 
is very good, brilliant…work alongside them and the regular tutors help the 
specials fit in…” 
SC, (23 years duty, rural) “My relationship with the regular officers is very good…I 
hang out with them socially…” 
SC, (1-year duty, rural) “The relationship between the specials and regulars is 
very good…you are straight into the team…always been welcomed…” 
SC, (1-year duty, rural) “I feel like part of the team…if they are short on a section 
they call in a special…” 
SC Superintendent, (7 years duty, urban) “We now have a regular Sgt who comes 
to the specials senior management meetings…” 
However, this did not stop some Special Constables reporting that while in 
general, the relationship was good there was still a small minority who openly 
made it clear they did not like working with Special Constables, and would be 
particular grumpy about working with Specials and were therefore widely avoided 
by Specials.  
SC Temporary Inspector, (4 years duty, urban) “In the main relationship between 
specials and the regulars is good…there is a small minority who have either had 
a bad experience with specials before or dislike working with specials…some are 
grumpy about working with specials…you usually know who these are and avoid 
working with them…” 
Others stated that it could be variable and that the Special Constable had to prove 
their worth and that they were not going to be a hinder for the regular and nearly 
all had heard of other Specials who had not had a good experience with regulars. 
These findings are in direct support of the previous findings by Gill & Mawby 
(1990) suggesting that despite some improvements, nothing much has changed 
between the two forces.  
SC, (7 ½ years duty, urban) “The relationship with the regulars is variable…need 
to show that you are keen to learn, that you ask questions and are proactive…not 
just there to ride shotgun…if you contribute…I feel part of the team, but I have 
heard of some specials having had a hard time…some choose to work with other 
specials because of this…up to the individual and their attitude… the regulars 




Some Special Constables did, however, give some bad personal experiences of 
working with regulars, and that these experiences also greatly affected their 
desire to volunteer.  
SC, (2 years, urban) “…specials are not being able to get cars…which is causing 
arguments between the regulars and specials…” 
SC, (2 years, urban) “When I had been for barely a month…I hadn’t done many 
duties…I was asked by the regular Sgt if I was independent patrol…when I said 
that I was not… he said, “oh for fuck sake now I have to change all the teams”…I 
never wanted to work there again…” 
It seems that despite attempts to make them more integrated as part of the 
policing family, the Special Constabulary still appears to be on the outside of the 
police force. With regular officers jobs under threat through budgetary cuts, the 
very fact that special constables are actively recruited and pushed towards 
frontline policing the relationship between the two could become tense, even if it 
is not seen at the individual level. This is one particular area for further research, 
especially as previous research hints, Special Constables seem to underestimate 
the regulars’ actual feelings of hostility towards them; therefore, this is where 
future research should go.  
5.6 Deployment and Role 
The new development which is addressed here is that the proposals to further 
increase the number of Special Constables coincide with reductions in the 
numbers of regular police officers and other budget cuts. This raises the question 
of whether the role of the Special Constabulary has changed. The interview data 
collected through for this research project tests the hypothesis that the Special 
Constables are being asked to perform duties as if they were regular officers.  
 SC (2 years of duty, urban) stated that “The force is trying to push the special 
constabulary to do more and more as the budgets cuts hit…the turnover of 
specials has been affected considerably by this…” 
As some Specials noted the forces are asking more of the Special Constabulary, 
and as a result, the retention rate of Special Constables has decreased with an 
ever-increasing wastage rate, something further supported in the police strength 
figures (HMIC, 2015). Specials should not be asked to attend or deal with any 
incidents beyond their training or competency. However, a policy to ensure that 
this does not happen relies upon Specials being open and honest about their 
limitations and to ask for additional support. Some forces have tried to ensure 
154 
 
that their voluntary officers were used appropriately by making sure that their call 
management centres were aware of whom the Special Constabulary were and 
that they could not be expected to attend all incidents.  
SC, (13 years duty, urban) however stated that “In (force) we take on a callsign 
like all regulars which mean control don’t know it’s a specials team…we are 
expected to do everything including all the paperwork and files…” 
This illustrates how many Specials are out on duty in the same capacity as their 
regular officer colleagues, and are being deployed and utilised in the same way 
as the regular officers. This suggests that the Special Constabulary are moving 
from being supplementary officers, who are merely backing up regular officers at 
jobs, to being frontline units performing the same job as their regular colleagues, 
essentially as “policing on the cheap”.  
SC Temporary Inspector (urban) said“…the cuts have not necessarily pushed 
specials towards response, but many are already there…we can double the 
numbers of officers on duty…” 
This move of the Special Constabulary towards the frontline, response duties may 
not be the direct response to the budgetary reductions, but a slow move that way 
within the forces anyway, as Special Constables could double the number of 
officers available. However, it could be suggested that with the reduced police 
strength available to police leadership, the Special Constabulary could be seen 
as a considerable increase in manpower available. Some Specials suggested 
that police forces have made their uniforms closer to those of their regular 
colleagues to create the impression that there are twice the numbers of regular 
officers available and on duty to the general public.  
SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) argued that the Special Constabulary were being 
“…moved towards response due to the drop in frontline numbers…politically used 
to make the figure numbers look good…push for the specials to impact on the 
frontline…” 
SC (23 years duty, rural) who stated that “We have moved to wear 
custodians…the same uniform as the regulars…it looks like there are more 
regulars around…” 
This, therefore, suggests that despite the strong messages from police leadership 
that the Special Constabulary is not being used as policing on the cheap to fill the 
manpower gaps, that is exactly what is happening on the ground.  
 An SC (13 years duty, urban) suggested that this change in the role had been 
done through “…there have been subtle changes with the cuts…slow changes, 
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not sharp…more is being asked of the specials…well, it is a huge resource 
available to the force but have they utilised them properly…” 
Special Constables who have been in for a long time stated that Special 
Constables are now being sent to ever more serious jobs, including threats to kill. 
They can be asked to do the job completely by themselves, and are often the first 
police officers on the scene. Some Specials are feeling the pressure.  
 SC (13 years duty, urban) stated that “In () we get sent to everything, for example 
threats to kill, teenagers with drugs…sometimes I am on my own…I have to do 
everything…being the first response, gathering all the information…being treated 
as a response officer…” 
SC (13 years duty, urban) went on to say that, “…expect a lot of their specials 
which is very scary and challenging…huge responsibility…” 
This “policing on the cheap” has put considerable pressure upon a group of 
volunteers who instead of being supplementary officers helping out their regular 
colleagues, are being asked to be free police officers. This is now what the 
Special Constabulary was created for. We see, therefore, a voluntary force being 
used in a reservist capacity. One of the dangers associated with this is that it 
opens both them and the police service up to criticism and possibly to legal action. 
With Specials performing across a wider range of duties there are more 
opportunities for the public to log complaints against them or for them to get 
something wrong through a lack of experience, training or knowledge and there 
is a question whether they feel that the police forces would support them. Apart 
from the concomitant paperwork, these responsibilities may represent exciting 
possibilities for the Special Constabulary but are rightfully the province of the full-
time regular officers with the greater training background. Although it could be 
argued that the Specials who once joined in order to be involved in the fetes and 
parades within their communities as the local Bobbie, no longer exist, this is the 
area in which there is the greatest potential for Special Constables’ to get into 
trouble, a risk having implications not only for the individual but for the police 
forces as a whole.  
 SC  (2 years duty, urban) “My partner is a regular officer…so I know that people 
in the force are down and lacking management…they are feeling really 
unsupported so that morale in the force is at an all-time low…the HR department 
is doing nothing in the face of the threat of complaints…there is no backup from 
the force whether you are a regular or special…” 
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With regards to specialist roles, some forces have trained teams of SC’s who can 
be deployed as and when for specific tasks in support and guided by a smaller 
number of regular officers. For example, prisoner handling teams for football 
matches/public order, car boot raid teams working with training standards, part of 
teams executing warrants and licensed premises checks, ANPR/drink driving 
campaigns, house to house enquiries/elimination fingerprint and DNA teams. 
Some forces are even using the skills of specials from their non-policing 
backgrounds with some allocating specialist roles/activities to individuals who 
have skill e.g. mechanic as vehicle examiner, accountant as a fraud investigator, 
technology specialist fitting covert surveillance equipment, farmer as a wildlife 
officer, gym instructor as personal safety trained, polish speaker as in interpreter. 
This provides an opportunity to motivate SC’s and provide a greater sense of the 
value of their role.  
From the data collected during this thesis, across the four different police forces, 
it would appear that forces are providing the Special Constabulary with different 
opportunities to move into specialist roles ranging from CID: 
 SC Superintendent (7 years duty, urban) provided an example of specialist roles 
within their force “A role outline for specials to work in CID has gone out…the 
PCC is also looking into having a mounted section of specials…not started but 
looking into…also, there are specials working PSU at football events…gone 
down really well as it leaves the regulars PSU free…” 
SC Inspector (7 years duty, rural) stated that “We have Specials who work in 
CID…covering everything from child protection to domestic violence…” 
There did appear to be a difference between rural and urban forces as to the 
likelihood of Special Constables obtaining some skills. For example within rural 
areas in particular due to the geography and nature of the locations, it would 
appear that Special Constables are much more likely to be able to obtain their 
driving qualifications than those within the urban forces. 
SC Inspector (7 years duty, rural) from a rural area acknowledged “We still have 
road policing units…and specials are members of this…all of our specials are 
able to drive…all have E grade driving at least…some have been able to get blue 
light training…regulars are actually pushing for us to get it.” 
So not only are Specials able to be part of the road policing units (units no longer 
existing in some forces) in rural forces, but the regulars are supporting the Special 
Constabulary gaining more vital skills to be able to work at full capacity and back 
up the regular officers.  
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SC Superintendent (7 years duty, urban) stated that “I did two and a half year on 
traffic as one of four specials…I still do the odd op with traffic…operational two 
or three shifts a month…” 
However, while these opportunities are becoming available, they are still rare with 
one Special stating that their career in CID has been unique: 
SC, (2 years duty, urban) “My route into the Special Constabulary has been fairly 
unique…I spent around three months in uniform after my attestation when I then 
moved into CID…I did a CID course and took care of my own workload including 
prisoners, interviewing, putting together files and attending court…now the CID 
section which I was part of merged into the PTU …Public Protection and Youth 
Offender team…which is not really working and they have a lack of money and 
people…one problem is that the team have to cover such a large area covering 
Bristol, South Gloucester and Bath…three enquires can take a full day due to 
having to travel everywhere.” 
In some police forces, the Special Constabulary are being used to provide 
specialist services which otherwise would not be available to the public. Some 
Specials interviewed provide unique examples to their areas where the Special 
Constabulary were being used to provide a service which otherwise would no 
longer be able to exist for example marine patrol.  
SC Superintendent (7 years, urban) stated that “Due to the cuts…the marine 
patrol was gone completely…now we have a team of 12 specials who provide a 
marine patrol on one boat on which the crew is provided…The PCC is very 
interested and keen to continue these marine patrols run by volunteers…the 
specials are filling in the hole…” 
While not specialist roles in the long term there were examples of Specials being 
able to move around different types of shifts ranging from the dog unit, police 
helicopter to custody and even run their own ops such as undercover plain 
clothes operations.  
 SC Inspector  (7 years duty, rural) stated that within their force there “…have a 
lot of plain clothes ops which specials can join in…actually run them 
ourselves…begging ops etc.…” 
SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) said that “I have worked as part of the same team 
since I joined…I’ve tried everything from the dog unit, traffic and I’ve been up on 
the police helicopter…” 
SC (1-year duty, rural) stated that “I have worked in custody…as a requirement 
of probation…it really helped so that I have now helped out on two shifts on the 
weekend if they are short we can be called in to help…” 
One significant discovery related to a “resilience op”.  
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SC Superintendent (7 years duty, urban) “We run a resilience op every three 
months when specials take over all patrol duties from the regulars with specials 
crewed with specials…on a Sunday morning...we can use it as a training op…” 
This kind of police exercise is a training operation to see if the Special 
Constabulary could take over all policing duties within an area if the regulars were 
unavailable. In the context of budgetary cuts and high terrorism alert, this should 
be a source of alarm for both the Special Constabulary and to the public. Although 
it might suggest a potential for more aspects of the policing service to be run in 
their entirety by the Special Constabulary to show what they are capable of, it 
does not mean that this is an appropriate use of the Specials. An alternative 
interpretation would that that some individuals within the Special Constabulary 
leadership are carving out areas in which they can “empire build” rather than 
integrate their volunteers within the regular force. Regulars could well see this as 
an area where the Special Constabulary is stepping in on regulars’ roles and jobs. 
While these are exciting roles for volunteers to provide there are other activities 
such as community policing or neighbourhood policing (as it is sometimes 
referred to) where the strength of the Special Constabulary could be more 
gainfully utilised.  
Most forces are not utilising the skills or expertise which Special Constables bring 
to the force from their everyday jobs. Some forces are now allocating specialist 
roles/activities to individuals who have skills which the force can make use of, 
e.g. mechanic as vehicle examiner, accountant as a fraud investigator, 
technology specialist fitting covert surveillance equipment, farmer as a wildlife 
officer, gym instructor as a personal safety trainer, Polish speaker as an 
interpreter. These are all opportunities for motivating specials and providing a 
greater sense of the value of their role. This is one area in which the National 
Crime Agency to striving to achieve best practice.  
Working Time Regulations 
Interestingly there has been one obstacle to the Special Constabulary increasing 
their hour’s duty, the Work Time Regulations (see Home Office, 2014). The effect 
was most noticeable in one force in particular. 
SC Temporary Inspector (4 years duty, urban) stated “…another area really 
affecting the specials are the work time regulations…which say we cannot work 
past 0300…Avon and Somerset have interpreted this as absolute…if you are 
working past 0300 on a regular basis you are seen as a night worker…and we 
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cannot opt out of this…this is majorly affecting specials hours and in reality, most 
ignore this.” 
SC (1-year duty, rural) also said how “We are not allowed to work past 3 am 
now…we use to be able to do…did something happen?” 
This enforcement of the Work Time Regulations had not been explained to the 
Special Constabulary within that force, with some Specials believing that the ban 
was a punishment for a particular Special who must have done something wrong. 
On other forces, Special Constables were opting out of the Work Time 
Regulations in order to get around it and work past 0300am. However, this raises 
questions around how many hours in a day some Specials are completing, 
bearing in mind the demands of their full-time employment. Police forces do need 
to make sure that some Specials are not at risk if they are completing far more 
hours than they should be. There will be questions asked if, for example, a 
Special Constable falls asleep at the wheel when driving home after working for 
the police until after 0300am, following a full day of employment. This will be 
particularly controversial of other members of the public are involved.  
The fiscal deficit for the UK means that the rising cost of living and food is 
impacting upon the Special Constabulary members within their everyday jobs and 
lives, which has in turn impacted upon the hours they have available to volunteer.  
 SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) detailed that “During the cuts…last year saw the 
most significant change…people cannot commit the hours due to the pressures 
of work…these extra issues have impacted on the specials…in the last three 
months, a canvas showed a significant drop in specials hours…from HR at HQ” 
This combined with more being asked of the Special Constables when they are 
on duty, means that the morale of the Special Constabulary has also been 
affected, especially with some Specials indicating in the course of this research, 
that since the budgetary cuts and reductions, the relationship between the 
regulars and Specials have become increasingly tense. This has led to some 
Specials not wanting to continue to volunteer anymore. A lot of the Specials 
interviewed during this thesis stated that the police forces needed to define 
exactly what they want or expect from the Special Constabulary because this, in 
turn, would have an impact upon how they are viewed and treated by forces as a 
whole and their regular colleagues.  
SC (2 years duty, urban) indicated that “My hours have dropped so that I am 
barely doing the minimum…I don’t feel thanked or feel particularly welcome…” 
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 SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) also detailed how “We have plugged a few gaps, but 
we are a long way off from being a useful officer…force needs to define what they 
expect or want from the specials…hit morale within the specials…only the 
goodwill of people gets us through…need to damage control…” 
SC (1-year duty, rural) argued that “There has been a huge recruitment drive for 
more specials…the force wants it to be 800…this is good, but they should be 
recruiting more regulars not specials…” 
Some Specials argued that although on paper, things might be looking good to 
the police forces top management; in fact, this leadership is out of touch with how 
things are really on the frontline. In particular, they argued, they may be unaware 
of just how much the frontline is being propped up by the Special Constabulary.  
SC (2 years duty, urban) argued that “…the force’s top management needs to be 
in touch with how it runs for specials on the ground…what is actually 
happening…” 
SC (1-year duty, rural) also stated that “The force is getting something for 
free…doing a regular officers job…feel bad about it…” 
5.7 Leadership and Ranks 
Police Leadership Opinions  
When investigating the management of the Special Constabulary, it is necessary 
to consider the voluntary forces internal management system and leadership. 
One area of potential friction between regular officers and the Special 
Constabulary is the effect of a rank structure within the Special Constabulary, 
with even the First Police Advisory Board in 1979 suggesting a separate grading 
system, as it antagonised regular officers. At the moment, a regular, probationary 
officer would be viewed as of higher rank than a senior ranked Special with years’ 
experience. Although the rank hierarchy is present within the Special 
Constabulary, it is not viewed as having any value within the regular police force, 
therefore raising the question as to whether there is any point in having the rank 
structure at all. Therefore another way of acknowledging experience and skills 
could be presented, such as a different title for various roles or experience. For 
example, there could be administrative titles for those looking after welfare etc. 
while experience could be acknowledged by a title or purely via years duty 
served. However, if the Specials move towards being a reserve force, then 
obviously those ranks can remain and become meaningful with a promotion 
process behind them.  
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The ACPO Member interviewed did not believe, however, that there should be 
exams imposed for the Special Constabulary rank structure instead arguing that 
while there should be standards: 
ACPO Member: “Need to have standards, but we must be careful not to 
overregulate the Special Constabulary, they are volunteers…but we do need 
some level of process…they need to say when they are coming in etc.…” 
There is given that there should be a clear understanding that the similarity does 
not make them operational leaders like their regular ranked colleagues. Therefore 
even ACPO has taken the value of the rank away, a making it merely a token for 
Specials. Instead, those Specials with ranks are given all administrative and 
welfare duties to look after within the Special Constabulary. It could, however, be 
argued that the welfare of the Special Constabulary should be the duty of the 
regular force, not passed off onto the voluntary rank structure.  
Senior Police Office: “Have clarified specials leadership role…been very 
clear…specials leadership roles are primarily admin welfare and leadership 
support…command and control come under the regular sergeant…” 
However, even Special Constabulary Chief Officers interviewed acknowledged 
that their ranks mean nothing on the street. This again highlights the controversial 
issue of what is the true function of the Special Constabulary rank structure. 
Indeed it could be argued that policing on the cheap could be a reason as to why 
forces are continuing with the rank structure as they could pay for an 
administrative team to look after the Special Constabulary, whereas the ranking 
system allows them to ask volunteers to do this on top of their volunteering for 
nothing. This is not only a politically divisive issue but also runs the risk of the 
purpose of these ranks within the Special Constabulary being misunderstood.  
The Police Federation has always been against the rank structure in the Special 
Constabulary. The Police Federation argues that regular officers have to go 
through a promotion process which includes exams on the law and an interview 
before a panel to obtain any ranked position. Additionally, once they are 
promoted, they have to take on the responsibilities legally and professionally in 
relation both in terms of jobs/incidents and issues of welfare in a way no Special 
rank would have to. Therefore for many regulars, the introduction of a ranked 




To counteract these negative views, some forces have introduced a promotion 
process into the Special Constabulary. Some forces have introduced an 
application and interview process while others are considering introducing a 
pared-down version of the regulars’ exams. This idea was not supported by the 
interviewed ACPO member who instead argued that  
ACPO Member “…need to have standards but we must be careful not to 
overregulate the Special Constabulary, they are volunteers…but we do need 
some level of process…they need to say when they are coming in etc.…”  
Senior Special Constables felt that the rank structure was working well. However, 
this might be expected as they are in the position themselves.  
One Senior Ranked Special Constable “…feel like the structure works very 
well…we have the right people at the right level…having a similar structure is 
complimentary…” 
Another Senior Ranked Special Constables “Not looking into creating exams for 
promotions…are looking into a matrix style …showing experiences, range of 
things…update PDP, use of force etc…a possibility.” 
The Special Constabulary for the City of London was a very interesting case in 
that they are looking into making their promotion process like that done by regular 
officers in order to make the ranks of more value, although they would still not 
hold operational power. The city of London was investigating into providing a 
version of the exam in which the regulars take (e.g. to lower the number of 
questions or topics). Other forces while reviewing their promotional process for 
the Special Constabulary are not looking to include exams.  
There was some acknowledgement among the senior regular officers that there 
was some individual Special within ranked positions, who misunderstood their 
role and had attempted to view themselves as a ranked individual with regards to 
operational matters as well.  





Specials with Rank 
Specials Constables from across four forces were interviewed in relation to their 
opinions and experiences of holding ranked positions (for a few) and of those in 
ranked positions. Those Special Constables who held a ranked position at some 
point in their police career or were currently within a role did have a clear 
understanding of what the role meant. They all realised that the position was for 
the welfare and disciplinary issues within the Special Constabulary rather than 
for any operational decision making at incidents.  
As one SC Inspector, (7 years duty, rural) indicated “As an Inspector, I have 
responsibility for everything from hours, training, welfare, operational tasks and 
disciplinary issues.”  
It is interesting that the above Specials’ Inspector does state that they were in 
charge of some operational tasks, including Specials, only events and operations. 
So despite what regulars are stating there is some operational value to the ranks, 
just with Special Constabulary events only, nothing to do with the regular force. 
This again means that the police force has created a rank structure which means 
something operationally when it is useful for the force but is second class when 
compared to a non-ranked regular officer.  
Another SC Superintendent (7 years duty, urban) even argued for a harder 
promotional process “Specials ranks are understood to be based around 
welfare…should be aligned with their regular counterparts…there also should be 
exams to move up the rank structure…” 
This suggests that those Specials ranks who do take their position seriously want 
the process to be harder and more aligned to the regulars promotional process 
so that their ranks positions would hold more value and worth with the regular 
force.  
A non-ranked SC (13 years duty, urban) who had held a rank previously was very 
positive about the fact that they “We have an area officer who is an ex-regular 
officer who was in the force for 45 years, retired and then came back as a 
special…” 
It could be that this former officer who holds a ranked position within the voluntary 
force does hold a valued ranked position taken seriously by the regular force 
because they were once a regular officer with many years of experience. This 
supports the idea that by introducing ex-regular officers into the voluntary force, 
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the attitude and value of those ranked positions would increase in the viewpoint 
of the Special Constabulary and most crucially within the regular force.  
One SC (23 years duty, rural) said that “I did become an area officer for a 
bit…inspector level for three years but I then handed it back as I wanted to be 
back out on the streets…” 
This was another common theme that some Specials Constables had obtained 
ranked positions but at some point had decided to hand away from the rank due 
to the fact that the positions had become so administrative heavy and that had 
not been what they joined and volunteered for. This supports a previous 
statement that forces are getting volunteers to administratively look after their 
voluntary force for free, however, that it largely not what people joined to do.  
Non-Ranked Specials Opinions on the Ranks 
This was one of the most interesting and unexpected findings of this thesis that it 
was clear that the non-ranked Special Constables had a very negative 
perspective of the rank structure and those within the ranks. This is, therefore, 
something which police force and the Special Constabulary management, in 
particular, need to review and consider. The ranked Special Constables were 
incredibly unpopular, and the reason for this needs to be ascertained. From the 
interviews gathered, it would appear that this unpopularity to due to the attitude 
of those in ranked positions. The majority of Specials interviewed argued for not 
having any ranks within their organisation, indicating that instead, they would 
prefer to work underneath a regular sergeant.  
One SC (23 years duty, rural) argued that there was no need for ranks and that 
instead, it puts the huge burden upon volunteers “We don’t need ranks…it puts a 
very big burden on volunteers…there is no real need for them…should just be 
placed under the regular response Sgt…” 
Another SC (2 years duty, urban) indicated that posts were not being filled 
because even Specials did not want the role or burden “The Specials 
management…there is no management…nobody wants the positions 
either…there was an area officer position empty for six months…they can’t fill the 
positions because no one wants it” 
It could be that some Specials are choosing not to apply for a promotion because 
they are aware that the regulars do not like their rank structure and that this could 
change their relationship with the regular teams. 
As SC (13 years duty, urban) said: “…the regular officers don’t like the rank 
structure in the specials…” 
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However, other Specials were very blunt about the style of management that they 
experienced from the Special ranks.  
One SC (7 ½ years, urban) argued that all that Special management did was 
send emails “Specials management…send authoritarian emails…rude 
emails…shitty emails…” 
While another SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) “…there has been talking about the 
specials moving to ranks rather than titles in the force…I use the term 
“management” loosely…it is more of dictatorship…building empires…the 
requirements needed are too easy, and the bar should be much higher…the rank 
structure doesn’t work…the Scottish don’t have any…instead the regular 
management should be used…we should be managed by the regulars…be more 
effective…volunteers can’t do it…flawed…there needs to be a degree of 
commitment…lacks credibility…” 
It is not necessarily the case that the pool of potential managers offered within 
the population who volunteer to serve as Specials Constables is very large. If 
they have had no management training for the purposes of their own professional 
careers, then the level of competence of these more senior Specials may be low. 
The designated purpose of their promotion to higher ranks, in terms of 
management and welfare, may be beyond their abilities or level of training. 
Therefore in 2008, a Home Office Green Paper pledged more than £2 million 
worth of funding, directed towards the Special Constabulary leadership. It was to 
include provisions for a leadership training program to develop and enhance the 
capabilities of the Special Constabulary. A Senior Leadership Programme (SLP) 
was therefore developed and delivered specifically for the Special Constabulary 
(College of Policing, 2016). It was developed with the aim to improve their 
understanding of leadership and provided delegates with the ability to establish 
a clear set of values, ethics and standards. It also was intended to enable 
Specials to deal with a range of differing and often competing standards. The 
objective of the Specials’ SLP was to increase the capability of the SC senior 
leadership by equipping them with the skills and knowledge to support and 
influence their chief officers concerning performance and value for money. The 
SLP featured six areas of focus: emotional intelligence, negotiating and 
influencing, values and ethics, performance management, organisational change 
and public confidence (College of Policing). It outlines and explained the current 
styles of strategic leadership, the implications of the current police reforms, 
responsibility, leadership development and management techniques. However, 
this course was not compulsory and in many forces was not provided or even 
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offered. The quality and nature of the management of the Special Constabulary 
are of crucial importance as they attempt to professionalise themselves and to 
prove that they can stand alone as a volunteer force. Effective leadership is a 
goal of the Special Constabulary National Strategy Plan of 2011-2016, but 
currently, there is potential for huge improvement. The findings reported here call 
into question whether or not the Special rank structure should continue. Not only 
is it apparently a source of dissatisfaction, but it places great pressure upon those 
within the rank structure to only volunteer their hours’ duty but to supervise others 
as well. The recent rapid and large scale recruitment of Specials by the majority 
of police forces has left Special infrastructure unable to cope with the structural 
imbalance between having too few officers out of probation to supervisory those 
still within their first two years probationary period. 
An example of this is Northamptonshire Police who had over 462 Special 
Constables by the end of 2015, but only 124 were of independent patrol status 
(Freedom of Information Act Request Response No. 03072015-1). Therefore 
once these new Special Constables are out of their initial training period, the 
pressure to get them through their probationary period is placed upon their 
voluntary part-time supervisors, of whom there are far too few. This could be 
contributing to the number of Special Constables leaving forces or declining the 
opportunities for promotion. Some of those who were interviewed stated that they 
had reached a ranked position but then decided to hand it back, largely to the 
pressure of the work involved becoming too much. 
Overall some forces are investigating the possibility of developing a course 
providing Specials with leadership and supervisory skills. The aim would be to 
improve their understanding of leadership and provided delegates with the ability 
to establish a clear set of values, ethics and standards while being able to deal 
with a range of differing and often competing standards. The objective of the 
Special’s SLP was to increase the capability of the SC senior leadership by 
equipping them with the skills and knowledge to support and influence their chief 
officers in relation to performance and value for money. The SLP featured (1) 
emotional intelligence, (2) negotiating and influencing (3) values and ethics, (4) 
performance management, (5) organisational change and (6) public confidence. 
It outline/explain the current strategic leadership’s styles, the implications of the 
current police reforms, responsibility, leadership development, techniques. 
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However, this course is not compulsory, and many forces do not have something 
like this in place.  
ACPO researched whether the Special Constabulary should have ranks and if 
so, what the structure should be. In 2005 ACPO voted to endorse the adoption of 
a common rank structure using the same ranks as the regular system but without 
the regular insignia, retaining instead the Special Constabularies own widely 
used bar system, however, many forces are only now implementing this in 
2013/2014. Each force still has the decision whether to put in place this rank 
system despite the ACPO vote in 2005 and so far the landscape has been mixed. 
The findings from this study demonstrate some evidence that there are 
differences between the urban and rural stations in terms of the speed at which 
Special Constables are being developed within the promotional process. For 
example, Specials with fewer years’ duty were being promoted quicker within the 
smaller rural stations as they had fewer Specials Constables and fewer to 
supervise. In the bigger urban-based stations, fewer Specials were being 
promoted, meaning that those within supervisory positions had a large number of 
probationers to supervise. This has led to inconsistencies in the experience in 
terms of years of service and expertise, leadership skills and different levels of 
expectations and responsibilities in terms of supervisory duties.  
Summary 
The key findings from the interviews obtained during this study were that Specials 
Constables reported being utilised by multiple forces in a frontline capacity and 
that they felt pressure from the level of responsibility in upholding the law 
especially in terms of their own level of competency. Despite the rhetoric of police 
leadership surrounding the Special Constabulary not being used as policing on 
the cheap, this was how the Special Constabulary themselves felt they were 
being utilised. Some within specialist roles were feeling that they were being 
utilised well and deployed effectively.  
 Training continues to be a significant issue for Special Constables in terms of 
their own level of confidence in being able to deal with multiple types of incidents 
on their own, and how their level of competency affects their relationship with 
their regular counterparts. The more competent they are, the more value they 
provide to their regular colleagues and therefore are more welcome because of 
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it. While the initial training and recruitment process had improved significantly, 
there were still significant issues. Specials reported that for the long-term 
strategic management of the Special Constabulary, the recruitment process 
needed to widen in its remit in terms of the types of recruits. It is suggested that 
recruitment could be targeted out to the wider community to really utilise the role 
of the Special to draw in individuals who might not apply for the police force. For 
example those of an older age 35-45 bracket with a more settled job, life balance, 
or a well educated person in a high paying job not looking for an employment 
change or a single mother looking to do something around childcare. All of these 
individuals would be looking to volunteer within the Specials and therefore stay 
for a longer time period adding stability to the Special Constabulary management 
structure.  
The rank structure within the Special Constabulary was of particular concern for 
the Special Constabulary, especially those not in a ranked position. The findings 
suggest that those who have been promoted have no management training 
instead of poorly managing officers through emails which were often authoritarian 
and rude. This suggests that there needs to be management training and a proper 
promotion process in place to improve the quality of the leadership with more 
responsibility being placed upon Specials their welfare and support are even 




Chapter Six: The Future of the Special Constabulary  
As this thesis has established throughout history in times of financial constraint 
and social unrest, various governments have sought to utilise the Special 
Constabulary within policing of the United Kingdom. A key factor used to promote 
the Special Constabulary has been their position as a cost-effective resource 
available to police leadership (HMIC, 2002) although the appropriateness of 
volunteers being used as such is called into question within this chapter narrative. 
This has often been done in the context of the government seeking to reconfigure 
the relationship between the state and citizen to facilitate the pluralisation of 
public service delivery and by encouraging citizens to become more active within 
their local communities, thereby reducing some of the demand being placed upon 
the public services (e.g. Home Office, 2010; Bullock, 2016). The lack of research 
carried out exclusively upon the Special Constabulary in the United Kingdom 
means that overall there is a lack of clarity around the position of these voluntary 
officers by the police themselves and within the academic literature. The ongoing 
ambiguity and interchanging ways in which the Special Constables are being 
utilised within policing makes it problematic to define. Therefore this current study 
embarked on an investigation to uncover Special Constables perceptions and 
experiences of their role within policing in a time of austerity and financial 
constraint.  
A key question for the public sector organisations, including the police since the 
comprehensive spending review of 2010, has been how to maintain their current 
levels of service during the deep funding cuts. Bullock (2014) argued that it has 
increasingly become clear that volunteers are being used to fulfil the workforce 
gaps left within the forces through reorganisation and redundancy, raising the 
question about the nature of that voluntary role. Back in the 1980s academics 
declared that there was potential for the Special Constabulary to be a dynamic 
force capable of making a significant contribution to the range of policing 
mechanisms available to police leadership (e.g. Leon, 1989). As this thesis 
illustrated historically, there was an argument that as the regular paid police force 
became more prominent and more professional, there was less and less need to 
have a voluntary unpaid police force. The development of the Special 
Constabulary alongside the regular force has been used to justify their continued 
existence as one of additional support for regular officers. However, there has 
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been no clear investigation or consideration of this continued existence and 
demand for the Special Constabulary, and indeed the debates surrounding their 
merits and disadvantages as solutions to various policing problems has had 
minimal contribution to their actual historical use. There has been so little 
investigation and research into the Special Constabulary that their very 
establishment is open to interpretation.  
Today the Special Constabulary has become an integral part of the police service 
and such it has had to adapt and change to continue to meet the various internal 
and external demands and expectations of policing in modern day UK. It could, 
therefore, be argued that the Special Constables who once joined to be involved 
in policing local fetes and parades within their local communities no longer exist, 
and instead, Specials are being utilised nearly exclusively across forces in a 
response reactive frontline capacity. A key finding highlighted within chapter five 
was that Special Constables reported a shift in deployment and roles, from 
community or neighbourhood policing roles, to nearly all being deployed in some 
response capacity. This reflects the same movement of the regular paid 
workforce, with officers in non-frontline roles being redeployed back to frontline 
positions to protect forces reactive 999 response capacity as overall workforce 
resources available decline. This change to the role and duties of Special 
Constables has led to officers feeling significant pressure from the level of 
responsibility being placed upon a voluntary unpaid part-time position, in 
upholding the law. This, in turn, has to lead to many questioning their level of 
competency and ability, especially in conjunction with the lack of continual 
development or training being provided by forces. This increasing mobilisation 
and utilisation of the Special Constabulary upon the policing frontline during a 
time of economic constraint and declining paid full-time resources, has led to 
questions as to whether police leadership are using the voluntary force as a 
means of policing on the cheap. Others such as Bullock and Leeney (2016) 
proposed that the Special Constabulary is merely becoming embedded into the 
mixed economy of policing and present a practical response to fiscal constraint, 
with volunteers long having been used in times of need throughout their history.  
The Special Constabulary provide forces with over 3.5 million hours of volunteer 
contribution within policing, which is an estimated cash value equivalent of 
between £50-100 million (Britton et al., 2016). Police forces would struggle to 
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maintain certain aspects of the policing service if these hours were no longer 
available, so it makes operational sense that they should develop, maintain and 
invest in this voluntary workforce. In order to impact upon the experience of these 
voluntary officers both organisationally and operationally, a cultural change within 
forces in which there are greater appreciation and understanding of the 
motivations, experiences and ability of these volunteers is necessary if forces are 
to make full advantage of this pluralised approach to delivering a policing service 
to the public (e.g. Stenning & Shearing, 2015, p.7). Police forces should be more 
innovative and visionary in re-imagining policing especially in terms of the role 
that the Special Constabulary can fulfil (Britton & Knight, 2016) which in turn 
would shift them from their peripheral position within the extended policing family. 
Police forces could be far more flexible and imaginative in utilising the range of 
skills, opinions and experiences that the Special Constabulary bring from outside 
policing something which the organisation are traditionally have failed to do. 
Rather the organisation tends only to appreciate skills, training and experience 
developed and accredited to policing, perpetuating the cycle of police thinking 
like the police. Some sporadic progress has been made as can be taken from the 
research carried out that Specials are being engaged in specialist areas of 
policing (also see Britton et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2018) yet this continues to 
be ad hoc and merely slotting volunteers within existing roles rather than thinking 
differently. The unsustained growth surge of the Special Constabulary is 
evidence that both nationally and locally police forces have failed to to manage 
their voluntary forces both operationally and organisationally. With the already 
high attrition rates of Special Constables before austerity measures changed the 
nature of the role, rising as forces ask more and more of their voluntary workforce, 
suggests that they have failed to support, develop and build the infrastructure 
necessary to maintain their expectations and experiences. This is supported by 
Whittle (2017, p.137) who argued that forces have focused on recruitment while 
the rate of departures has remained poorly understood or tackled. This 
preoccupation with the number of Specials rather than the overall experience, 
ability or management of them, has resulted in poor levels of feelings of being 
valued, supported, invested in and overall morale.  
For this thesis, and as can be seen in chapter five, a high ranking member of 
ACPO with specific national interest and position with regards to the Special 
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Constabulary was spoken to about their view on the future role of the Special 
Constabulary within policing. This ACPO member was clear when asked directly, 
that the Special Constabulary are not a version of policing on the cheap and that 
they would never be used to fill any workforce gaps as the result of paid 
workforces reductions. This individual also highlighted that an HMIC report in 
2012 outlined how Special Constables were already being used in a frontline 
capacity on response sections during peak or busy periods allowing for greater 
flexibility and resilience during a period of high demand. The findings from this 
current study illustrate clear discrepancies between the rhetoric of police 
leadership and the Special Constables serving upon the policing frontline. 
Despite those within police leadership positions being clear that the Special 
Constabulary is not being used as a form of policing on the cheap, fulfilling 
workforce gaps left by austerity measures, that is precisely how the Specials 
themselves reported and felt that they were being used. Not only this but the 
Specials interviews within this study highlighted that there had been a significant 
shift in Specials being used in times of high demand to nearly exclusive use in a 
frontline capacity.  
This thesis argues that the contribution of Special Constables to policing in the 
21st century is significant, even more so than the police service would 
acknowledge. Specials interviewed illustrated high levels of dedication and 
professionalism in supporting their regular paid colleagues in frontline policing, 
and indeed in many areas Specials were providing that service without any 
support of paid staff. This thesis, however, strongly advises that the Special 
Constabulary must be consistently and continually developed so that they can 
continue to meet the challenges and demands of contemporary policing in the 
UK. The growing complexities of modern day policing is a crucial challenge for 
the Special Constabulary so that these voluntary unpaid part-time officers are 
equipped with the ability and skills to cope with the full range of duties undertaken 
by officers in the course of everyday policing. As those interviews illustrated there 
is almost a complete lack of continued development of Special Constables 
outside of their probationary period, and it is predominantly those within specialist 
roles who feel that they have been trained to a standard to which they can be 
most effectively deployed. Therefore police forces must ensure that the continued 
development of the Special Constabulary is both invested in and prioritised within 
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forces for both non-ranked and ranked Specials. It would also be advised from 
the key findings of this current study that bespoke leadership training for those in 
and going into supervisory positions was provided. To achieve this forces would 
need to reconsider the overall purpose and role of the Special Constabulary 
within policing and the police organisation itself.  
O’Reilly (2016) argued that volunteering within the policing context raises 
significant questions about police legitimacy and accountability, especially 
regarding the pluralisation of the police services. Volunteering in the emergency 
public services has long been a contentious issue, especially with regards to the 
governmental austerity agenda, police budgets and reforms. Unison (the public 
sector union) also drew attention to how police services are quietly retaining some 
volunteers within key roles once performed by salaried staff and the implications 
that may have with replacing employed, highly trained, vetted and skilled police 
employees with volunteers (Unison, 2014). The role of volunteers within both the 
criminal justice system and policing itself means considering the appropriateness 
of using part-time volunteers with limited training to carry out the same function 
as paid regular trained staff, who might be regarded as professional police 
experts. It has been long presumed within the criminal justice system that the 
police are experts in their field on topics such as crime types, crime prevention, 
case investigations etc. yet there is some debate within the contemporary 
literature as to how their obtain this expertise. This debate surrounding police 
expertise is especially timely given that the College of Policing seeks to achieve 
chartered status as the professional body for those working in policing services 
across England and Wales. The purpose of the College as established already 
within this thesis is to provide standards to the professional development of the 
police including codes of practice, regulations and training standards of the 
training itself, development, skills and qualifications held within the police service 
(College of Policing, 2018). The College of Policing is therefore at the forefront of 
the recent drive for an evidence-based approach to policing, and are the hosts of 
the What Works Centre for Crime Reduction, involving the collaboration of 
academics and university consortiums, coordinating and commissioning 
research. The College of Policing has also created regional university networks 
between various academic organisations and police forces, leading to the two 
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working together to provide theoretical and empirical underpinnings to what is 
policing and what they should be doing.  
Research such as that conducted by Collins and Evans (2007) argue that 
expertise is socially constructed while others such as Carr (2010) are outlining 
multiple ways in which individuals can obtain expertise. Carr (2010) for example 
argues that apprenticeship could apply directly to policing as a critical method of 
knowledge being exchanged within the police as novices or recruits being 
initiated into the skilled practice by their peer groups and that peer group, 
therefore, defines the boundaries of that practice. This approach promotes the 
traditional form of learning with expertise being exchanged to novice police 
officers through the police occupational culture and practices with a large 
proportion of their training taking place in practice upon the street and everyday 
aspects of the job itself rather than the classroom. This model of learning enables 
individuals to share the collective understanding of the group and therefore 
develop the tactic skills to apply to any new settings they find themselves in (e.g. 
Collins, 2010; Collins & Kusch, 1998; Dreyfus, 1979). Tacit skills are those 
deemed to be vital elements of mastery where experienced workers draw upon 
everyday activities and extend that knowledge to tackle new or unexpected 
situations (e.g. Evans, 1997). However the College of Policing aims to include 
policing qualifications into the recruitment requirements, this would mean a move 
away from such socially constructed expertise, towards being in line with other 
institutions where skill is examined and tested such as that found within technical, 
medical and law professions. In these cases, the expected standards are 
codified, and entry is via formal examinations, and work is therefore likely to 
maintain the appropriate levels of competence (e.g. Ericsson, 2006, p.3).  
This thesis, therefore, raises the point that if the police are to be seen as experts 
of contemporary policing practices and knowledge, that how can volunteers with 
limited training be ever expected to carry out the same role. In some respects, 
the very fact that volunteers are fulfilling the same position challenges this 
concept of police professionalism and expertise. Historically the police have had 
limited if any link to any formal education or qualification as there has been no 
educational requirement for joining the service, and years of experiences have 
been seen as a critical measurement of expertise. Over time various 
examinations were introduced for promotional processes, something still not 
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included within all Special Constabularies with the odd exception, for example, 
the City of London Specials who had a variation of the same promotion process 
and exams as their regular colleagues undertake. Interestingly there has been 
very little academic attention to how individuals obtain expertise in policing 
despite a general assumption, for example, in courts of law of them being experts. 
If this expertise is to become more quantified, then how can Specials continue to 
exist in their voluntary form?  
As demonstrated in chapter five, the management of the Special Constabulary 
specifically regarding their management by the Special Constabulary rank or 
leadership structure is an area of tension. Many volunteer organisations 
experience issues regarding voluntary management with the contrast between 
the need to develop a systematic structure of management to promote 
accountability, particularly important within policing, and the need to avoid 
bureaucratic and inflexible systems which are often viewed as inappropriate for 
volunteers. A simple example of this tension is that fact that as a matter of course 
within the criminal justice system a Special can be called to testify at court either 
as the arresting officer or as a witness, during a time of their paid employment. 
This can result in volunteers having to take a day off work to attend court, and if 
court overruns etc. this can have a significant impact on their employment. The 
day to day supervision and management of Special Constables serves to 
strengthen their position within the organisation, offering a way in which there can 
be communication between the two forces, better deployment and effective use 
of volunteers when they are on duty and a method for managers to show their 
appreciation for the time and support given. Management structures also provide 
a way through which to distil information about the organisational values, the 
priorities and accepted standards of behaviour, while also providing a mechanism 
through which concerns can be voiced, and opinions can be heard. A well 
organised and run management structure should enable the opportunities for 
Special Constables to reflect upon and develop their performance. Supervision 
is essential especially regarding accountability for the action of these voluntary 
officers while on duty, as the office of constable and powers of arrest etc. that 
come with it are especially powerful making the voluntary position barely 
distinguishable from that of the regular officers. Indeed the only difference is pay.  
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This means that the findings of the current study are of particular significance. A 
key unexpected result regarding leadership and supervision for the Special 
Constabulary, serving Specials interviewed had a very negative perspective of 
both the rank structure and those individuals who hold ranked positions. Those 
within ranked positions were incredibly unpopular, and the reasons for this need 
to be further examined by the Special Constabulary and police forces themselves. 
Some argued that it placed an incredible burden upon a volunteer to maintain 
and meet all the welfare and administrative needs of other volunteers when the 
very nature of volunteering means they have competing demands for their time. 
Due to the nature of being on duty when people have some free time available, 
supervisors often will not be in the station or on duty with those they are 
supervising for months unless they are working the same events etc. It can be 
challenging to keep a proper channel of communication opens between the two 
parties, to be kept up to date with what has happened to that individual, for 
example, do they have any welfare needs after a particularly traumatic incident. 
Instead the person most likely to deal with that Special on the day will be the 
regular supervisor of the response teams on which they are working, so many 
have a better working supervisory relationship with the regular sergeant than their 
Specials supervisor. The extra workload and responsibility of these posts have 
led to many being unfilled in various forces as those volunteering their time either 
do not have that extra time or wish to take on a promotion.  
Other Specials interviewed were unusually blunt and frank about the style of 
management that they were experiencing from those within supervisory or 
leadership positions. Management within the Special Constabulary as illustrated 
in chapter five was described as rude, empire building and done through 
authoritarian emails. Both this and the above paragraph present forces with two 
ways forward for the future. One that they remove Special Constabulary ranks 
altogether as they have done within the Scottish police, or if the rank structure is 
to remain as a source of reward for those putting in the hours and duties, to put 
some promotional process and training in place. If the Special Constabulary is to 
remain the voluntary unpaid policing workforce that they currently are, then this 
promotional process and training will have to take that into account. The time that 
these individuals may have to accomplish all that is being expected of them 
should be acknowledged, and they should be provided with the necessary 
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support to take on the extra responsibility as well. However, if they were for 
example to become a reservist paid part-time force, then they could and should 
be expected to sit the same exams and promotional process as their regular 
colleagues, this would also mean that their ranks mean the same unlike at 
present where even a regular PC rank overrules a Special Constabulary rank. 
This is a critical finding and unique to this study, if the quality and integrity of the 
management structure are not improved then the welfare of these voluntary 
officers could potentially be compromised and their experience of being a Special 
not a predominantly positive one, feeding into the continual retention issue faced 
by the Special Constabularies.  
Failure to manage the Special Constabulary could ultimately lead to 
inefficiencies, increased costs and an increasingly dysfunctional relationship 
between the volunteers and members of the paid workforce (e.g. Johnson, 2018; 
Moynes, 1966; Twelvretrees, 1991). Indeed it is maintained by this thesis that 
police forces need to decide on exactly what role they are to maintain (voluntary 
or reservist) so that a new model of policing inclusive of all the policing family can 
be developed and sustained (Britton & Callender, 2017). In many aspects, the 
professionalisation of the Special Constabulary has already proven that they are 
going beyond that which should be expected of a voluntary workforce and 
suggests a slow development towards becoming a reservist police workforce. By 
becoming a perhaps a reserve paid workforce, the Special Constabulary could 
request that forces provide a monetary investment into resources and training for 
the Special Constabulary, especially in leadership and management skills. It is 
submitted by this thesis that police forces are currently operating haphazardly on 
the basis that they are utilising the Special Constabulary in a reservist manner, 
yet without the protection, training or support that a paid reserve force would. This 
very fact is becoming counter-productive regarding Special Constabulary 
recruitment, retention and deployment, and exposing Special Constables to legal 
and psychological and physical dangers. The general public sees no distinction 
between the regular paid police force and the voluntary Special Constabulary and 
indeed regarding uniform and powers, there is none, meaning they will place the 
same demands and expectations upon volunteers as those who carry out the role 
as a profession.  However, if the Special Constabulary is to remain voluntary, 
then there is a strong argument for complete removal of the ranked positions 
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within the Special Constabulary. Instead of like that seen within the Scottish 
police, Specials are alternately placed in teams under the supervision of regular 
sergeant as part of their usual regular paid teams, making Specials ultimately 
more integrated as part of the regular police force. There would, therefore, be a 
full-time supervisor who could work with them on a consistent basis and be a 
single point of contact for those Specials. If the voluntary ranks hold no 
operational standing or authority and they are having, as the current research 
attests, a negative impact upon Specials experiences of volunteering, then they 
should be removed. Other means of reward and development would, therefore, 
need to be provided such as further specialist training, greater integration and 
involvement within policing that they wish to be part of. As volunteers, then less 
pressure should be applied, instead of more opportunities and experiences 
provided if they so want. 
A vital contribution of this thesis is recognising the fact police forces need to 
provide the framework or infrastructure through which the Special Constabulary 
can be utilised effectively and efficiently while being focused in areas where they 
could be used to add the most value. As the Special Constabulary grows, there 
will be increasing pressure for Specials to get more varied roles to fit their unique 
capabilities, meaning that there needs to be an overall strategy to ensure 
Specials are not in competition with other members of the policing family. Integral 
to the professionalisation is the continued development of their skills and 
knowledge (ACPO, 2011, p.3). Training continues to be a significant issue for 
Special Constables, suggesting that not enough has been learnt from the limited 
literature available on the Specials. However, they did acknowledge that that 
initial training and that provided within the probationary period had improved 
significantly and that they were overall happy with the standard of recruits’ ability. 
However, nearly all Specials across the four forces interviewed stated that 
continual professional development such as they may receive in their paid 
employment had fallen away and indeed in some areas was utterly non-existent. 
Indeed it is the lack of this type of continual training that led to Special Constables 
having a lack of confidence in their level of competency and the level perceived 
by their regular colleagues. The Specials interviews argued that a significant 
change had been felt and observed since austerity measures began, is that 
Specials are being expected to attend a vast range of incidents on their own 
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without the support of regularly paid colleagues, without any means of knowledge 
checking their skills, ability and law knowledge since probation, leading many to 
feel under pressure. It should be considered here that while Specials themselves 
may question their ability to attend and deal with such incidents, their actual ability 
has not been investigated. Overall Specials stated that if they were provided with 
ongoing training, they would be more competent and therefore be of better or 
more value to their regular colleagues, helping them to be made more welcomed 
because of that ability. Specials reported feeling like a burden upon regular 
colleagues when they were unable to do certain aspects of the job, through lack 
of training and felt that regular officers would be less inclined to work with a 
Special because of that fact. Indeed the only Specials who reported being trained 
and kept up to date regarding their knowledge and ability where those in 
specialised roles. This suggests that when forces have a reason and priority to 
invest in a Special, then that training is and can be made available. This highlights 
the importance of forces investing in and prioritising the Special Constabulary 
regarding preparation for them to become more effective overall.  
This thesis found that for police forces to develop an effective long-term strategy 
for the deployment, management and motivations of Special Constables, they 
must clarify the nature of the role within policing and the police organisation. 
Special Constables are a form of volunteering with amateur, part-time voluntary 
officers giving up their free time against the rigour, regulations and 
professionalism of police work itself. The Special Constabulary themselves 
outlined that they must continue to adapt and change to meet the internal and 
external demands and expectations being created by contemporary policing 
(National Strategy for Special Constabulary, 2008). The National Strategy for 
Special Constabulary (2008) established that there is a need for the Special 
Constabulary within modern policing, arguing instead that forces needed a 
framework to ensure that they were being utilised effectively and efficiently so 
they could be focused in areas where they could add the most value. With the 
service changing rapidly reflecting the various changes happening within society 
and with new approaches and technologies being created, every aspect of 
policing is being challenged and tested for its relevance and value for money; the 
Special Constabulary must define their purpose. The Special Constabulary needs 
to find an opportunity to play a valuable, cost-effective and differentiated role 
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integrated with and alongside the regular force. With Special Constables 
contribution to policing demonstrating the high levels of dedication and 
professionalism already present, they need to be supported and developed to 
ensure that they can face the challenges of modern policing. This means that 
police forces need to value their voluntary forces not only regarding the 
commitments they provide the force and their communities but in investment 
terms as well (e.g. NPIA, 2010).  
It has been demonstrated throughout this thesis that contemporary police forces 
are operating in a competitive, performance-driven field with rising demands 
created by both the public and budgetary constraints. Besides some local 
variations, the Specials need to have a clear and unambiguous role, as Specials 
need to be able to understand what is expected of them and also where they 
stand within the force as a whole. This clarification could result in greater 
integration as both the regular officers and Specials would be aware of the 
boundaries of each other’s role and what could and should, therefore, be 
expected of them. While they carry out the same duties and hold the same legal 
powers as regular police officers, Special Constables remain outsiders in the 
“police family”. The concept of a police family was initially used in the late 1990s 
in England by Sir Ian Blair in a speech to the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(Where do the police fit into policing, Blair, 2007, p.176). While the concept of an 
extended policing family has remained central to debates around the future 
direction of policing, the term itself remains ambiguous (Johnston, 2007, p.134). 
This lack of integration has been seen with other groups such as Native American 
police officers in America never being fully integrated into the police society or 
occupational group (e.g. Gould, 1999). Atkinson (2013) also found that the “them 
and us” culture existing within the police organisation (see police occupational 
culture) reflects the asymmetric distribution of power in the service. Special 
Constables have been excluded from membership of the unions such as the 
Police Federation, who have historically been vocal opponents to the continuation 
of the voluntary force, especially on the frontline. However, as a sign of the 
changes taking place within policing in the UK, the Police Federation did 
acknowledge more recently that due to the difference in the role of the Special 
Constabulary that it would be appropriate for the Specials to have some 
membership within the Federation or at least the option. However, in 2016, the 
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Home Office ruled out changing the law to enable them to join the Federation. 
This is significant regarding the support available for Special Constables as they, 
therefore, do not receive the same access to legal representation, advice and 
support both legally and welfare wise that a regular police officer would in the 
same situation. Instead Special Constables are covered by an insurance deal 
between forces as Arc Legal for some issues relating to on-duty incidents, 
however only to a particular monetary value and not if the matter about them 
being suspended was not in the course of being on duty as a Special Constable. 
This is a significant point for Special Constables and one which should be made 
incredibly clear to all joining their ranks, especially when specific incidents or 
rulings could have an impact not only on their continued role within the police but 
potentially their paid employment as well.  
Back in 1990, Gill and Mawby (1990) argued that the Special Constabulary 
needed to consider the advantages of having national machinery in place to 
represent the views, experiences and interests of Special Constables. This has 
become increasingly important as their role has expanded upon the frontline of 
policing, yet there is incredibly little consultation by forces with the Special 
Constabulary on various ideas, policies and strategies which affect all. Recently 
the formation of a limited company called the Association of Special Constabulary 
Officers seeks to provide and become a national voice for Special Constables 
across the UK with the SC Chief Officers and others from each force being 
involved. ASCO was established in 2005 to represent all Special Chief Officers 
yet in 2018 they elected to become the representative organisation for all Special 
Constables regardless of rank. The various stakeholders involved with ASCO 
include the Home Office, College of Policing and ACPO who work alongside 
ASCO to allow for some consultation and informed impact upon different policies 
etc. Within the context of this thesis, ASCO could potentially become an active 
voice for the increasingly frontline position of the Special Constabulary within 
policing of the UK and as such all the challenges and impacts that those types of 
roles and incidents play upon officers. There is a real opportunity for the voices 
and needs of the Special Constabulary to be heard at the top level of policing and 
police organisations something historically not achieved. ASCO also presents an 
opportunity for various Special Constabularies from across the UK to compare 
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and learn from each other, obtaining greater consistency, transparency, overall 
sustainability and professionalism to the Specials across the country.  
The Special Constabulary is the only group outside of regular officers who hold 
the full powers associated with the office of constable and therefore can be 
deployed to have a significant impact upon a broad area of public concern 
(National Strategy for Special Constabulary, 2008). Special Constables are in 
general competent and willing policing resources which if used effectively and 
efficiently could potentially increase the effectiveness of the police service overall. 
The data from previous exit questionnaires and limited academic research all 
indicated that general underutilisation and a lack of variety regarding deployment 
had led to Special Constables leaving or reducing their duty hours. Interestingly 
in the context of this current study, it would appear that Specials are now being 
utilised in a response reactive capacity through which they are experiencing a 
wide variety of incidents and jobs yet are not being provided with the skills or 
training necessary to feel competent to deal with. Some expressed concern over 
the responsibility and pressure being placed upon Specials in this time of 
austerity to match the performance of regularly paid colleagues without the same 
support, guidance, training or management. This suggests that things have 
changed since the previous research, yet the infrastructural issues remain to 
place voluntary officers in a, particularly vulnerable and precarious position 
especially legally.  
These findings contribute new insights into the management and deployment of 
Special Constables illustrating that fact that the planning, management and 
support of Specials activities could enhance their fulfilment from the role and 
overall feelings of being valued. For Specials to be utilised and deployed as part 
of the whole police service rather than on an ad hoc basis, there needs to be 
reliable, adaptive information about the availability of Specials so that when they 
come onto duty, they can be briefed and deployed efficiently and effectively. 
Special Constables duties are primarily shaped by their availability with peak 
times for Specials availability centred on standard working hours, so particularly 
around the weekends and evening hours. This, to some degree, coincides with 
peak demand for forces surrounding the late hours of the weekend, which is an 
apparent significant advantage to police forces. Some forces are utilising 
IT/online internet based systems where Special Constables can log on from at 
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home to define their duty hours and the ability to send out text/email alerts to ask 
officers to come in on duty/task specific duties and events. For example, when 
there have been significant public emergencies and natural incidents such as the 
recent flooding and snow when Special Constables specifically turned out during 
the working week to assist. As Specials often start at different times to regular 
paid officers, meaning that briefings are often missed or not completed leaving 
out relevant information. Facts such as these are essential for Specials to feel 
valued as those in charge of that shift need to take on the responsibility for 
managing the Specials when they are on duty, to ensure that their welfare and 
value is upheld such as thanking them for their work. It is therefore vital that the 
activities of the Special Constables are planned and managed as a means of 
enhancing their fulfilment of the role.  
“…there is a need to ensure a more consistent, national approach to special 
constabulary recruitment, induction, training and development practice to help 
professionalise the role and to further enhance their mobility and flexibility as a 
resource.” 
(HMIC, 2003, para 7, p.101) 
What the Special Constabulary do is of significance to the police service and 
government discourse primarily because of the implications for officer wastage 
(Leon, 1991). Indeed the focus upon their potential position within neighbourhood 
policing seemingly recognised the importance of deployment in motivating and 
retaining Special Constables (NPIA, 2008, p.13). As subsequently found within 
this current study, the NPIA (2008, p.13) also noted that “Specials deployed in a 
challenging specialist or responsible roles have longer service than those 
deployed in less demanding tasks”. This corresponds with the findings for this 
thesis with those working in specialist positions reporting having a higher level of 
training and support which in turn made them feel valued, yet those working in 
the heavy demand frontline are not feeling the same. It would appear that 
specialist roles make Specials feel like the force was investing time and training 
into Specials allowing them to obtain the skills to feel like a useful resource.  
A critical overarching theme within this thesis is that police forces need to clarify 
the role of the Special Constabulary within policing and to do this forces must 
decide whether they should remain voluntary or move towards becoming a paid 
reservist force to meet the 21st-century modern day challenges facing policing in 
the UK. Currently, as this thesis illustrated, Special Constables are being 
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expected to carry out the same duties as regular police officers and are subject 
to the same sanctions in the event of their failure to carry out those duties 
correctly, without the benefit of the full training available to regular officers. This 
is further compounded by the fact that they cannot, in the event of being subjected 
to disciplinary action, access a level of support equivalent to that available to 
regular officers by reasons of their being denied membership to unions and other 
groups such as the Police Federation. Due to this, it could be proposed that the 
Special Constabulary should become a paid, part-time reserve force with force 
investment into their training and membership like any part-time regular officers 
to such unions. The nature of policing has changed since the establishment of 
the voluntary force, and therefore, this is a time to reconsider. In the context of 
the growth of the Special Constabulary in recent years, this has not been matched 
by any increase or reform of the organisational or support infrastructure (Whittle, 
2014, p.37).  
Historically in the UK, there has been a consideration for different operational 
models for the Special Constabulary, for example, Gill and Mawby (1990) 
exploring the possibility of dividing the Special Constabulary into two tiers. The 
Scottish Police Advisory Board in 1975 suggested the idea of creating a two-tier 
approach within the Special Constabulary with the first reserve being trained and 
available for a range of police duties under the guidance of a regular officer and 
could involve retired regulars returning in a voluntary capacity as Specials. The 
second reserve would then be more limited with less complicated, less varied and 
arguably less difficult duties with the focus being on those who are unable to offer 
a consistent commitment (ibid). A similar two-tier structure was also advocated 
by former Metropolitan Specials in a Bow Paper (Peterson & Axworthy, 1983).  
“A case can be made for the splitting of Special Constabularies into two 
branches and rationalising training accordingly. The first would set out to attract 
young careerists and concentrate on policing skills, being mainly deployed on 
Friday and Saturday night shifts, with as close an integration with the regular 
force as possible-a slightly older but the unpaid form of police cadet. The 
second could concentrate primarily on the community orientated role, attracting 
older candidates, and could be deployed on Neighbourhood Watch, property-
marking fairs and fetes and other public relation initiatives.” 
(Leon in 1989, p.15) 
However, ultimately this two-tier structure was rejected due to concerns that any 
restructuring would lead to the formation of a second class Special from the 
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viewpoint of the regulars, Specials and the public. The creation of a two-tier 
structure would also require separate administration and management structure, 
which would seem to be an unnecessary burden on forces (Gill & Mawby, 1990). 
Instead, Gill and Mawby (1990) argued that there was much greater scope for 
the integration for Specials within the present structure through the effective 
deployment of Specials. More recently, Harron (2005) also argued that police 
forces needed to move beyond the historical view of the Special Constabulary 
and that means placing them where they could work at the most effective level. 
For example, very few Specials throughout most force areas are authorised to 
drive police vehicles over and above the basic driver classification, leading 
Harron (2005) advising forces to train a minimum of one Special Constable as 
driver trainers cutting costs in the long term. This could lead to better use of 
resources, and increase police profiles with the possibility of traffic sections 
capable of being self-sufficient (Harron, 2005).  
The proposal to move the Special Constabulary from that of a voluntary workforce 
to a reservist one has been proposed at various times during history, more 
recently by the PCC of Northamptonshire Adam Simmonds in 2013. PCC 
Simmonds suggested that having reservist who could work at least 20 days a 
year alongside police officers and could be expected to be called upon at a 
moments notice, based upon models in Northern Ireland and the Territorial Army. 
This proposal, however, was never put into motion after some resistance from 
the force both regular and Specials. The Special Constabulary has long been a 
voluntary unpaid police workforce, and if they remain as they are, then there is 
an argument for their embedment within neighbourhood policing such as the 
Special Constabulary Strategic plan (2008) argued. Their core role in the past 
could be to provide a visible local reassurance link between the police, the public 
and local businesses and communities. With the removal of regular police officers 
away from community-based initiatives onto the frontline, then there is a 
significant gap opening up at the local level for the Special Constabulary to have 
a substantial impact. The National Strategy for the Special Constabulary (2008) 
argued that Specials could utilise their local knowledge and experiences and 
provide a key element to policing by strengthening the local intelligence gathered 
and provided the public with the public reassurance and visible patrols that they 
demand. Neighbourhood policing is a manpower-heavy function requiring officers 
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to be very visible within the local community, and with funding and resources, 
both declining this remains an area where the Special Constabulary could 
become the critical visible presence.  
An example of a force utilising the Special Constabulary in this function is West 
Mercia. West Mercia decided to outline clearly that the Special Constabulary are 
volunteers who with training had a primary role in assisting and supporting their 
local divisional policing teams, and with some local exceptions, they would be 
posted and deployed as members of the Local Policing Teams. As identified 
through the National Intelligence Model and priorities created through PACT 
community engagements Specials will be deployed alongside the local policing 
teams under the leadership of the on-duty regular sergeant. Any Specials in 
supervisory positions are then expected to assist the sergeant in the supervision 
and coordination of the Special Constables in their teams. West Mercia force was 
also evident that Special Constables are not deployed on independent patrol until 
a minimum level of training had been completed and other training such as data 
protection, IPCC complaints system and victim care for examples. West Mercia 
police do not expect their Specials to attend or deal with any incidents beyond 
their training or competency. However, this relies on Specials being open and 
honest about their limitations and asking for any additional support. Members of 
the call management centres were also made aware that Specials were a 
volunteer force who do not have the same level of training as regularly paid 
officers and therefore should not be expected to attend all incidents. By 
acknowledging the voluntary nature of the role, West Mercia had decided to have 
a clear neighbourhood based part where the voluntary role can be protected and 
developed. However, it would be interesting to see since the austerity measures 
have been in place for some years now, whether this is still happening within 
West Mercia.  
By keeping the Special Constabulary in their voluntary capacity, there still needs 
to be a clear and differentiated set of responsibilities identified within this thesis if 
the proper value of the Special Constabulary is to reached and the volunteer’s 
motivation is maintained and developed. If forces are to continue to utilised the 
voluntary force as they currently are, then the ambiguous role of the volunteer 
backfilling the resulting workforce gaps with no clear agenda will result in them 
continually being underutilised and their full capability never being reached. Other 
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public providers such as the National Crime Agency are already making use of 
particular Specials with expert skills, with volunteers being targeted recruited for 
those skills, for example, financial experts, cybercrime. Harron argued back in 
2005 that there is ultimately little point in spending public money on recruitment 
if forces are unable to provide suitable training, development and management, 
all problematic yet operationally essential issues for the Special Constabulary. 
The findings from this current study highlight that these continue to significant 
problems for the Special Constabulary and indeed forces have failed to make any 
improvements in this area, suggesting that perhaps the Special Constabulary’s 
voluntary capacity needs to be reconsidered.  
Public participation within policing is not unique to the UK, and there are many 
variations of volunteers working within police organisations often referred to as 
auxiliaries, reservists and even Specials in the British colonies (e.g. Button, 
2012). Some key examples of the two can be seen within the United States of 
America who have both reservist and auxiliary police officers. Auxiliary police are 
unpaid, uniformed volunteers like Special Constables yet they do not possess 
any policing powers, while reserve officers are paid, wearing police uniforms, 
carry firearms in many states and possess the full police powers (Larson et al., 
2008). British influences within the many American States, even after 
independent was obtained meant that many local based initiatives survived (Gill 
& Mawby, 1990) with for example Boston establishing a mixture of the night 
watchmen and daytime constables being introduced in 1823 (Lane, 1967). Today 
the USA retains its mixed police force with variations and differences across the 
individual states with Federation, National and local police forces. These 
variations can also be seen within the reserve forces, for example, St Louis 
reserve police having full police powers and the power to carry firearms, while in 
New York they have no policing powers (e.g. Johnston, 1992a). Research into 
such police forces has recently raised concerns over reserve forces carrying 
firearms with various examples of reserve officers overwhelmingly using them in 
the course of their duties (e.g. Guion, 2015).  
In the UK some of the vital volunteer reservist forces include the Royal Naval 
Reserve, the Royal Marines Reserve, Territorial Army Reserve and the Royal Air 
Force Reserves (Derbyshire Police Volunteer Reservist Force Guidance, 2018). 
The Ministry of Defence (2014) indicated that the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve 
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and Territorial Force saw active service as far back as World War I with members 
of both being deployed at home and overseas, playing a significant role in some 
of the most famous battles including Gallipoli (1916) and Ancre Valley (1916). By 
the end of the First World War saw approximately 70,000 Navel Reservists and 
1,000,000 Army Reservists being called to service (MoD, 2014). The successful 
use of volunteers in support of the armed services saw the creation of the 
Auxiliary Air Force between World Wars I and II, with all three services being 
deployed all around the world. Indeed like the Special Constabulary, the uniform 
of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve officers was modified to match that of their 
Royal Navy counterparts due to their contribution by 1942 (MoD, 2014). The 
Auxiliary Air Force formed in 1924 was responsible for the first German aircraft 
being shot down over British waters and over the mainland (ibid). Today there 
have been many large-scale mobilisations of all three services with operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan by 2004. The reservist also assisted and supported on the 
mainland with 2,100 reserve personnel supporting the police for the 2012 London 
Olympic Games. Corresponding with the austerity measures being felt by the 
police and other public services, plans were announced in 2013 to have 3,100 
Maritime Reserves, 30,000 Army Reserves and 1,800 Royal Auxiliary Air Force 
Reserves by 2018 (MoD, 2014).  
Many of the issues facing the Special Constabulary are also things for 
consideration regarding the reserve military service, with Basham and Catignani 
(2016) examining the factors that shaped and influenced the commitment of 
military volunteer reservists, in particular, those which also affect their family lives 
and the pressures of their civilian employment. Reserve soldiers taking part 
reported that they were receiving increased training of a better standard, with less 
repetitive and boring classroom-based training (Basham & Catignani, 2016). 
Basham and Catignari (2016) also found from their interviews that the missing 
and critical variable to sustaining the reserve forces into 2020 was their family.  
The fact was for many volunteers, it was becoming increasingly difficult for them 
to separate their voluntary role from the other significant life commitments, and 
this was having a substantial impact on their family life. This could also be a 
variable impacting upon Special Constabulary retention figures, with volunteers 
perhaps choosing to leave due to the difficulties with juggling multiple 
commitments and the impact that can have upon both their family/personal life 
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and their paid employment. This could be proposed as a strength of moving to a 
reservist force, as this paid time volunteering would allow for more balance 
against the paid employment, but the above findings suggest that this would not 
solve all issues such as family life balance, especially with a higher demand in 
the level of service for those in a reserve. The current study did not delve into the 
family balance for Special Constables, and this would be an area of interesting 
further investigation.  
The Keeping Enough in Reserve project (2018) key findings suggest that the cost 
of maintaining a reserve identity needed full recognition while the Negotiating 
Civilian and Military Lives (2018) study also found that reservists capacity to serve 
is dependent upon their time and energy. Some Special Constables in previous 
studies such as Gaston and Alexander (2001) indicated that Specials were 
worried that being paid would take away from the nature of them giving their time 
up to do some good within their community and that it would change the way 
others thought they were motivated. It would appear though from the research 
around paid military reserves that while the pay was a consideration, it was not a 
major motivational factor for volunteers to continue to give up their time. It was, 
however, the motivation for their negotiations with their families, and the pay for 
some members allowed them to shape their civilian careers around their military 
service (Negotiating Civilian and Military Lives, 2018). This means that police 
forces by changing the nature of the Special Constabulary into that of a reservist 
force and providing them with a level of pay; this would allow individuals greater 
flexibilities as to the time of the duty hours and types of duties they can do. This 
would be beneficial for forces in having more flexibility to utilise this part-time 
workforce at other times during the weeks other than key weekend evening slots. 
Interestingly the reasons provided as to why individuals chose to volunteer within 
the military reserves are incredibly similar to those given by Special Constables 
such as “In my daily line of work I would never be in a situation where I have to 
think that quick(ly) on my feet and have to be so physical…This is why I’m 
enjoying the Reserves; this is the kind of thrill that I don’t get in my day to day 
job” (Reservist Motivations to Serve, 2018). Although a critical difference between 
the military reserve and the Specials regarding motivations are the number of 
statements provided by Special Constables with altruistic motives such as giving 
back to the community or making their communities a safer place.  
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Volunteer reservists are committed and motivated to serve, with the military 
experiences a wide range of people in a variety of different career trajectories 
form employed to unemployed, singe/in a relationship, or children/no children 
(Reservist Motivations to Serve, 2018). This again could be of advantage for the 
Special Constabulary as by providing a level of pay, this could allow some 
individuals the opportunity to become involved in policing which otherwise they 
could not have. For example, a single mother may be able to provide time as a 
Special Constable reserve as the pay would allow her to pay for childcare. 
Someone unemployed may be able to commit lots of hours duty to the reserve 
police due to receiving a pay incentive when otherwise they would need to spend 
all their time findings paid employment. This could, therefore, allow the police to 
tap into specific pools of potential recruits or individuals who previously would not 
have joined, increasing their diversity. Overall retention rates are police forces 
biggest problem with regards to the Special Constabulary, with the scale of 
departures recently leading to some forces abandoning their recruitment drives 
as there have been no overall voluntary workforce increases. Nationally the police 
forces have purged Special Constables at a higher rate than they can recruit 
them, leading to an overall decline in the numbers across nearly all forces. For 
example, in 2017, there were around 13,502 Special Constables nationally, now 
by March 2018, there are only 11,690 (Home Office, 2018).  
Another possible reason for why the national large-scale recruitment drives by 
forces have been so inadequate in increasing the overall number of Special 
Constables could potentially be an insufficient consideration to the views of the 
Special Constabulary themselves. The National Strategy for the Special 
Constabulary (2011-2016) reported that there is still a lot of work to be done to 
make sure that the Special Constabulary is part of the overall police decision 
making process. A one Special who spoke to the BBC on the guarantee of 
anonymity stated “There are so many unhappy and unsupported and rarely 
valued officers…the lack of help and support for the special constables is mind-
boggling…who would want to stay and volunteer in an organisation that shows 
no respect or helps their volunteers” (BBC Report, 2017). Therefore there could 
be some reasons as to why these numbers have fallen so dramatically. It could 
also be suggested that as budgets across the sectors have become more 
restricted, including the commercial industry, Special Constables feel obliged to 
191 
 
give their paid employment priority. However, this thesis suggests that these 
reductions are primarily down to infrastructural issues outside of career change, 
such as recruitment into the regular force. Despite large numbers of Specials 
being processed through the recruitment and training across the police forces, 
there has yet to be an investment into the creation of a sufficient infrastructure to 
manage and support those within the forces. Once out of initial training at force 
headquarters and move out into their local stations, there have been issues with 
an imbalance in numbers between those out of probation and able to supervise 
those in probation. This has created some situations where recruits are unable to 
go out on duty because there is nobody availability for them to crew with, and this 
imbalance has placed enormous pressure upon the Special Constabulary 
management rank structure. The responsibilities being placed upon them is the 
management of high numbers of trainees, training requirements while on duty, 
welfare and expectations of those recruits, a pressure that should arguably not 
be placed upon unpaid volunteers.  
To remedy this, reserve police forces could propose a minimum length of service 
required before people can move on to join the regulars paid forces; for example, 
this would be a suggested two years minimum. This would also allow for the 
creation of a higher skilled, motivated force being available to police leadership 
and could make it easier to move individuals back and forth between the regularly 
paid force, and paid part-time reserve as the training and standards would be the 
same. This means forces have a more versatile, flexible workforce to meet the 
variations in modern-day policing demands. This ability to move between the two 
forces could also produce a higher degree of integration of officers, by increasing 
their knowledge base, experience, training capabilities and most importantly their 
social, occupational standing as regular officers would also be working within the 
reserve. This would force regular officers to re-evaluate the Specials as a policing 
workforce. To achieve this, however, would require a change in the law to enable 
a paid reservist police force, something which many of those interviewed in the 
course of the current thesis though would highly unlikely to ever happen. As one 
interview senior regular police officer (4) stated “The law doesn’t allow them to be 
a reservist force at the moment…cannot demand people to come out…have to 
ask…would have to be a fundamental change and the government doesn’t have 
the appetite for it”. The ACPO member interviewed also firmly believed that the 
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Special Constabulary should remain a voluntary organisation arguing that when 
asked Specials had not wanted to be paid, but instead rewarded for the work that 
they were doing. However it could also be argued that it is in the interest of police 
force to maintain the status quo as they are currently getting policing on the 
cheap, with Specials providing the work of a reserve force, but without the 
investment and cost from the forces. It could also be argued that Specials are not 
being rewarded for what they are doing despite rhetoric from police leadership as 
the interviews from the current study highlighted and that if a paid reserve at least 
some monetary acknowledgement of that work would be available to them.  
However, in the course of this researcher’s experiences and opinions, this move 
is already starting to happen just in the very nature of the professionalisation of 
the Special Constabulary in its voluntary form. Policies are being proposed that 
would see Special Constables carrying Tasers, meeting specific requirements in 
fitness alongside their regular colleagues, and a growing movement for them to 
specialise within specific needed roles in forces. All of these moves suggest that 
even if not strategically planned, in the long term, this move from voluntary to 
reservist would not be so significant. Police forces need to consider an overall 
plan within policing both organisationally and structurally regarding the Special 
Constabulary to provide a clear description of their role and what duties they are 
expected to perform. A more explicit structure would then shape what educational 
standards are required to fulfil that role, with a comprehensive level of awareness 
of the knowledge and expertise already present within the Special Constabulary. 
The level of skills available could then be increased if recruitment could become 
more targeted like that of the National Crime Agency. As the access to training 
continues to be a particular barrier to Special Constables and aggravating 
feelings of being undervalued  
Driven largely by economic necessity, the public services are all striving to do 
more with less, less money and fewer resources. Each represents a various 
component of the criminal justice system, with their definitions of demand and 
organisational goals which they are striving to achieve all affecting each other’s 
austerity plans and reorganisations. The corresponding connection between 
these different criminal justice nodes has led to the development of responsibility 
for crime prevention (Bullock, 2015) with public services, non-state agencies and 
individuals to become the co-producers of crime control (Garland, 1996). As a 
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critical example of the public becoming involved in the criminal justice system is 
the role of the Special Constabulary, a role adapting to the circumstances of 
modern day policing. Special Constables are exposed to the same 
organisational, operational hazards and occupational stresses that are an 
unavoidable aspect of police work (Hart & Cotton, 2003; Zhao et al., 2002). While 
historically the Special Constabulary has been a voluntary unpaid police 
workforce, it did not start as such and by what means does not have to continue, 
if it was not the best structure for modern day policing. If the police are to keep 
having a meaningful impact on crime levels, these reduced resources must be 
directed more efficiently and effectively. One strategy would be to lead resources 
into a preventative approach to reducing the demand for police services in the 
first place. In the next few years, the shape and adaptivity of police forces to deal 
with these changes will be what matters, rather than the size of the budget 
provided. With reforms and recommendations being proposed for the complete 
overhaul of the police from their workforce numbers, pay and conditions and 
operational structure, many of these changes have direct implications for the 
Special Constabulary. If the Special Constabulary is to remain a voluntary force 
rather than reservists, then the position in which they can logically place to have 
the most significant impact would be within neighbourhood policing. However, it 
has been demonstrated throughout this thesis that the Special Constabulary 
should become a reservist force to protect these part-time officers within the 
context of contemporary policing. This research highlights the importance of 
obtaining the perspectives of the Special Constabulary as they have much to offer 
within criminological research, raising awareness that the opinions and 
experiences of these voluntary officers should be considered regarding how 
policing and the police are evolving and adapting to modern-day challenges. This 
thesis demonstrated the willingness of Special Constables to contribute to 
academic literature and studies, with them demonstrating how open and eager to 
share their experiences, however, the fact that they were unwilling to be recorded 
suggests that the relationship between the voluntary force and regulars is not as 
friendly as stated. To end this chapter and thesis, this study illustrated the role 
that the Special Constabulary are now fulfilling calls for a change into the 
fundamental nature of the part-time police officer, and it is the stance of this thesis 
that they should become a reservist force to ensure the training, support and 
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CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS 
Project Title 
The Strategic Management of Special Constables: The Future of Policing. 
Details of the Project 
These interviews are being conducted as part of a scholarship funded doctorate thesis 
for a PhD at the University of Exeter. The final thesis will be held by the University.  
This study is investigating the developing role, function and personnel who make up the 
Special Constabulary. The Special Constabulary is a volunteer force of part time police 
officers who work alongside their regular colleagues since the beginning of the public 
police as we know it. In the current economic and political environment that Britain 
finds its self, the public police are facing massive changes to their organisation, and as 
part of this, the role of the special constable could also be about to change.  
My interest in this subject is driven from my own experiences from being a special 
constable for nearly five years in Exeter. I myself am interested in the direction that the 
special constabulary is going to go.  
Contact Details 
If you have any further questions with regard to the project, your interview or feel that 
there is something which I should know, please do not hesitate to contact me or my 
supervisors. 
Researcher: Ms Ashley Frayling, Law Department, University of Exeter, Devon, UK.  
 Email: ajf218@exeter.ac.uk: Phone: 078********. 
Supervisor 1: Professor Jenny McEwen, Law Department, University of Exeter, Devon, 
UK. 
Email:  
Supervisor 2: Dr Liz Trinder,  
Email: 
Confidentiality 
At all times your interview data will be kept confidential both in audio and transcribed 
form. The data will be used for the use of the project detailed above, nothing more and 
no third party will have access except where the law requires. The interview data will 
appear in the final thesis in quote form.  
If requested you can have a copy of your transcript which you can comment on and edit 
if you so wish (for this please supply your email address). At the end of the process you 
are also entitled to a copy of the finished thesis if you so wish.  
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All data will be stored in accordance to the Data Protection Act and will be destroyed 
after five years. It will be kept on a private, personal password protected laptop and 
personal password protected university files.  
Anonymity 
At all times, the interview data will be held and used anonymously. Within the final 
thesis it will be seen in quote form with reference to rank or title from a certain force or 
area, expect when the title can be used to identify the person. 
Consent 
I voluntarily agree to take part in and provide my consent for my data to be used for the 
purpose outlined above. I have the right to withdraw this consent at any point during the 
study by contacting the researcher.  
TICK HERE:      DATE…………………………..... 
 
Note: Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data 
 
Name of interviewee:....................................................................... 
Signature: ......................................................................................... 
Email/phone:..................................................................................... 
Signature of researcher…………………………………………………. 
 















Telephone +44 (0)1392 263365  
Fax +44 (0)1392 263196 









02 September 2019 
Ref: <Ref>  
RE: The Strategic Management of the Special Constabulary: The Future of Policing. 
Dear 
I am a Criminologist currently researching a PhD at the Exeter University Law School. The 
research is titled The Strategic Management of the Special Constabulary: The Future of 
Policing. I am investigating the role of the Special Constabulary within the changes that are 
currently being made to police forces across the country. Government cuts to the policing budgets 
will make the role of the Special Constable key in the allocation of front line resources. 
I am seeking your help to contact the relevant people within your force to interview Specials about 
the role they are currently fulfilling and what role they may play in the future. Key individuals 
involved in the leadership and management of your Specials will be of special interest. I would 
also like to interview you as well, as to your personal vision for the Special Constabulary within 
your force. 
My passion for this subject has come from my role as a Special in Devon and Cornwall 
Constabulary where I have served for the past 6 years. I believe that it is a very important aspect 
to policing and one which has been almost completely overlooked in the academic circle. I will be 
producing observations and recommendations from the evidence and information gathered and 
all forces involved in the study will get a copy of the final research.  
I look forward to your response, 
 
<Yours sincerely> 




If you have any further questions about the study please contact me or my research supervisor from the University. 











INFORMATION SHEET FOR INTERVIEWS 
The Project 
These interviews are being conducted as part of a doctoral thesis called “The Strategic 
Management of Special Constables: The Future of Policing”.  
The public police in the United Kingdom are currently undergoing major changes to 
their organisation in terms of structure, organisation, operations and personnel. Brought 
about by the current economic and political environment these changes could mean 
significant changes to a small group of officers within the police force.  
The Special Constabulary is a volunteer force of part time police officers who have 
worked along regular officers since the beginning of the public police as they are today. 
Recently brought to public attention through various recruitment drives, the Special 
Constabulary has previously been largely unknown, and in terms of research this is still 
so.  
The aim of this study is to investigate the role and function that the special constabulary 
could play in the police force with these changes in place, and how these changes will 
affect the Special Constabulary itself. By understanding these factors, this study 
proposes to provide some recommendations on how best to manage the use of Special 
Constables within the criminal justice system.  
Your Participation 
As a voluntary participant in this study you retain the right to withdraw at any point 
during the interview or study. To do this tell or contact the researcher by the contact 
details provided.  
Your interview will be confidential and anonymous. The audio recording is for my use 
only and will be transcribed under an anonymous number. At all times 
rank/position/title within a force area will be the method of reference, except if this 
could identify an individual. In this incident only rank/title/position would be referred 
to.  
All data gathered will be kept on private, password protected computer systems 
including the University system and the researcher’s personal laptop. This data will be 
kept for 5 years anonymously under the Data Protection Act when it will then be 
destroyed.  
The information gathered from the interviews will then be used anonymously in quite 
form within the final written text of the final doctoral thesis.  
Thank you very much for taking part in my study, your time and opinions are greatly 
appreciated. If you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Ms Ashley Frayling (Law Department, University of Exeter, Exeter, Devon) 
Email: ajf218@exeter.ac.uk 
Phone: 0787******* 
 
